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

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The *Naval War College Review* was established in 1948, and is a forum for discussion of public policy matters of interest to the maritime services. The forthright and candid views of the authors are presented for the professional education of the readers. Articles published are related to the academic and professional activities of the Naval War College. They are drawn from a wide variety of sources in order to inform, to stimulate, and to challenge the readers, and to serve as a catalyst for new ideas. Articles are selected primarily on the basis of their intellectual and literary merits, usefulness and interest to service-wide readership, and timeliness.

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NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

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Our cover: Four (!) F/A-18 Hornets of the U.S. Navy's "Blue Angels" fly in right echelon formation during the Quonset International Charity Air Show held 28 July 1991 at North Kingstown, Rhode Island. This striking image was captured by Mr. Jeffrey Yount of the Personnel Support Detachment, Newport, Rhode Island.

The Secretary of the Navy has determined that this publication is necessary in the transaction of business required by law of the Department of the Navy. Funds for printing this publication have been approved by the Navy Publications and Printing Policy Committee.

"The Foundation. . . has enabled the War College to provide services to its students, faculty, and staff that would not otherwise be possible. Its influence has permeated to almost every corner of this school."

President's Notes

THERE IS A GROUP OF DEDICATED MEN AND WOMEN who for the most part remain in the background but nonetheless provide a great deal of dedicated support to the Naval War College. I have decided to introduce you to the great work that they do through this quarter's President's Notes because their assistance is evident in just about everything we do here. I can tell you that I personally am very grateful for their help since without it we would not be able to do many of the things that make this College such a special place.

The Naval War College Foundation began its service to the College in 1969. It was the brainchild of Vice Admiral Richard G. Colbert, U.S. Navy, during his tenure as thirty-fourth President of the College, and a small number of civilian friends. Over the ensuing years, the Foundation has grown from its founding size of 176 to its current membership of 2,100 and has enabled the War College

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Admiral Strasser holds a B.S. from the Naval Academy, two master's degrees from the Fletcher School, Tufts University and, from the same school, a Ph.D. in political science. He graduated from the command and staff course at the Naval War College in 1972. He commanded the USS *O'Callahan* (FF 1051), Destroyer Squadron 35, Cruiser-Destroyer Group Three, and Battle Group Foxtrot. His seven years in Washington included two years in the office of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.

to provide services to its students, faculty, and staff that would not otherwise be possible. Its influence has permeated to almost every corner of this school.

The pillars on which any successful graduate-level institution rest are its faculty and library. The Naval War College is certainly no exception. Our civilian and military faculty is of the highest caliber, and the library was specifically singled out by our accrediting body as a particular strength. Both the faculty and the library have been generously supported over the years by the Foundation.

The Foundation assists with academic research, travel, and the presentation of scholarly papers so essential to having a faculty that is conversant with current academic developments. Fellows in the Center for Naval Warfare Studies, along with an annual conference sponsored by the Center's Oceans Law and Policy Department, are supported by the Foundation, as are the research efforts conducted by the incumbent of the College's Stockton Chair of International Law.

Support given by the Foundation to the College's library is provided annually in the form of three grants. One is for the purchase of missing periodicals, another for the restoration and preservation of rare books and other library materials, and the final one is for the library's world famous Naval Historical Collection, which contains many valuable books and manuscripts.

For many years the War College has held a conference or symposium in November between our first and second trimesters and again in March between the second and third. These one or two-day sessions cover topics of great interest which are not treated in depth in our basic curricula. The November conference traditionally deals with ethics issues while the March meeting has covered military-media relations, military-congressional issues and, this year, Total Quality Leadership. Distinguished speakers under the sponsorship of the War College Foundation journey to Newport to assist our students as they grapple with these tough issues. Additionally, we are most fortunate to have members of the Foundation join us as our guests during these between-trimester activities.

Six times each year the College is the scene for an evening lecture presented by a well-known expert discussing a topic of current interest or one not emphasized in our core course. We rely totally on the Foundation to support this evening lecture program, which consists of presentations in the Contemporary Civilization series, the Admiral Raymond A. Spruance Memorial Lecture, and the International Lecture. These lectures are open not only to our students but also their families as well as friends of the College in Newport and the surrounding areas. These presentations are extremely popular with our civilian neighbors, particularly during the long New England winter.

Recent participants in the Evening Lecture program have included Vice Admiral and Mrs. James B. Stockdale, Mr. Lee Iacocca (Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer of the Chrysler Corporation), Ambassador Thomas R. Pickering (United States Permanent Representative to the United

Nations), His Excellency Shaikh Saud Nasir Al-Sabah (Ambassador of the State of Kuwait), Mr. Tom Clancy (well-known author), and Mr. Richard Underwood (advisor to the National Aeronautics and Space Administration on photographic matters for the manned space program).

The Foundation also provides invaluable help to the Naval War College Press, which is the College's publishing mechanism. The Foundation has supported the publishing of twelve books (including the College's centennial history in 1984 entitled *Sailors and Scholars*), with two more in preparation for publishing. The Foundation also sponsors an annual award for the three best articles published during the previous year in the *Naval War College Review*.

Founder's Hall, the original site of the Naval War College, currently is the home of the Naval War College Museum, which also benefits from steady Foundation support. In general, the Foundation provides some operational assistance for the Museum, one of Newport's popular tourist attractions, and also helps to collect suitable items for museum or exhibit display.

Other projects and areas which the Foundation generously supports include the sponsorship of awards for students at our June graduation ceremony, the coordination of alumni affairs activities for the College, and supporting a biennial conference associated with our senior international college.

I think the above discussion serves to highlight the impact of this organization on our quality of life in Newport. We are indeed fortunate to have such a dedicated group of selfless individuals who are interested in our activities and anxious to assist. They certainly enrich the Naval War College experience for our students, staff, and faculty, and make this a more academically pleasant place to be.



JOSEPH C. STRASSER
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy
President, Naval War College

Individuals interested in obtaining more information about the Naval War College Foundation may contact the Foundation's Executive Director at (401) 848-8300 or by writing the Executive Director, Naval War College Foundation, Naval War College, Newport, R.I. 02841-5010.

The New View from Russia

Captain Dan Moore, U.S. Navy

AS CHANGES RAPIDLY UNFOLD in the former Soviet Union, new opportunities present themselves ever more frequently to gain insight into a nation that not long ago was essentially closed to us. Such an opportunity occurred in a recent war game at the Naval War College sponsored by the Chief of Naval Operations's Strategic Studies Group.

For over a century gaming has been a basic analytical tool at this War College. Game planners devise situations that force people to think about and act upon the issues of concern. The players—who in policy games such as this one would be scholars, civilian policy makers, and officers—assume roles and interact with each other through decisions the results of which are judged by control teams. Generally the discussions of the players in each "cell" while they work up their plans are at least as valuable as their final decisions, and certainly are more important than the final result of any game.

Formerly, when games were designed to gain insight into the policies of the Soviet Union and the likely Soviet reactions to events, Western experts played the parts of Soviet leaders. In this case, however, the "Russians" really *were* Russian. Six Russians and Ukrainians, each of them previously a government official or academic fellow in Soviet international institutes, participated. Their contribution greatly enhanced the interplay among the other sixty players in a "futures" game that explored how changes in U.S. naval forces might affect the framing of American security aims and the ability of the United States to satisfy those aims.

This article is a distillation of Russian deliberations and decisions during the recent game. Bear in mind that our data sample is small and was provided by individuals who may, at worst, be only on the fringes of actual movements in Moscow—but may also, at best, represent the majority opinion of policy makers there today.

Russia will continue to focus its security interests within its borders, concentrating on economic development, institutional restructuring, infrastructure

Captain Dan Moore is a nuclear-trained submarine officer currently assigned to the Strategic Studies Group, which is directed by Dr. Robert B. Pirie, Jr., and reports to the Chief of Naval Operations. Captain Moore will report to the Joint Staff for duty in July 1992.

fabrication, and ideological reorientation. Geography has not changed: Russian policy is still affected by the need for access to the sea, and the nation comprises a large and cumbersome landmass that is still hamstrung by problems of communications within its borders. The approach to the rest of the world will be four-fold: encouraging capital investment from the West; diversifying ties with the world's major economic regions; dissuading any single country from dominating any specific region contiguous to Russia; and preventing any nation from drawing Russia into a regional conflict. Most efforts in foreign relations will be focused on the other nations of the Commonwealth of Independent States (C.I.S.) and in supporting the United Nations as the world arbiter.

Russia is not now confronted by any major threat to its internal security. This is due in large measure to its still-formidable deterrent forces, both conventional and nuclear, and its non-dependence on foreign oil. In fact, Russia considers its essential social challenge to be in its own border regions—educating Slavs living there about local Moslem, Turkic, and oriental cultures, and investing in these regions in order to smooth the sharp societal edges. Further, local threats from neighbors (Ukraine, Poland, China, and the Central Asian states) are limited. Inherent ideological, ethnic, nationalistic, or tribal differences with these regions can be handled diplomatically in all foreseeable eventualities; only agitation in these border regions by an external movement, such as Islamic fundamentalism, could threaten serious instability, i.e., threaten Russia's national security. Russia considers its neighboring former sister republics as "special buffer states" and will give them the economic and security support that such an important relationship deserves. In general, Russian security policies will be dominated by a desire to maintain a stable, "least demanding" international environment.

Conflicts in other world regions will constitute only a secondary threat to Russian interests. Russia will participate heavily in multinational security arrangements that respect national sovereignty and a stable world order. With the strengthening of its economic ties to the rest of the world, Russia would increase its efforts to ensure the safety of its sea lines of communications, especially in the western Pacific, and participate in international maritime forces to guard against piracy and other contingencies that might hamper free movement on international waters. Keeping in mind the need for clear policy guidelines for standing multinational maritime forces, Russia will establish explicit rules of engagement to preclude being drawn unnecessarily into war.

Russian armed forces will be drawn down to reflect the changing role of military force in the national security equation. The Russian military will be downsized to a force of about 1.4 million personnel. Its basic principle of minimal sufficiency in a defensive orientation is as much a recognition of economic reality as it is an acquiescence in a new fundamental military strategy. The main functions of the Russian military will be to prevent conflict on its borders, deter

aggression against Russia and the C.I.S., maintain readiness to defeat a persistent aggressor, and help the C.I.S. against recognized security threats.

As presently agreed, the nuclear weapons now in Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan ultimately will be dismantled or returned to Russia. In the nearer term, the Russian nuclear force will consist of small numbers of intercontinental and submarine-launched ballistic missiles and tactical weapons, predominately nuclear bombs for aircraft. The total number of warheads will be about two thousand. Nuclear forces will remain under unified, centralized (i.e., Commonwealth-level) command, and would comply with all treaties and international agreements.

"Russia is interested in seeing U.S. presence around the world continue—primarily, it presumes, a naval presence, supported by. . . rapidly deployable contingency forces at home."

Army forces will be restructured into more mobile, lighter components than now exist. They will retain some power-projection capability, and will be withdrawn from their current border deployment positions to garrison and training regions well inside the Russian boundaries. The four major base areas would be southwest of Moscow, the Volga region, near Novosibirsk, and near Khabarovsk in the Far East, from where these highly mobile, airborne-capable units could respond quickly to any threat.

National air defense will consist of sophisticated air surveillance systems covering the entire country, with surface-to-air missile complexes near major urban and industrial centers.

As to naval forces, the Baltic, Black, and Northern Fleets will be secondary to the Pacific Fleet, and the Caspian Flotilla will be cut back. Total force structure, including submarines, will be reduced. With new procurement, ships will be fewer but more sophisticated. The navy will be tasked to defend merchant and fishing fleet activities; some capabilities for long-range oceanic ("blue-water") operation will be maintained for this role. Russians see their navy as a mechanism that can draw Russia closer to the West through integration into Western security organizations. By participating in Western naval exercises (which the Soviet Union previously considered so dangerous) they can minimize further chances of anyone trying to harm them.

Air forces will be of a size commensurate with the requirement to defend other branches (with attack and fighter aircraft) as well as to maintain a strong reconnaissance and transport capability. The inadequacy of the internal national infrastructure (lack of extensive rail and highway networks in the central and eastern regions) not only causes but shows the reliance on well-developed air capabilities.

Efforts at providing an equivalent to the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) will continue, with the building of five missile interceptor complexes for defense against medium-range ballistic missiles. These missiles will be built and kept in garrison, not to be deployed unless necessary. Russia would be interested in cooperating with a great-power accidental-launch protection system.

Defense budget priority will be given to space systems, mobility of conventional forces, command and control, communications and intelligence, sea control, and SDI. Forces and force structure will be geared for defense and for use only in conjunction with multinational, coalition forces. Procurement of new systems will be curtailed significantly. Much of the defense spending will be shifted to research and development—basic physics, computers, materials, biotechnology, and engineering systems.

The strategy underlying Russia's national security is to build the economy. Moscow will be willing to compromise *some* military strength in comparison with Western nations in return for geopolitical stability. The biggest task facing its industry is "retooling" from a military basis to commercial industrial applications. Progress here would greatly aid in developing a market economy based on a convertible currency.

While there is great uncertainty regarding the prospects for developing a satisfactory and viable market economy in Russia, there remain three foundation stones upon which the best chances for success lie: first, Russia is rich in natural resources; second, the country possesses a highly educated work force; and third, there is an excellent opportunity for international participation in Russian development—a prospect that appeals directly to the strengths of the Western and Japanese economies. The government must take the lead in massive infrastructure construction. While private corporations will benefit from the building process as well as from the new systems themselves, central planning may be the only institutional strength left over from the previous regime.

Future world security problems will come from an "arc of crisis" that covers the Maghreb (northwest Africa), the Levant (the eastern Mediterranean littoral), Southeast Asia, and Indonesia. This will result in a North-South orientation, with the developed national power blocs of the United States, the European Community, and Japan facing the burgeoning populations (and poor living conditions) of predominantly Moslem areas. Tribalism and indifference will prevent Sub-Saharan Africa from being of more than moral interest, and the great oceans will, in the Russian view, keep any South or Central America issues from influencing Eurasia.

Russia is interested in seeing U.S. presence around the world continue—primarily, it presumes, a naval presence, supported by prepositioned equipments for ground forces in various locations and by rapidly deployable contingency forces at home. Russia envisages cooperation with U.S. forces through participation in routine naval exercises and in task forces oriented towards merchant ship

and fisheries protection, action against drug trafficking, counter-terrorism, and imposition of U.N.-mandated sanctions (such as currently exist against Iraq).

Russia recognizes and supports the *present* (1992) U.S. role in world events. While both countries are superpowers by virtue of their strategic nuclear arsenals, the United States is the only global power. Russia now understands also that American withdrawal from overseas would invite other countries to fill the gap. This would not be manifested by a parade of regional armed forces quickly moving in as the last American went home. Rather, at the first inkling of destabilizing local unrest, at a level too low to trigger the concern of U.S. policy makers, locally strong regional actors (e.g., China, Iran, France, Argentina) would take the lead. While the debate was still being joined in America, new military forces would have filled the void and established the manner in which regional security matters were to be resolved. Russia recognizes the value of having the United States engaged from the very start in these matters (diplomatically as well as militarily), in that, as can be said of few of the world's nations, the United States lacks imperialistic aspirations or any desire for territorial gains.

Russia believes the most unsettling threat to international security as a whole, if not directly to itself, will come from entities smaller than states and not related to states. These factions will continue to attempt to influence nations, to gain a legitimate voice, and to obtain some recognition and affirmation of their causes. Russia assesses that the issues of these "non-state players" cannot be resolved by great-power politics, but rather by examining the *root causes* of the strife and incorporating solutions on the national level. The greatest fear is that these non-state entities will gain control of some source of great leverage, such as nuclear weapons, or of a scarce and inelastic resource, such as oil or water.

With regard to proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, Russia supports and will support denying access to such weapons and delivery systems to any additional nations, and encourages worldwide adoption of a no-first-use policy. These initiatives must be organized through international cooperation.

Russia does not, however, want to relegate the entire role of world leadership to the United States. While the presence of the U.S. as the predominant power in the world is recognized, Russia still sees an overriding necessity for the other great powers (Russia, the "G-7" economies, and China) to remain consultative, and for the formulation of the international security agenda to remain collective.

Clearly, responses from the Russian cell in this game were markedly different from those the world had learned to expect during the Cold War from the U.S.S.R. They shed light on some specific ways that at least these particular Russians think that their country may have changed. It was not possible for them to address every issue during the game, and some of the most significant (such

as the precise relationship of Russia, and of its conventional military forces, to the Commonwealth of Independent States) remain ambiguous. Notwithstanding, the deliberations and decisions reflected here deserve close attention as indications of voices speaking today in the new Russian nation.

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To U.S. Defense Department Subscribers
of This Journal:

The U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) has decreed that beginning 1 July 1992 standardized mailing addresses will be used by all its commands and activities. After 1 January 1993 post offices will return to the sender all mail from one official DoD address to another unless it is in the standardized style.

We will know the standardized addresses of the naval operating forces and those other subscribers who are on the Standard Navy Distribution List (SNDL); those addresses will be updated automatically.

However, *all other subscribers using official military addresses for the subscriptions* will have to tell us what their new addresses are; for we have no other way of learning what they will be. Most such subscribers (commands and organizations) will soon receive a biennial validation mailer from us required by the U.S. Postal Service. It will ask for an address—indicate the standardized one. If you do not get a mailer but use a DoD address for your subscription, please contact us directly.

Our own new standardized address will appear on our masthead when we learn it (presumably the Autumn 1992 issue). Official DoD mail intended for us must use that address as of the end of this year. The mailer has, of course, the old address; it will be good if mailed before then.

All other subscribers (i.e., not in the U.S. defense department) will receive their copies of this journal in plain English and may write to us, as they always have, at the Naval War College, Newport, R.I. 02841-5010.

Yet it is a well-known thing that you can never get from bad to good through what is better, but always through a worse state of transition. . . . Through worse to better!

Ivan Turgenev
Smoke, 1867

Pacific Garrison or Contingency Force?
Implications of the New National Security Strategy for the Marine Corps

Lieutenant Commander Sam J. Tangredi, U.S. Navy

PRESIDENT BUSH'S ANNOUNCEMENT of his vision for a new national security strategy for the post-Cold War world, on 2 August 1990 at the Aspen Institute, was initially overshadowed by an event on the other side of the world—Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait. However, with the ensuing Gulf war victory and the diminution in the Soviet threat, the administration's plans to reduce the overall size of the Department of Defense by almost one-third started to receive deserved attention in Congress and in the press. Today, with the dissolution of the Soviet Union itself, it is clearly time for strategists, defense analysts, and military officers to analyze and discuss the implications of the new planning for our force posture. Since American defense reorganization—particularly reorganization characterized by sharp fiscal reductions—has historically entailed a reassessment of the role and mission of our smallest but most elite service, the United States Marine Corps, it is appropriate for all members of the navy-marine corps team to direct their attention to the inevitable and enduring public policy question: where does the marine corps go from here?[1]

Objectives of the New National Security Strategy

The Bush administration's future defense plan, outlined in a series of speeches and congressional budget testimony by defense officials, is not yet solidly fixed—it is still evolving.[2] This is evidenced by the fact that until very recently the plan lacked a permanent name. The titles Aspen Strategy, New National Strategy, New Military Strategy, and Reconstitution Strategy have been used alternately to describe the proposed program. (For the purposes of this article, the abbreviation NNSS will be used to designate the administration's New

Lieutenant Commander Tangredi is the executive officer on the USS *Fort McHenry* (LSD-43). This article was written during his year as a National Security/Federal Executive Fellow of the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, Stanford University. He holds a Ph.D. in international relations and is a frequent contributor to journals.

National Security Strategy plan.) Even before the NNSS crystallizes, however, it is obvious that a significant reorganization in the Department of Defense will occur.

The objective of the strategy is to adjust American military posture to the apparent disappearance of the Soviet threat as such and to reduce defense expenditures to the anticipated requirements of the post-Cold War world. Expenditures in the current budget are expected to be cut by at least twenty-five percent. The focus of the reductions are those forces committed to Nato, which will be reduced by fifty percent. Pivotal to this decision is the new intelligence estimate that the West would have a period of up to two years' strategic warning prior to a conflict with the former Soviet Union, or any other global conflict threat.

Rather than maintain a high proportion of forces in forward-deployed status, the Bush administration plans to rely on fewer deployable, active-duty forces backed by an infrastructure facilitating "reconstitution" to previous levels. The reduction in active forces is intended to create a base force sufficient to handle the most probable future contingencies. These reductions will cut 245,000 personnel from the U.S. Army (six active and at least two reserve divisions), 170,000 personnel from the air force (ten tactical air wings), 77,000 sailors and ninety-four ships from the navy, and 36,000 marines (a reduction from 196,000 to approximately 160,000). An additional aspect of the base force plan is to reorganize the Department of Defense into four force components: Atlantic Forces, Pacific Forces, Strategic Forces, and Contingency Forces. Whether the intent is to consolidate the current unified command structure into these four "components" is currently under fierce debate. Whereas the Pacific Force component appears quite similar to the current Pacific Command, the Atlantic Force would include those units assigned to the U.S. European and Central Commands.

Impact on the Marine Corps

Until now, common wisdom has suggested that the pending defense cuts will have a lesser impact on the Department of the Navy (which includes both the navy and the marine corps) than on any other military department. Fewer cuts in personnel are planned, and, more importantly, a significant reduction in overseas-based land and air forces would presumably increase the relative importance of naval forces, giving greater meaning to the long-standing navy-marine corps claim to represent America's "first line of defense." The obvious reason is geography. Defense planners, even if they so desire, cannot wish away the oceanic environment that separates the United States from both potential allies and potential enemies and compels therefore the continuing maintenance of maritime forces, nor can they reduce American economic dependence on

foreign trade, the vast percentage of which travels by sea. For many reasons however, maritime forces, and in particular the marine corps, may face severe challenges to their policy and composition in the wake of severe overall defense budget reductions and varying interpretations of the "lessons" of the Gulf war.

First, there seems to be a nascent but possibly growing view among certain defense analysts that amphibious assault capabilities—in light of the absence of an actual assault—were unnecessary for success in the Gulf war and, by implication, future wars. Two versions of this view are circulating: air power advocates vigorously maintain that *all* ground action was unnecessary in light of the "inevitable" collapse of Iraqi will; others emphasize that army airborne troops were the first on the scene to prevent Saddam Hussein's probable continuation into Saudi Arabia and to secure the area *prior* to the arrival of the navy and marine corps. Besides being decidedly partisan, both claims disparage the unique contribution of the marine corps by portraying marine operations as patently similar in scope and detail to those of the U.S. Army. Their grudging admission that the marine corps is the "finest light infantry in the world" harbors the implication that marines are nothing more than light infantry, of the sort that should properly be in the army inventory. Another question (of the "who won the war" variety) sidestepped is whether airborne troops (without sea-lifted weapons) represent the same sustainable combat power as is inherent in amphibious-lift forces.

Second, there are growing pressures for the army and air force to adopt an "expeditionary perspective" with the restructuring of their forces. With the elimination of the Soviet threat as such to the European continent and the assumption that Saddam Hussein is an aberration in a Mideast region evolving towards peace, the scenarios for which the army and air force have tailored their capabilities are effectively dissolved. The army had previously begun a readjustment by emphasizing the development of light forces, such as the 7th Infantry Division. The air force is now describing the future organization of "expeditionary air force air wings" that will function in a fashion, albeit land-based, similar to navy and marine carrier air wings. If these services take on a primarily expeditionary role, another uniquely marine corps focus will be duplicated.

Third, the continuing proliferation of special operations units in all the services, controlled by a Special Operations Command with apparently independent responsibilities, has created an impression that there is much duplication among American contingency forces. The traditional role of the marine corps as America's contingency force, capable of functioning—through swift seaborne deployment to crisis regions—as a prime element of crisis diplomacy during a transition to possible conflict, is obscured by a panoply of units posed to jump from the sky, shoot terrorists, rescue hostages, and perform other covert but spectacular operations.[3] The fact that most crises are defused or resolved by overt

assets, such as deployed naval air, surface, and amphibious forces, rather than covert means, is sometimes forgotten.

Fourth, cutbacks in the fleet will have an obvious impact on the procurement of future amphibious ships. Since the concept of sea lift as a transportation function has been divorced from what is in reality combat sea lift (i.e., amphibious ships), policy makers tend to view sea lift as an exclusively army-oriented function. Pressure will mount to build or otherwise acquire sea-lift ships to transport army material while correspondingly reducing amphibious lift. This makes sense only if one assumes that friendly, developed port facilities, such as were available in the Persian Gulf, will be available in any future overseas conflict. Since this is unlikely, it would seem to be just a matter of time until the army insists on putting some degree of combat capability on our future sea-lift ships to make them able to land supplies under less than commercial conditions. While this would not make them amphibious ships *per se*, it is a small step for the army then to acquire their own amphibious capabilities in order to deal with those situations in which ports must be seized. Historical precedent, such as General Douglas MacArthur's Southwest Pacific campaign, can be cited to demonstrate that the army "always had an amphibious capability."[4] Of course, the fact that MacArthur's primary amphibious assets and expertise were provided by his *naval* component command, the Seventh Fleet, is treated a bit hazily by this claim.

These four perceptions, combined with perceived fiscal realities, are sufficient to create an intellectual challenge to the role and mission, independence, organization, and perhaps very existence of the marine corps. In any case, the interplay between these perceptions and the NNSS inflicts tough choices among options of how the marine corps should adjust to the assumptions of post-Cold War planning.

Should the Marine Corps Become Geographically or Contingency Oriented?

The New National Security Strategy assumes that the United States will be involved, and only when it so chooses, primarily in Third World contingencies and crises no longer instigated by communist ideology and superpower rivalry. It also assumes that the United States will be able to build political-military coalitions that will support American involvement. Yet, it is obvious that there is always the potential requirement for U.S. unilateral intervention in situations where there is no base support for land or air forces. The NNSS appears to downplay this likely scenario, which is clearly not in keeping with our most wishful hopes for a new world order. However, there may be areas of the world where the marine corps, with its unique capabilities to mount independently sustained expeditions, might logically focus its efforts. Amphibious warfare is

ultimately maneuver warfare, and there are certainly regions where such maneuver capabilities are more important than logistics-dependent heavy armor or land-based air forces. These regions will presumably be the responsibility of the Pacific and Contingency Force components. In order to escape the inevitably bloody political fight over roles and missions, it may be logical for the marines to become more geographically oriented, to concentrate on being the primary service in commands and regions where amphibious, littoral, and ground maneuver are the prime elements of deterrence, crisis resolution, and victory.

On the other hand, and given the marine corps' two-hundred-year history of independent, small-scale operations in support of American interests, it may be more logical to assign the contingency role exclusively to the Corps. While this appears to be radical departure from the current policy of having a joint Special Operations Command siphon individual units from each service to retain a national (vice theater) special operations capability, it would greatly simplify training and tactical interoperabilty (and would probably be cheaper). In return, the marine corps might have to give up some of the sustained land-combat capability (such as armor and armor-trained units) that it demonstrated in the drive to Kuwait City and that is required under the geographic primary-service concept.

The Argument for a Pacific Orientation. The current emphasis on maneuver warfare, which is made evident in such doctrine as Fleet Marine Force Manual (FMFM) 1, *Warfighting*, would appear to position the Corps to assume a major responsibility for both the Pacific and Contingency components of the proposed new military organization.[5] However, it is particularly the Pacific region, in which the administration plans to use "chiefly maritime" forces in a reduced level of forward operations, that is most suitable for the use of a seaborne marine presence for crisis response; most of the nations here that are of interest to the United States, whether as potential allies or potential enemies, are coastal states. The Pacific Rim is characterized by oceanic trade. Likewise, many of the potential conflicts take on an oceanic character. A number of the major powers or possible future powers—Japan, Australia, New Zealand, Taiwan, and Indonesia—are separated by expanses of ocean. With no Soviet threat, most of the potential conflicts on the Asian landmass itself will probably remain of peripheral interest to the United States except where they affect coastal regions. In view of the imminent loss of bases in the Philippines, and the probable reduction of forces in South Korea and Japan, and also of the great distances required for air transport, amphibious forces will be even more critical if the United States is to maintain its formal and informal defense guarantees with Asian allies.

This poses a bit of a dilemma in that *Warfighting* and other recent writings on marine doctrine seem to de-emphasize classic amphibious operations. The marine corps campaign in the Kuwait Theater of Operations consisted of

effective ground maneuver combined with sea and land-based air support but did not include a major combat amphibious assault. Marine corps commandant General Alfred Gray's warfighting philosophy was put to good effect. As noted, however, critics are swift to point out that marine actions differed from that of the army only by the degree of armor involved, thereby challenging the marine corps claim to exclusivity of mission. Critics could ask: If army units can be rapidly deployed and backed by sea lift, why is a separate marine corps required? If the marine corps is de-emphasizing its amphibious assault mission, what makes the marine corps unique? Possible answers are that marine corps expeditionary forces are designed to remain afloat for extended periods and land and mount an initial defense without the need for an extensive logistics train; that amphibious assault is not really being de-emphasized, but other aspects of expeditionary combat are being reemphasized; and that in contrast, airborne and air-transportable units simply do not have the combat sustainability of amphibious forces bringing their weapons by sea.[6]

Rather than fight such intellectual battles, the administration, operating under the tenets of the NNSS, may conceivably choose to designate the Pacific theater as "Marineland," under the logic that so much of the region consists of water or territory not conducive to operations by heavily armored forces. Conversely, the ground forces of the Atlantic component, with its responsibility for Mideast operations, may become the sole province of the army under the logic that army heavy armor is the major requirement in most regional scenarios. This approach is suggested by the Bush administration's deliberate intent to continue assigning two of the three Marine Expeditionary Forces to the Pacific region. For the navy, this would require designating the bulk of its amphibious ships for the Pacific and assigning the bulk of its fast logistics sea-lift assets to the Atlantic.

The Argument for a Contingency Force Orientation. The land component of the Contingency Force may consist of a combination of amphibious-based marines, light army infantry (air transportable), airborne assault, various special operations forces, and even a brown-water navy.[7] On the other hand, the land component of the Contingency Force might just as well be composed primarily of marines with support as required by special operations forces. Only after a "limited contingency" (for which the contingency force is presumably designed) appears to be large enough to require major intervention would forces assigned to the Atlantic and Pacific components, including armor and extensive logistic capabilities, be introduced. Such a solution would preserve the marine corps without debilitating battles over roles and missions. In exchange, the army would be free to concentrate on mechanized warfare and building a reserve structure that could adequately reconstitute Nato.

Under such a plan, the marine corps would revert to its "can-opener" function in a major conflict (that is, conflict beyond the contingency level),

followed up as necessary by active-component armor and all-mechanized army units, and finally the reconstituted reserve "people's army."[8] This would require shifting some of the less glamorous functions now detailed to reserve units (particularly in logistics) back to the active component in order to ensure success of the rapid initial marine and army armor response. This might also lessen the land maneuver focus of the most recent marine doctrine. The obvious strategic implication is the gamble that heavy armor and highly mechanized forces would not be needed initially in a crisis (probably in the Americas or Africa).

Another feature that the marine corps might need to adopt in order to fulfill the contingency forces mission is a foreign-force training orientation similar to that of army's Special Forces (Green Berets). This capability is provided to some extent by the special operations capable Marine Expeditionary Units (MEU(SOC)), but only on a limited, as-required basis. Considering the high regard in which the marines are held by foreign forces and also the esprit natural to the Corps, creating a more intense, dedicated foreign-force training capability would not seem overwhelmingly difficult.

The prospects described above would seem to argue for retiring the mechanized maneuver emphasis of marine corps *Warfighting*. This does not mean that marine armor would go away—only that its funding would become secondary in priority. It is important, however, to reflect on the ultimate prerequisite for this sort of approach—benign behavior on the part of Russia. The strategic vision it assumes is that of a worldwide conventional deterrent (forward presence) consisting of combatant ships and afloat marines, a ready response to small military crises by such sea-borne forces, relatively placid contingency regions whose conflicts (if they are of interest to the United States) can be addressed by the navy-marine corps team, and a fast sea-lift capacity to move army units rapidly across the Atlantic and Mediterranean with minimum opportunity for opposition at sea.

There are inherent assumptions in the Bush administration's New National Security Strategy that will put pressure on the marine corps to redefine its function in the post-Cold War world. The reason is *not* that the marine corps' previous orientation is outdated; in fact, it is quite the contrary. The primary reason is that the post-Cold War army and air force will be attempting to redefine *their* functions as being expeditionary forces. In the inevitable roles and missions battle, fueled by pressures to reduce duplication and various claims as to what constitutes the lessons of the Gulf war, the marine corps will once again be forced to argue for its independence and uniqueness.

A possible way to avoid this conflict is for the marine corps to focus on a geographic or force component orientation in those areas and components

(Pacific and Contingency) most suitable for expeditionary and amphibious warfare. Another method would be to devote the Corps exclusively to the Contingency Force role, although this option is more likely to cause bureaucratic backlash from existing units. These are only two options, but they are ones that need to be considered under the tenets and tensions of the new strategy. Is the marine corps suited to be the Pacific garrison or to be the American contingency force? Or both? Or neither? Should it simply remain as presently constituted, albeit smaller by 36,000 marines? The time for the marine corps to make this decision is when it still has the power to decide—before its expeditionary function appears to be redundant.

Notes

1. A debate most similar to the post-Vietnam dialogue prompted by such studies as Martin Binkin and Jeffrey Record, *Where Does the Marine Corps Go from Here?* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1976).

2. The best assessment of the strategy thus far can be found in the technical report, *America Promises to Come Back: A New National Strategy*, by Dr. James J. Tritten of the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS-NS-91-003, 26 December 1990, updated 1 may 1991). Implications for naval forces can be found in Sam J. Tangredi, *The Means to Deliver: Implications of the New National Strategy for Maritime Forces*, Working Paper in International Studies 1-91-8, Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, (Stanford Univ.: May 1991). (Available from author.)

3. This traditional role has been reinforced by development of the Marine Expeditionary Unit—Special Operations Capable (MEU(SOC)) concept in which all deploying MEUs are trained in a specifically tailored package of "special operations" skills. While not considered a national special operations asset, forward-deployed MEU(SOC) units may be the most readily available forces to handle particular low-intensity war and non-combatant evacuation operations.

4. It should be pointed out that the post-World War II army leadership tended to disparage the need for amphibious capabilities—obviously challenging the need to maintain an independent marine corps. The illustrative quote of the period is from General of the Army Omar Bradley's testimony to Congress: "I am wondering if we shall ever again have another large-scale amphibious operation. Frankly, the atomic bomb, properly delivered, about precludes such a possibility." Less than a year later, U.S. forces landed at Inchon, Korea.

5. U.S. Marine Corps, *Warfighting*, FMFM-1 (Washington: 6 March 1989).

6. In the absence of sufficient naval amphibious lift, the marine corps has spearheaded the development of the fast-reaction Maritime Prepositioning Ship (MPS) force capable of delivering the combat equipment for air-transported marine units. Obviously, this is a concept suited to the U.S. Army and one in which, given the Desert Storm experience, interest is likely to continue to increase. Again, it must be pointed out that the concept reqnires a relatively benign environment where commercial shipping can be off-loaded.

7. Inferred from General Powell's brief depiction. General Colin L. Powell, USA, *Statement of General Colin L. Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Before the Committee on Armed Services, U.S. House of Representatives*, 7 February 1991, p. 10.

8. This is similar to the scenario described by General Powell (on 7 February) as constituting the initial American response to Operation Desert Shield and Storm. *Statement of General Colin L. Powell*, pp. 12-13.

Ψ

After the Storm

Andrew E. Gibson

IN THE SPRING AND EARLY SUMMER OF 1991, there was an outpouring of patriotic fervor for the returning veterans of Desert Storm that exceeded anything seen in this country since the end of the Second World War. It was a tribute to a magnificent victory. It also indicated the relief in knowing that so much had been accomplished at the cost of so few American lives. It could have been far different.

In the aftermath of Desert Shield and Desert Storm, there was a pronounced tendency to focus on the good things that happened and to minimize or even ignore those things that only worked partially or not at all. Desert Shield confirmed what every study of a regional conflict in Southwest Asia had concluded, and that was that the United States had insufficient sea lift to deliver the required weapons, supporting equipment, and ammunition in an acceptable time frame.

The Maritime Prepositioned Ships (MPS), the chartered, privately owned U.S. ships stationed in Diego Garcia loaded with army and air force material, the Fast Sealift Ships (FSS), and forty-three of the ships in the Ready Reserve Force (RRF) performed their assigned tasks well. As Vice Admiral Donovan, Commander Military Sealift Command (MSC), remarked, "It had gone well—better than expected." In addition, during this first phase seventy-three ships were chartered, more than half of them flying foreign flags.

During the first weeks, instead of a heavy division and a significant part of its supporting equipment being in place, there was only the Seventh Marine Brigade and the 82nd Airborne Division standing between a large, heavily armed Iraqi force and the Saudi Arabian oil fields. Much more emphasis might have been placed on the possible fate of these forces if the Iraqi army had continued its southward invasion.

The rapidly declining American merchant marine was a major factor in the problem. While the navy had spent well over $7 billion to increase sea-lift

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capacity during the 1980s, little had been done to provide the support needed to sustain a viable U.S. merchant fleet. The scarcity of trained seamen as the result of this decline contributed to the problem of activating the laid-up ships in the RRF. Samuel Skinner, the Secretary of Transportation at that time, noted during the activation period that "putting less than half of the emergency fleet [RRF] in service has nearly exhausted the nation's supply of merchant mariners."

Too often Desert Storm is described as the "hundred-hour war." It was a seven-month war, requiring all of that time to position the forces and their equipment to ensure ultimate victory. It took every bit of the time available to achieve the final result, and there is no doubt that sea lift drove the timetable. Before the grand offensive started in February, the United States used virtually every available vessel in the world capable of moving heavy equipment. This included more than one hundred foreign ships.

For the first time since the Second World War, merchant mariners who had manned much of the vital sea lift in Desert Shield and Desert Storm marched proudly down Pennsylvania Avenue alongside the combat veterans of that war. Shortly afterward, one shipping company executive observed, "The war did create heightened awareness [of the merchant marine] which unfortunately may be forgotten very quickly."

Almost immediately after victory had been achieved, key Department of Defense (DoD) personnel began to formulate plans to obtain the additional sea lift required to close the gap that had been all too clearly demonstrated. They had learned a lesson and, in spite of a declining defense budget, they began a determined effort not to be caught short again. While the planners concentrated on developing programs to obtain the necessary ships for a future emergency, little thought was given to the means of ensuring that a supply of trained personnel would be available to man them.

Historically, such manpower has come from the existing merchant fleet as it did in Desert Shield; however, there is little question that unless corrective action is quickly taken, the dwindling American merchant marine will have virtually disappeared by the end of this century, and with it the men who have traditionally provided the crews for wartime sea lift.

In testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, General Colin Powell said in response to a question from Senator McCain concerning Operation Desert Shield, "If there is one thing I would like to have had more of last Summer and early Fall, it would have been large capacity, roll-on/roll-off kind of ships." (This is a type of ship that hardly exists in today's U.S. commercial fleet.) Continuing his testimony, he urged the addition of large numbers of new C-17 transports to enhance the Military Airlift Command (MAC) fleet that had performed so well during the conflict. He might have added that following the initial surge, with its requirement for vast amounts of heavy equipment, much of the supplies and material required for sustainment and the buildup for the

eventual invasion was transported by American ships, owned and normally operated in commercial trade by the seven U.S. liner companies. In fact, starting in October these ships eventually delivered over a million tons of essential cargo. General Powell went on to say that we should continue to seek opportunities for prepositioning ammunition and equipment in distant parts of the world and, although he did not say so, much of this would inevitably be afloat. Nowhere can there be found in his remarks or in DoD planning documents any support for a revitalized merchant marine.

"Desert Shield confirmed what every study . . . had concluded, and that was that the United States had insufficient sea lift to deliver the required weapons, supporting equipment, and ammunition in an acceptable time frame."

The imminent demise of the American merchant marine is too important to be allowed to go unnoticed. It is an issue worthy of national debate. The whole question of the need for or even the desirability of maintaining a national-flag commercial fleet should be honestly and realistically addressed. When the question is raised in general terms it is almost always answered in the affirmative. It is only when the necessary legislative changes are proposed and meaningful programs are put forward that effective support is found wanting.

Nineteen ninety-two is a presidential election year, and it should be a time when the candidates for that office begin to state their positions on a variety of national issues. In the past, the future of the American merchant marine was included. President Nixon laid out a detailed plan to revive U.S. maritime industries in a speech given in Seattle in the fall of 1968. It is worth reading. The 1970 Merchant Marine Act was a direct result of that commitment, which in turn resulted in the largest peacetime shipbuilding program in U.S. history.

President Reagan made a similar, although not so detailed, commitment in 1980. His maritime program embraced not only the merchant marine but included a major expansion of the navy. The $100 billion naval building program that followed amply fulfilled that part of the pledge. However, support for the merchant marine was virtually nonexistent. All subsidies for commercial shipbuilding were eliminated, but by leaving in place the requirement for domestic building in order for the shipowner to qualify for government programs, the U.S. international fleet may have been doomed to eventual extinction.

The excuse offered for the failure to address the problem was that lacking a clear consensus in the industry for the type of program to be developed, no one could or would do anything. One has to wonder how many government programs developed in the past two hundred years that directly affected a diverse interest group ever had a similar requirement. For an industry in which both

management and labor fight not only among themselves but with each other, such a requirement makes fulfillment impossible.

When President Bush came into office he stated his intention to establish "an executive branch maritime liaison," other than the Secretary of Transportation, with the industry. He intended the holder of that new liaison position to coordinate and advise him on commercial maritime issues. This position has never been filled. That may be the result of the president's considering, on reflection, that it would be more trouble than it was worth.

A few years ago, Congressman Charles Bennett, the chairman of the Sea Power Sub-Committee of the House Armed Forces Committee, tried to focus attention on the state of the U.S. merchant fleet by introducing legislation to create a high-level commission to study its current state and propose solutions. Although the resulting commission, chaired by former Senator Denton, was titled "The Merchant Marine and National Defense," almost all of its recommendations were directed at supporting not the merchant marine but domestic shipbuilding. None of the testimony taken that described the economic condition of the shipowner or the high cost of buying a U.S.-built ship found its way into the final report. The commission's recommendations were so one-sided in favor of the shipbuilders, and so contrary to the needs of the operators and seamen, that they were almost immediately discredited and received only one brief hearing. If any good came out of the commission, it was that it made clear that no one should suggest another commission to investigate the conditions of the merchant marine as part of any proposed solution.

The fact is that the issue had become so highly politicized that the Congress is probably incapable of providing any practical solution. The responsibility for finding the answer, if there is one, rests squarely with the executive branch. Before the United States wakes up to find itself without a U.S.-flag merchant fleet to carry a portion of its international commerce and to serve in time of emergency—its mission as defined in the preamble of the 1936 Merchant Marine Act—the country should at least be alerted to the fact that it has a problem. This can best be done by raising the issue in a national forum and asking specific questions that demand specific answers.

In any eventual debate one will need to start by defining what is meant by the words "merchant marine." In simple terms, a merchant marine consists of a body of seamen manning a fleet of ships (not tugs and barges) engaged in international and domestic trade, all financed by private (not government) investors willing to put their money at risk in anticipation of a profit. That seems simple enough, but to make it work the heavy hand of government has to be largely replaced by Adam Smith's invisible one.

There is an iron rule in international trade which states that to be successful, one has to be either very good or very cheap. Since Americans probably do not have the latter option, the American shipowner has to concentrate on providing

excellent service at competitive rates. In the liner trades it is remarkable, given the obstacles that exist, that some American owners have done as well as they have. At least two of the premier containerized shipping companies in the world still fly the American flag. But to provide excellent service the owner must have the best equipment, and that means that rapidly aging ships must be continually replaced by better ones. And, they must be replaced at prices comparable to the best that the competition can obtain. This leads to some important questions.

Will the shipbuilders and their congressional allies allow the changes proposed by the government to permit companies to acquire foreign-built ships and still retain access to non-defense government cargoes? Will they allow these companies to continue to receive an Operating Differential Subsidy (ODS) for payment to their American crews? Will the same coalition allow the removal of the fifty-percent ad valorem tax on foreign repairs in order that U.S. companies be placed on a par with their foreign competitors?

"It may be too much to hope that the debate on an issue involving millions of dollars and thousands of jobs can be carried out in a way that keeps the national interest uppermost."

The next question involves the wages paid to American seamen. When the 1936 merchant marine legislation was enacted, the shipping companies unwisely allowed themselves to become characterized as the recipients of subsidies. They collected the subsidies for the shipbuilders, thus relieving the builders of that stigma. At the same time they became the government's agents to provide a supplemental payment to American seamen in order for them to have a living wage. None of this money remained with the shipping companies, yet in the minds of the public and of many in government the shipowners are recipients of great largesse. Recently a senior military officer wanted to know why these companies attempted to make a profit on their carriage of military cargoes during Desert Shield since they already got so much money from the government!

It has now become quite clear that there will no longer be any direct subsidies for commercial shipbuilding. It is equally clear that there is no intention now to continue to provide a wage differential to American seamen. When the current government contracts providing the seamen's wage differential expire in the next few years, they will not be renewed. If there is any other plan to provide American seamen with a living wage, there is no indication of it.

The wage differential for seamen sailing with the subsidized shipping companies, if compared to competent Korean, Taiwanese, and Filipino crews, is at least $1.5 million per ship-year. For South American and European competition, the difference is less but still significant. So we must ask another question: Is there any way that an American shipowner can absorb such a differential and

remain in business? A related question is, if the U.S. government does not think that it is important to have a supply of continually trained American seamen available for emergencies such as the recent war in the Gulf, why should the shipowner do so, even if he could afford it? These are only several of the more important questions that need to be addressed.

Let us consider an owner who wants to fly the U.S.-flag on his ships and employ Americans to run them. Certainly some of the maritime unions in recent years have encouraged the non-subsidized operators to do so by making significant wage concessions. A major impediment to such an owner doing this is that under current U.S. law he is forced to employ far larger crews on his ships than do his competitors. In spite of attempts to obscure the question of crew size by raising safety issues, a recent study by the National Research Council finds no such linkage. Another question then might be: How soon can U.S. laws relating to crewing be amended so as to bring them

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into conformity with international standards? This is an effort that could be initiated immediately by the U.S. Coast Guard, under Department of Transportation direction. This is a good place to start.

Yet another question involves taxes. Under the 1986 Tax Reform Law, shipowners are no longer able to defer their tax burden. Until that law was passed, tax payments could be reserved to buy replacement tonnage in the future. This was only a partial recognition of the fact that many, if not most, of their foreign competitors pay no taxes at all. This new U.S. tax regulation in fact says that if by chance a U.S. owner does make a profit, he will pay a significant tax penalty for choosing to fly his country's flag. Another question has to be, is there any real possibility that the Treasury Department and the committees in Congress having tax jurisdiction would allow significant change in the tax law in order to encourage continued ownership of American vessels?

President Bush reminded us in his Aspen speech given in August 1990 that in the future we will probably face different challenges than those for which we had been preparing. The president said that "in many of the conflicts we could face, we may not have the luxury of matching manpower with prepositioning material. We'll have to have air and sealift capacities to get our forces where they are needed, when they are needed. A new emphasis on flexibility and versatility must guide our effort." In the new world order, if these issues are not faced and solutions found to the present problems, it is almost certain that there will not be an American merchant marine available to meet those future emergencies that the president foresaw.

There may well be a greatly enlarged Ready Reserve Force, and possibly a program can be developed to provide reserve manpower to activate the more modern, diesel-powered portion of this fleet. However, there is little question that this will be more expensive than removing the myriad restrictions that unnecessarily add to present costs, and also providing some form of wage differential for American crews to ensure their ready availability in the future. Such differentials could be in the form of monthly payments for remaining in a qualified reserve status.

One last observation should be made, and this leads to a final question. There is a growing realization among many of those who attempt to frame future defense strategies that the United States has entered a phase where attrition warfare is neither probable nor of major concern. It is believed that no credible war scenario envisions a prolonged non-nuclear war that involves major ship losses. As a result, some people are beginning to question procurement policies that continually support defense industries based on the claim that this type of surge capacity is essential in a future global conflict. The need for this continued support may be too political to be debated constructively in a presidential campaign; however, the mounting national debt will force some review of these policies in the years ahead.

It may be too much to hope that the debate on an issue involving millions of dollars and thousands of jobs can be carried out in a way that keeps the national interest uppermost. This does not necessarily imply a lack of integrity or even political courage. It is more the result of the intense pulling and tugging of opposing political forces. Often it arises from real differences in how best to resolve the problem. The result has been described as "political gridlock."

Until we are able to define clearly the amount of shipbuilding capacity required to construct future U.S. naval vessels, the proponents of a shipbuilding mobilization base sufficient to sustain the merchant fleet in a sea war of attrition may well prevail. The result will be not any new ships, but the throttling of any serious consideration of removing or amending the legislation that denies American shipowners the ability to compete in the international marketplace.

How all of this will impact upon the future of American shipbuilding, the merchant marine, and as a consequence the availability of essential sea lift, remains to be seen. The continual decline of these industries without an objective evaluation is clearly not in the nation's interest. But, lacking clear direction, this undoubtedly is what will happen.

Ψ

Preparing the Western Alliance for the Next Out-of-Area Campaign

Thomas-Durell Young

THE CURRENT PHASE IN EAST-WEST DÉTENTE has had a fundamental effect on the Western alliance. Nato's institutional structure, basic strategy, and doctrinal concepts have been or are currently under review, and for good reason. After all, it is clear that future security challenges to the Western alliance, even in the form of a future hypothetical Soviet/Russian threat, will be faced under completely different political circumstances and geopolitical conditions.[1] While Nato military structures and national defense and diplomatic bureaucracies have produced a large number of proposals to bring Nato into line with the evolving political realities in Europe (i.e., Nato's "New Strategic Concept" released at the Rome Summit in November 1991), one issue has complicated alliance efforts to reach agreement on these needed reforms. The 1991 Gulf War forced the alliance to confront once again the perennial and almost insoluble problem of "out-of-area" conflicts at a time when the alliance was in the midst of review and restructuring. While the subsequent coalition victory over Iraq has removed the immediate need to resolve the issue, the problem of the alliance meeting common threats outside of the Nato-defined area remains unsolved.[2]

A problem that has continued to plague Nato since its inception is that it is limited to geographical boundaries stated in Article 6 of the North Atlantic Treaty. Whereas there is no limitation on what individual member states or any

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collective body of them can do outside of the alliance area, there is no legal, let alone political, basis for joint responses out-of-area under the rubric of the alliance. The existence of this problem has long been known to Europeans, but in recent years it has resulted in reviving the hitherto "sleepy" Western European Union (W.E.U.).[3] As defined by its charter (the 1948 Brussels Treaty modified by the 1954 Protocol), the W.E.U. is the sole Western European organization that is both concerned with collective self-defense and has no geographical limitations to its applicability.[4] Under the leadership of its current secretary general, former Dutch defense minister Dr. Willem van Eekelen, the W.E.U. has attempted to fulfill two new roles: response to threats to collective security outside the geographic area covered by Nato, and serving as the basis for strengthening the European defense pillar.[5] The W.E.U. has been successful in this regard since the European Community's (E.C.) Maastricht Summit, when it was decided that the W.E.C. would become an integral part of the Community's effort to achieve Political Union by acting as an instrument to implement its defense policy goals.[6]

By making the W.E.U. the vehicle by which the E.C. might ultimately achieve a defense identity, the U.S. goal of attaching the emerging European defense pillar to Nato, no matter how tenuous, was accomplished. Article IV of the Brussels Treaty, as amended by the 1954 Protocol, enjoins the W.E.U. to work in close cooperation with Nato.[7] Yet, to date, resolution of the issue of whether and how Nato could respond to another out-of-area contingency continues to elude the Western alliance. One might think it unlikely, given the extremely sensitive nature of this issue, that now is the proper time to bring up this divisive matter in Western alliance councils. Nonetheless, there are a number of reasons why the alliance would be well advised to address at this point the problems associated with out-of-area deployments.

First, in view of the overwhelming support that exists in Europe for the United States remaining diplomatically engaged in the affairs of the Continent, if a forward military presence is also to continue European officials would be wise to ensure that Washington does not reach the conclusion that Nato has become anachronistic and no longer accommodates U.S. security requirements.[8] If there is insufficient political consensus in the alliance to enable it to alter effectively the threat-risk orientation away from the disintegrating Soviet Union to emerging trouble spots, both in and outside of Europe, Nato will simply lose its attractions to Washington. At the very least, such an eventuality could encourage Washington to review closely the option of initiating bilateral defense arrangements, which could be at the expense of Nato collective activities and programs, with Nato members that share Washington's security objectives.[9]

Second, despite the views of some in Europe that such contingencies will not elicit a response from Western Europe, there are strong rationales to suggest that instability in the south will increase in frequency and intensity in the near

future.[10] Population growth that far outstrips industrial expansion has sent a surge of Arabs to Europe in search of jobs now being taken by equally desperate, but more welcome (read: Christian) East Europeans who are willing to integrate themselves into European society. At the same time, West European investment and aid are being redirected eastward, leaving North African countries as an increasingly destitute playground for radical anti-Western fundamentalists and pan-Arab nationalists with increasing access to long-range weapons of mass destruction.[11] This situation is fraught with risk for Europe, as well as for the U.S. interests in the region, and should be addressed in common.

If, then, one assumes that there is a need to make Nato (or whatever metamorphic organization replaces it) relevant to its principal members while at the same time addressing European political sensitivities regarding relations with its neighbors, there would appear to be limited political room within which to maneuver. Moreover, there is no doubt that whatever a Nato-E.C.-

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W.E.U. effort may produce concerning the out-of-area issue, the principle of noncommitment prior to the recognition of a specific threat will continue to prevail in Nato. In consequence, it can be assumed with a high degree of certainty that alliance members will continue to address these scenarios in their traditional ad hoc way.[12]

In spite of these seemingly severe limitations, this essay will argue that a basis may exist for an important area of alliance defense cooperation that would facilitate Nato member states' out-of-area deployments. Moreover, the command and control (C^2) controversy that plagued the deployment of allied forces prior to the Persian Gulf War will be offered as evidence that the consequences of not initiating such cooperation between Western countries would outweigh potential political costs.

Two points need to be understood concerning cooperation for out-of-area contingencies. First, the cooperation envisaged in this essay would not imply any a priori political commitment or agreement to supply forces to any given contingency. Rather, it would ensure that where any number of alliance members formed a political consensus to act, a military basis for *all* members of the Western alliance to participate would exist. Second, such cooperation, comprising basic staff planning, could occur within whatever organizational structure was comfortable for the participating members: under the auspices of either Nato, the W.E.U., or—conceivably the best solution—*jointly* between these two organizations. What must be recognized by the alliance as a whole is that given the growing sophistication of some Third World military establishments, it would be exceedingly imprudent to assume that the preparation

time the coalition against Iraq enjoyed will be available in future contingencies. Moreover, as seen by the ongoing civil war in what used to be Yugoslavia, the Balkans have the potential for explosive conflict, with little warning time, to which the alliance may feel compelled to react. Indeed, it will be argued that the Western alliance should interpret the Iraqi case as highlighting the clear need to establish a foundation for allied force projection, since current circumstances suggest that without such a basis potentially devastating results could occur in future campaigns.

National Command and Operational Control Defined

At the outset of this discussion, a distinction needs to be made between "national command" and "operational control" in coalition warfare. In essence, national command concerns the internal administration, unit training, logistic support, management, and discipline of armed forces by national authorities. Operational control, on the other hand, relates solely to the actual employment of armed forces for designated objectives either by national or allied commanders. Wartime C^2 structures that allow for "chopping" (changing operational control of) national units to Nato military commands for employment have long existed in Nato. For instance, under previous Nato arrangements the German army's 12th Panzer Division was to assume wartime operational control over a brigade from the U.S. VII Corps.[13] At the same time it needs to be stressed that no government surrenders national command of its armed forces to any other country or organization.[14] This important distinction is well accepted in the Western alliance since it allows, in principle, for the most efficient use of allied forces.[15] As a general rule, in a crisis situation national units of an allied formation will operate in a loose association with the central command authority. As conflict becomes more likely, the command association becomes incrementally more firm, to the point where operational control is exercised by an allied headquarters once conflict actually commences.[16]

However, to be effective both militarily and politically, clear high-level arrangements among allies need to exist beforehand. "Unity of command," after all, is a widely accepted Principle of War. In the best of circumstances, wartime C^2 arrangements should be established and tested in peacetime in both field and command post exercises to ensure that they do indeed function. John Collins argues that these arrangements serve four essential purposes: "they establish mutually acceptable lines of responsibility and authority"; "they reduce the likelihood of serious misunderstandings in emergency"; "they increase the likelihood that collaboration will be close and continuous"; and "they affirm the sovereignty of individual states."[17]

At the same time, coalition participants are not disposed to allow the use of their forces in situations that could jeopardize their immediate security or their

own specific national interests and objectives. Consequently, both national and coalition rules of engagement (ROE), as well as national guidelines, are issued to commanders to "delineate the circumstances and limitations under which force is initiated and/or continued with other forces encountered."[18] According to Ashley Roach, ROE "ensure armed force is used to achieve and not to defeat the desired political goal."[19] In a coalition setting, allied commanders and associated formations must understand the ROE of foreign units which have been "chopped" to them or risk potentially disastrous consequences. National commanders have the right, and indeed the responsibility, to ensure that the specific operational tasks assigned to them by their coalition commanders conform to their own national roles and missions.[20] A contemporary example of the employment of national guidelines within a coalition involved the use of Italian aircraft in the Persian Gulf War. Italian defense minister Virginio Rognoni stated in the press that it would be only after a particular mission had been determined for Italian forces that operational control would be transferred to "American" command. He continued, "It is up to the Italian command to decide which target is suitable for our forces. And since the targets are to be attacked by integrated forces, the coordination can only be American."[21]

It is standard practice among Western allies to refer any disagreements that arise between allied command and national units to the alliance and to respective national governments for resolution.[22] While this may appear at first glance a major impediment to the judicious and efficient employment of force, it needs to be recognized that combined operations necessitate consensus among the members if they are to aspire to success. Fortunately the Western alliance has forty years of experience dealing with this nettlesome issue, albeit problems remain.

Command and Control in the Persian Gulf Crisis

While the 1990-91 Persian Gulf crisis and war offers an excellent example of the difficulties faced by any coalition of states against a common enemy, in one sense it did present the Western alliance with an unusual situation and raised issues that ought to be of immediate concern. The anti-Iraq coalition had the unusual, if not extraordinary, ability to deploy forces against Iraq, indeed right up to the border of Kuwait, with a complete absence of enemy interference. In other words, it would be exceedingly imprudent to assume that future contingencies will enjoy an unhindered ability to deploy and mass forces complemented by modern and extensive port and transshipment facilities. Moreover, and perhaps most importantly, the time delay between the initial deployment of forces and the United Nations' 15 January 1991 deadline for Iraq to evacuate Kuwait enabled the coalition to sort out C^2 and coordination of ROE. Without a doubt, had Baghdad chosen to launch a preemptive strike against the coalition's

forces in November or December (at which time command issues were apparently still being resolved),[23] the lack of clear and comprehensive C^2 and standardized ROE would have resulted in an uncoordinated, and possibly unsuccessful, defense.[24]

Admittedly, the politically sensitive character of C^2 and ROE does not always allow a priori resolution of difficulties. The reason of course is that each contingency warranting a collective military response is different. In the case of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, there was assembled what must be considered a *sui generis* coalition of forces, literally from around the world. Therefore, the establishment of an acceptable C^2 structure was no simple task.[25]

While many details of the anti-Iraq coalition's command and control scheme have not been released publicly, it is possible to glean from press reports a sense of the general difficulties faced during the pre-conflict deployment period.[26] The coalition's forces were commanded by the Strategic National Committee,

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chaired by the Saudi defense minister, Prince Lieutenant General Khalid bin Sultan, and the commander-in-chief of the U.S. Central Command, General Norman Schwarzkopf. Under this body were two component command committees: one was composed of senior commanders from the Western forces and was chaired by General Schwarzkopf; the other, made up of representatives of the Joint Arab Islamic Force (JAIF), was commanded by Lieutenant General Sultan.[27] France, for its part, exercised national control over its own forces up to the outbreak of hostilities, in close cooperation with the JAIF.[28] (It was only on 16 January, just hours prior to the outbreak of hostilities, that the French government announced that its forces in the theater would come under U.S. operational control "for a specific period and [for] predetermined missions.")[29] The Coalition Coordination, Communication, and Integration Center was established to provide liaison between the two components. According to one source, it was not clear whether this center was indeed to have a command function in war, although subsequent events suggest this was indeed the case.[30]

Despite predictable command problems with the French and minor difficulties experienced by British forces under U.S. operational control, the primary challenges to unified C^2 were apparently those associated with the coordination of Western and Islamic forces.[31] Parenthetically, according to press reports these difficulties were aggravated by the nonexistence of a national Saudi command and control structure. Reportedly there had previously been no effective C^2

above the brigade level, and even basic command procedures were inadequate.[32] The solution to this conundrum was to allow national ground forces to fight independently at the operational level—in effect, to implement Nato's "layer-cake" concept of dividing the battlefield and assigning each nation its own territory of responsibility.[33]

One special case in the alliance has long been the close relationship between the British and American armed services—so close that the British 1st Armoured Division was given tactical operational control over a U.S. brigade during the campaign.[34] One would expect this sort of arrangement between two countries with a long association of peacetime cooperation both within Nato and bilaterally.[35] Can such cooperation be institutionalized for other future contingencies where other Western forces are involved? To be sure, it is unlikely that Western armies could attain the high degree of interoperability now existing among Western and Western-equipped air forces.[36] The anti-Iraqi coalition air forces (under U.S. operational control, using Saudi Awacs aircraft and common tasking orders, and flying approximately 2,000 sorties a day during the first days of conflict) demonstrated the incalculable value of equipment and doctrinal standardization—a condition Nato ground forces are far from achieving.[37]

The experience of the Western naval forces in the Persian Gulf suggests, however, that it is not operational doctrine but rather the *political* basis for cooperation that requires reform. That the navies of the Western alliance had operational control difficulties is remarkable since their deployment and equipment, like that of their air force counterparts, is international in orientation. For instance, when circumstances require the coordinated activity of two allied ships, it is standard procedure that the senior officer present, irrespective of nationality, assume operational command.[38] In the Persian Gulf War, however, operations between Western naval forces were hindered by ineffectual political coordination at the highest European levels.

Some European naval forces were deployed to the Persian Gulf to augment British and French forces there following a meeting of W.E.U. foreign and defense ministers in Paris on 21 August 1990, almost three weeks after the invasion of Kuwait.[39] Their purpose was to help enforce the naval blockade of Iraq in accordance with the United Nations Security Council resolutions; they were to join and coordinate with the U.S., British, Canadian, and Australian forces already or soon to be operating in the Gulf. A full week later, a meeting of the W.E.U. chiefs of staff and several chiefs of naval staff was held in Paris to set up procedures for cooperation.[40] This resulted in adoption of a three-tiered mechanism similar to that used in the W.E.U. deployment of 1987; it created an ad hoc group of experts from foreign and defense ministries and provided for naval points of contact in respective capitals, as well as permanent coordination in Paris (each navy being represented by a senior officer) and coordination between operational commanders.[41] French naval headquarters in Paris was

evidently to provide coordination and intelligence-sharing for W.E.U. warships operating in the Gulf.[42]

According to press reports, W.E.U. operational coordination was not resolved until 10-14 September, when a conference was held on board the French destroyer *Dupleix* near the Hormuz Straits.[43] Five zones of operation were subsequently established.[44] It is interesting from the perspective of this study, however, that this arrangement was agreed to only on 18 September, after the French Navy and the Royal Navy had failed on 13 September to agree on geographical sharing of patrol zones.[45] Apparently the W.E.U., under French pressure,[46] wanted to create its own regional C^2 and leave the U.S. Navy, the Royal Australian Navy,[47] and the Canadian Maritime Command to coordinate activities among themselves. A structure embracing all allied navies had reportedly been created in Bahrain during a meeting aboard the French frigate *Montcalm* on 9 and 10 September. Here it was decided that the French would coordinate French and W.E.U. activity and the United States all the others.[48] This apparently did not sit well with one W.E.U. member, the British, who joined forces early on with their Anglo-Saxon naval colleagues, accepting U.S. Navy command.[49]

Notwithstanding these arrangements, coordination among Western naval forces remained insufficient,[50] at least from the perspective of one Congressional Research Service study published on 21 September. Even as late as the end of December, according to another Congressional Research Service report, Western naval forces enforcing trade sanctions against Iraq were doing so under national command, and there was still "no formal command arrangement; a situation that would not suffice in the event of armed conflict." The same report also claimed that the W.E.U. played only a limited role in deployment of its members' naval forces and had not established an operational command arrangement.[51] This criticism of the much-touted W.E.U. deployment supports a remarkably frank assessment found in a 7 November W.E.U. Assembly report. This document noted that W.E.U. forces did not possess an accepted tactical command structure and were therefore unable to effect coordinated and directed responses, and that coordination of national ROE and logistic support had still not been achieved. The report also made a startling claim that it had only been during actual operations that U.S. forces in the area were discovered (much to the surprise of W.E.U. forces) to be using unique Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) procedures.[52] The W.E.U.'s ultimate failure to create an effective naval C^2 structure can be seen in the Dutch decision of 9 January to place its deployed frigates under American command (with the task of helping protect U.S. aircraft carriers) in the event of war.[53] This left French naval authorities exercising operational control upon the commencement of hostilities over only Belgian, Spanish, and its own ships in the war zone.[54]

The W.E.U.'s inability to meet its members' security objectives ought accordingly to be obvious; it has proved unable to coordinate effectively a modest naval deployment,[55] something recognized by its own secretary general as easier to organize than air and ground forces coordination.[56]

It seems inexplicable that the navies of the Western alliance should have experienced these C^2 and interoperability difficulties. After all, Western navies had had forty years of experience in peacetime cooperation, not to mention the benefit of the Allied Tactical and Communication Publications series. They had also regularly conducted a wide range of exercises, participated in standing naval formations since the 1960s, and deployed to the Persian Gulf together in 1987 and 1988. Clearly the problem rests at the political level and not with the military forces sent to the Gulf. Such disorganization could in a conflict cause needless loss of lives and equipment, both by enemy action and quite likely by fratricide. The case of the navies clearly indicates an even more serious problem that could have faced Western ground forces in Kuwait and Iraq. One can easily contemplate some future contingency with a larger Western ground presence where poor planning and coordination could have the terrible result of destroying the fragile political consensus among our allies for subsequent out-of-area deployments. Notwithstanding the W.E.U.'s value as a framework for ad hoc cooperation between its members and North America, the Gulf crisis demonstrates that a structure more formal than the current two-pillar arrangement is required.[57]

Imperatives for Reform

The Western alliance, therefore, needs to ascertain whether political support exists for resolving these operational impediments. One would think, given Nato's vast success in improving interoperability, creating wartime C^2 structures, and harmonizing national ROE that it should be a relatively simple exercise to facilitate future out-of-area deployments, drawing on this body of expertise, doctrine, and procedure. What is needed, therefore, is a politically acceptable method by which Nato assets can, as Nato secretary Manfred Woerner argues, be made available to alliance members engaged in out-of-area contingencies. After all, observes Woerner, the North Atlantic Treaty "does not limit the scope of our security planning or coordination; nor does it exclude joint action."[58]

The impediment to this seemingly obvious requirement is, of course, European sensitivity about becoming an unwilling participant in "adventures" critical to some alliance members but of little concern to others. Nonetheless, a strong case can be made that Western European countries are becoming increasingly anxious about potential threats to their common security on their southern and southeastern flanks.[59] The North Atlantic Assembly's condemnation of Iraq's conquest of Kuwait, and Nato's formal ministerial meetings and

daily crisis sessions, were unprecedented and indicate a sufficient basis for a more formal common approach to this issue.[60]

Several Western European countries are far advanced in developing forces for such contingencies. The French created the Force d'Action Rapide in 1983 for the purpose of providing a hard-hitting mobile force for both European and Third World operations.[61] The Italian Army created the Forca di Intervento Rapido in 1985,[62] and the Spanish in 1988 tested for the first time its Fuerza de Acción Rápida, a joint formation modeled on the French and Italian examples.[63] Albeit lacking sufficient indigenous air lift, the British have designated their 24th Airmobile Brigade and the 5th Airborne Brigade[64] as their mobile force for these types of operations. There is no logical reason why these efforts should not be coordinated and exercised on a regular basis.

Despite the fact that Nato is reforming its military structures and is in search of new missions in the post-Cold War world, it would be fruitless for the United States, or any other member for that matter, to press for the formal inclusion of out-of-area operations within the alliance's specific purview. There is too much emotional baggage, particularly in Europe, to allow such an eventuality; also, a Nato framework could exclude the European country most interested and militarily prepared to contribute to such operations, i.e., France. The sequel to the Cold War has yet to be written and the events in the former Soviet republics in 1991 point toward the possibility that Nato will continue to have urgent relevance for its members for some time to come. Thus, given the importance of maintaining consensus for the continuation of Nato with its traditional in-area focus, to introduce such a divisive issue as out-of-area planning when the alliance is undergoing fundamental structural reform could well be counterproductive.

At the same time, it is evident that other options are limited. During Italy's presidency of the E.C., Italian foreign minister Gianni de Michelis proposed that the role of the W.E.U. be shifted to the proposed European Political System itself in order to give the E.C. a foreign and security purview.[65] Interestingly, Michelis's proposal was subsequently rejected by the W.E.U. Assembly out of fear that such a move might weaken Nato.[66] In this vein, the E.C. Summit held in Maastricht in December 1991 agreed that efforts by the E.C. to achieve political union could eventually include a common defense policy, to be achieved via the W.E.U. In this respect, the Community has agreed to examine and identify military units which could be assigned to the W.E.U. Also, since the Community does not include all the European members of Nato, and not all European Nato states are members of the W.E.U., the E.C. has agreed in principle to offer W.E.U. membership or observer status to Community members. European Nato states not currently members of the W.E.U. will be offered observer status in that body.[67] Albeit moving at almost glacial speed, efforts at creating closer political union, to be complemented by an emerging defense identity, are moving ahead.[68]

Linking Nato and the W.E.U.

Short of creating some new security organization that will deal with the issue of extra-regional security, it is apparent that from the perspective of Western Europe the W.E.U. is the appropriate forum in which these states will discuss these issues. As the sole Western European organization that concerns itself with its members' security and whose writ has no geographic limitations, the W.E.U. is well situated to play a leading role in addressing its members' security concerns. While it is problematic whether the W.E.U. can claim to have served its members well in the Persian Gulf in 1990-1991, the fact remains that this organization is the only one potentially capable of providing the essential political support for such endeavors, and that *wants* to do so.[69] The W.E.U. deserves credit for having been largely responsible for garnering Western European support in 1987 for sending a joint naval force to the Persian Gulf to clear mines during the Iran-Iraq war. Thus, though admittedly the subsequent W.E.U. naval deployment to the Kuwait theater was far from the grand operational success some (like Dr. van Eekelen) have claimed, at least this organization, however ill-prepared it may now be, has at least once successfully coordinated its members' response to out-of-area contingencies.

If one acknowledges that the W.E.U. will be the organization to direct Western European engagement in out-of-area operations, a major problem becomes apparent in regard to the roles the United States and Nato are to play. It is also necessary to define types of cooperation and planning that are politically acceptable and militarily sufficient. These are two different if closely related issues, and are best dealt with separately.

Institutions and Roles. At a very minimum, establishing a formal liaison entity and a joint military body connecting Nato (including the U.S.) and the W.E.U. would be both reasonable and possible. There are a number of reasons for joining the two bodies and doing so in this way. First, it would enable the Western alliance to benefit from the enormous military expertise that exists in Nato, without necessitating replication. To be sure, power projection and sustainment over potentially vast distances is not something with which Nato has overly concerned itself; substantial doctrinal and conceptual assistance would be required from the United States, the United Kingdom, and France. Nonetheless, a basis for cooperation and coordination between defense forces does exist within Nato and should be utilized. Second, a joint arrangement would not constrain either of these two major bodies from internal reorganization and reform. Both organizations play important roles in their respective areas of responsibility and should not be hindered in any way from reforming themselves to meet changing security and political conditions. Thus, should the E.C. eventually subsume the

responsibilities of the W.E.U., the W.E.U.'s relationship with Nato under this proposal should not impede that European political and security integration.[70]

Nonetheless, there are potential problems that can be identified at the outset. For instance, some in Europe, particularly the French, see an enlarged W.E.U. independent of the United States and Nato as a supplement to Nato and particularly to Washington's leadership position. A number of rather ambitious proposals have been put forward by the Assembly of the W.E.U. for that organization to take a leadership role in Europe in a number of specific areas, e.g., developing a satellite verification capability to monitor compliance with the Conventional Forces in Europe treaty and to track potential out-of-area threats.[71] However, as noted, the W.E.U.'s track record has been less than satisfactory; it does not make sense in this era of finite defense resources to replicate what already exists in Nato. In any case, the physical contrast between Nato's enormous command, control, communications, and intelligence center

". . . Establishing a formal liaison entity and a joint military body connecting Nato . . . and the W.E.U. would be both reasonable and possible."

and the W.E.U. secretariat in London (which does not even possess secure communications to Nato headquarters)[72] should demonstrate that each organization should limit itself to what it is best equipped to do.

As regards institutional issues, the membership of the W.E.U. does not include a number of European Nato countries. Interestingly, in view of the W.E.U.'s strong interest in out-of-area security, it does not include the Nato members outside the Central Front area (Norway, Denmark, Greece, and Turkey). Moreover, it is problematic whether the Maastricht Summit proposals for associate membership for these countries in the W.E.U. will find acceptance by them. In any event, this should not present any major legal or political impediments, since one of the purposes of creating a joint liaison body would be to permit participation by Nato members who are not part of the W.E.U. Presumably the mere existence of coordination between those countries wishing to develop the capability to pursue out-of-area contingencies could serve as a catalyst for further Western defense integration. To be sure, it can be predicted that French sensitivities would have to be assuaged. Since specific C^2 plans and hierarchies would have to be determined prior to ad hoc agreements to deploy forces, this Nato-W.E.U. structure would not have the same political "baggage" that has alienated France from some Nato military activities in the past. Finally, in view of Paris's interests in out-of-area threats to its security, a strong case could be made to encourage France to take a leading role in the establishment and development of the proposed liaison body.

Indeed, to ensure a definite W.E.U. flavor (which may be essential for its acceptance) for this combined structure, it would be wise to limit the planning headquarters staff to field-grade officers seconded from W.E.U. members. In time of crisis, the staff would be complemented by personnel from participating states, who would take the lead in planning and in operations specific to the contingency. Nations involved in a given situation could greatly facilitate matters by commencing solely out-of-area contingency planning on a national basis.[73] When released by national political authorities, these plans would form a basis for action by the combined planning staff. The small permanent staff would act routinely as an overseer of alliance interoperability, maintaining and testing it through periodic exercises, and providing a nucleus for expansion in crisis. This cadre staff could also prepare tailored packages for various operational conditions, e.g., desert, jungle, over-the-beach, airmobile, airborne, etc. It may also be wise to make this body the headquarters of a standing combined rapid reaction corps such as that suggested by Dr. van Eekelen.[74] Such efforts could provide important impetus to achieving E.C. efforts to create a European defense identity within the framework of common E.C. and W.E.U. security and defense policies.[75]

Planning and Cooperation. The military planning necessary to facilitate future combined responses to out-of-area contingencies (presumably avoiding the problems of the Western contingent in the anti-Iraq coalition) would be very modest as long as the Nato military structures continue to exist and its forces conduct regular field, command post, and logistics exercises. Maneuvers for air-lifted, airmobile, and amphibious forces would be required, as well as logistics projection and sustainment exercises among countries possessing these capabilities; these could be carried out easily within existing Nato structures and programs.

Given the uncertainty of world events and the political sensitivity of certain scenario-specific issues, prior staff activity should be limited primarily to establishing standardized planning methodology. Such an approach has long existed within the context of the Anzus Security Treaty between the United States, Australia, and (until 1985) New Zealand. It would be prudent for the proposed Nato-W.E.U. body to draw from the Anzus experience, for instance, an agreed-upon planning manual with explicit provisions for C^2 and ROE specifically for out-of-area conditions. Wherever possible, existing Nato procedures, standards, and methods should be employed.

Actual contingency planning for specific scenarios would take place only when political consensus to respond to a specific threat existed among alliance members. It needs to be clearly understood, and would have to be carefully explained to the publics of alliance members, that helping to develop a generalized planning methodology would by no means imply a nation's pre-commitment to support any specific out-of-area operation, but would merely simplify

joint out-of-area action in instances where the respective political leaderships felt national interests so dictated. The actual organization that would do this planning would be very modest and could conceivably be housed in a former Nato facility closed as part of the alliance's streamlining of its common structure.

The military capabilities necessary for a specific operation would remain a national concern, and therefore the composition of the planning staff would be left to the participants. One would think that the capabilities involved could draw upon current thinking in Nato, which is attempting to direct more attention to the security requirements of the flank countries, who have seen little diminution in risks to their security.[76] With few exceptions, if any, out-of-area requirements would be very similar to those of campaigns on the flanks.

A Nato-W.E.U. linkage would be, without a doubt, a controversial proposal in some European countries where the mere suggestion that Nato ought to address threats to security beyond the geographic boundaries of the alliance treaty produces Pavlovian responses just short of hysteria. However, if the Persian Gulf War has demonstrated nothing else, it has made two points clear. First, the basic elements of preparing to fight in coalition, sometimes taken for granted in Nato military structures, are absolutely essential if military operations are to be successful and casualties minimized. Second, Third World military establishments are becoming more sophisticated and therefore will increasingly require a proportionately sophisticated, joint, and combined-arms response by Western nations.

In view of the likely distances involved and the accompanying logistical challenges, it is also increasingly clear that the W.E.U. alone would find it very difficult to meet the dual challenges of power projection and sustainment. For example, according to van Eekelen, the logistical challenges of deploying ground forces to Saudi Arabia were such that European nations were advised to dispatch only self-supporting forces.[77] Whether Europeans appreciate it or not, the involvement of the U.S. military could be crucial in worst-case scenarios, and would be very welcome indeed even in less challenging contingencies.

That the world is not entering into a new phase of universal peace and tranquility becomes increasingly evident with the passing days. The conflict in the Persian Gulf, the possibility of instability in the former Soviet Union, and seemingly never-ending conflicts throughout the Third World demonstrate that there is no shortage of potential trouble spots that could seriously threaten common Western security interests. At best, the adoption of a Nato-W.E.U. institutional arrangement to deal with out-of-area scenarios would manifest a new and mature approach to an issue long divisive in the Western alliance. From the perspective of the United States, such cooperation would be in line with long-standing policy, since it would encourage greater European defense

cooperation but not at the expense of existing trans-Atlantic security arrangements.[78] At worst, the creation of such an organization would be seen by those in Europe fundamentally opposed to this type of cooperation as a symbolically important concession in the perennially acrimonious trans-Atlantic burden-sharing debate. Those in that camp would be well advised to consider that nations who have interests everywhere but responsibilities nowhere run the serious risk of relying on others for their protection, with little or no influence upon the manner in which this protection is afforded. Thus, until such time as the "state of nature" as defined by Thomas Hobbes becomes more like that envisaged by John Locke prior to man's creation of property, the Western alliance would be best advised to adopt a unified approach and a strategy of deterrence, and not to continue to hope that its traditional ad hoc approach to crisis will meet its security needs in the uncertain future.

Notes

1. For a review of operational considerations in a future Nato operation in the Central Region, see William T. Johnson and Thomas-Durell Young, "Planning Considerations for a Future Operational Campaign in Nato's Central Region" (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, 1992).

2. "The Alliance's New Strategic Concept," Press Communique S-1(91)85, (Brussels: NATO Press Service, 7 November 1991).

3. For background on the renaissance of the W.E.U. see Daniel Colard, "L'UEO et la Sécurité Européene," *Défense nationale*, March 1988, pp. 75-89 and Alfred Jean Cahen, "The WEU and the European Dimension of Common Security," Royal United Services Institute of Defence Studies, *Defence Yearbook, 1989* (Washington, D.C.: Brassey's, 1989), pp. 25-37.

The Western European Union has nine members: Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, by contrast, has sixteen: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

4. Interview with the W.E.U. Assembly's president, Robert Pontillon, *Le Monde*, 11 July 1990 and *The New York Times*, 21 August 1990.

5. Willem van Eekelen, "Building a New European Security Order: WEU's Contribution," *NATO Review*, August 1990, pp. 18-23.

6. *The Washington Post*, 12 December 1991.

7. "Brussels Treaty, as amended by the Protocol modifying and completing the Brussels Treaty, Paris, 23 October 1954" (London: W.E.U. Secretariat, 1969), p. 5.

8. See, for example, Assembly of Western European Union, *Communique issued after the meeting of the WEU Council of Ministers*, Document 1224 (Brussels: 23 April 1990).

9. I argue this point in my monograph, *The Changing European Security Calculus: Implications for the U.S. Army* (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, 1991).

10. *The Washington Post*, 15 November 1990.

11. For background see Martin Navias, "Ballistic Missile Proliferation in the Third World," *Adelphi Papers*, no. 252 (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1990).

12. For an excellent history of Nato's response to out-of-area contingencies see Elizabeth D. Sherwood, *Allies in Crisis: Meeting Global Challenges to Western Security* (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1990).

13. Frederick Franks and Alan Carver, "Building a NATO Corps," *Military Review*, July 1991, pp. 30-31.

14. See, for example, former French defense minister Jean-Pierre Chevenement's comments on this topic in *Antenne 2 Television* (Paris), 20 September 1990 in *Foreign Broadcast Information Service* (FBIS-WEU-90-184), 22 September 1990, p. 7 (hereafter cited by FBIS short title).

15. For example, following the announcement by the British defence minister Tom King that British forces in Saudi Arabia would operate under American operational control, the Labour Party's defence spokesman, Martin O'Neill, responded, "It is what we expected. It means that we will be one of the people the Americans consult before any action is taken." See *Press Association* (London), 21 September 1990 in FBIS-WEU-90-184, 21 September 1990, p. 5.

16. For details of this particular aspect of C^2 relating to the Australian contribution to the Gulf see the *Telegraph Mirror* (Sydney), 14 January 1991.

17. John M. Collins, "High Command Arrangements Early in the Persian Gulf Crisis," *Congressional Research Service (CRS) Report for Congress No. 90-453F*, 21 September 1990, p. 1.

18. U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Publication 1, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1 July 1987), p. 317.

19. Ashley Roach, "Rules of Engagement," *Naval War College Review*, January-February 1983, p. 54.

20. *The Daily Telegraph* (London), 12 December 1990.

21. *Corriere della Sera* (Milano), 19 January 1991.

22. *Sydney Morning Herald*, 5 December 1990.

23. *The Washington Post*, 2 November 1990.

24. Regarding the importance of early establishment of clear C^2 structures, W.E.U. secretary general van Eekelen writes that this could be achieved once a conflict occurred. Air Chief Marshall Sir Paddy Hine, R.A.F., head of the joint command of Operation Granby in the United Kingdom, strongly disagrees. Cf., Willem van Eekelen, "WEU and the Gulf Crisis," *Survival*, November-December 1990, p. 529 and *Press Association* (London), 31 October 1990 in FBIS-WEU-90-212, 1 November 1990, p.3.

25. *The Washington Post*, 3 December 1990.

26. *Ibid.*

27. *Press Association* (London), 12 October 1990 in FBIS-WEU-90-199, 15 October 1990, pp. 7-8 and *The Washington Post*, 6 November 1990.

28. *Antenne 2 Television* (Paris), 20 September 1990 in FBIS-WEU-90-184, 21 September 1990, p. 7.

29. *The New York Times*, 17 January 1990.

30. Steve R. Bowman, "Iraq-Kuwait Crisis: Summary of U.S. and Non-U.S. Forces," *CRS Report for Congress No. 90-639 F*, 27 December 1990, p. 19.

31. Note that most of these reported "problems" were apparently resolved following the decision by the British government to deploy a division-size force, which enabled British troops to conduct independent operational missions. See *Press Association* (London), 23 November 1990 in FBIS-WEU-90-227, 26 November 1990.

32. *The Washington Post*, 2 and 5 November 1990.

33. *The Washington Post*, 3 December 1990.

34. For background on this issue see British Information Services, British Consulate General (New York), *Policy Background 1/91*, 10 January 1990; *Melbourne Herald*, 2 October 1990; *The Washington Post*, 10 January 1991; and *The Observer* (London), 30 September 1990.

35. For background on this subject see my "Whither Future U.S. Alliance Strategy? The ABCA Clue," *Armed Forces and Society*, Winter 1991, pp. 277-297.

36. As argued by François Heisbourg in *The New York Times*, 12 January 1991. Note that as early as October France provided liaison officers to U.S. and Saudi Awacs aircraft. See *Agence France-Presse* (Paris), 10 October 1990 in FBIS-WEU-90-196, 10 October 1990, p. 29.

37. *The Washington Post*, 18 January 1990.

38. Note that the Royal Australian and Royal New Zealand Navies also follow this procedure. See testimony by Admiral Sir Anthony Synnot, R.A.N., in Australia Parliament, Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence, Subcommittee on Defence Matters, *Official Hansard Transcript of Evidence*, vol. I, April 1980-March 1981 (Canberra: Commonwealth Government Printer, 1981), p. 1783; and Norman Dodd, "New Zealand's Defence Problems," *Journal of the Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies*, June 1978, p. 54.

39. *The Washington Post*, 22 August 1990.

40. *Il Sole-24 Ore* (Milano), 24 August 1990.

41. Van Eekelen, "WEU and the Gulf Crisis," p. 525.

42. *ANSA* (Roma), 28 August 1990 in FBIS-WEU-90-168, 29 August 1990, pp. 1-2.

43. *Agence France-Presse* (Paris), 18 September 1990 in FBIS-WEU-90-181, 18 September 1990, p. 4.

44. Van Eekelen, "WEU and the Gulf Crisis," p. 528.

45. *Agence France-Presse* (Paris), 18 September 1990 in FBIS-WEU-90-181, 18 September 1990, p. 4.

46. *Agence France-Presse* (Paris), 20 September 1990 in FBIS-WEU-90-184, 21 September 1990, p. 1.

47. Statement to the Australian Parliament by the Prime Minister, Mr. Bob Hawke, Canberra, 4 December 1990 in Australian Overseas Information Service, *Australia Background* (Washington), pp. 7-8; and *The Sydney Morning Herald*, 5 December 1990.

48. Interview with French foreign minister, Roland Dumas, in *Antenne 2 Television* (Paris), 3 September 1990 in FBIS-WEU-90-172, 5 September 1990, p. 9 and Assembly of Western European Union, *Consequences of the Invasion of Kuwait: Operations in the Gulf*, Report, Document 1243 (Paris: 20 September 1990), pp. 7-8.

49. As evidenced by the December boarding of the "peace ship" *Ibn Khaldoon*, cooperation among the British, American, and Australian navies was excellent. See *Press Association* (London), 26 December 1990 in FBIS-WEU-90-248, 26 December 1990, p. 1.

50. Collins, "High Command Arrangements," p. 5.

51. Bowman, "Iraq-Kuwait Crisis," p. 19.

52. Assembly of the Western European Union, *Consequences of the Invasion of Kuwait: Continuing Operations in the Gulf Region*, Report, Document 1248 (Paris: 7 November 1990), p. 14.

53. *Hilversum International Service*, 9 January 1991 in FBIS-WEU-91-007, 10 January 1991, p. 12.

54. Note that French press sources claim Italian warships fell under French control. See *Domestic Service* (Paris), 23 January 1991 in FBIS-WEU-91-016, 24 January 1991, p. 8. Italian sources, however, claim that all Italian forces were under U.S. operational control, *ANSA* (Roma), 18 January 1991 in FBIS-WEU-91-013, 18 January 1991, p. 45. According to press reports, the W.E.U. was eventually able to solve its coordination problems by creating more detailed guidelines. See *NRC Handelsblad* (Rotterdam), 9 January 1991 in FBIS-WEU-91-011, 16 January 1991, pp. 4-5.

55. *The Wall Street Journal*, 4 September 1990.

56. Van Eekelen, "WEU and the Gulf Crisis," p. 529.

57. *Ibid.*, p. 523.

58. *The Guardian* (London), 30 November 1990.

59. *The Washington Post*, 29 January 1991.

60. *The Washington Post*, 16 September 1990.

61. Dominique David, *La Force d'action rapide en Europe: Le dire des armes* (Paris: Fondation pour les Etudes de Defense nationale, 1984).

62. Carlo Jean, *Studi strategici* (Milano: Franco Angeli Libri, 1990), pp. 171-172.

63. Diego A. Ruiz Palmer, "Spain's Security Policy and Army in the 1990s," *Parameters*, June 1990, pp. 95-97.

64. Philip A. G. Sabin, "British Strategic Priorities in the 1990s," *Adelphi Papers*, no. 254 (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1990), pp. 49-51.

65. *Le Monde* (Paris), 22 September 1990.

66. *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, 5 December 1990.

67. See German foreign minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher's speech to the Bundestag in *ARD Television Network* (Hamburg), 13 December 1991 in FBIS-WEU-91-241, 16 December 1991, pp. 8-9. The twelve European Community members are: Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom.

68 *The Washington Post*, 12 December 1991.

69. Van Eekelen, "WEU and the Gulf Crisis," pp. 521-522.

70. As suggested by British foreign secretary Douglas Hurd, the W.E.U. could well serve as a bridge between the E.C. and the United States. See *The New York Times*, 26 December 1990.

71. Assembly of the Western European Union, *Observation Satellites—A European Means of Verifying Disarmament: Guidelines Drawn from the Symposium*, Report, Document 1230 (Paris: 25 May 1990).

72. *The New York Times*, 26 December 1990. It should be noted as well that there is far from being a consensus within the W.E.U. to standing military formations. For instance, a proposal to create multinational formations was defeated at the April 1990 council of foreign and defense ministers. See *Agence France-Presse* (Paris), 23 April 1990 in FBIS-WEU-90-079, 24 April 1990, p. 1.

73. As argued in *Consequences of the Invasion of Kuwait*, 7 November 1990, p. 25.

74. *The New York Times*, 26 December 1990.

75. *The Washington Post*, 12 December 1991.

76. See comments made by the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, General John Galvin, to the Times Journal Co., 17 September 1990 in *ACE Output*, November 1990, p. 2.

77. Van Eekelen, "WEU and the Gulf Crisis," p. 522.

78. Helmut Sonnenfeldt, "The European Pillar: The American View," in "The Changing Strategic Landscape," *Adelphi Papers*, no. 235 (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1989), pp. 95, 103 and David Yost, "France and West European Defence Identity, *Survival*, July-August 1991, pp. 327-351.

Ψ

Norwegian Security Policy
A Time for Change?

Captain Torstein Seim, Royal Norwegian Navy

THE OBJECTIVE OF NORWEGIAN SECURITY POLICY is to prevent or, if necessary, repel aggression on Norwegian territory. In addition, our Norwegian security policy is intended to enable us to resist any attempted political or military coercion so that we may remain free to determine ourselves the structure of our society.

Membership in Nato has been and still is the cornerstone of Norwegian security policy. It protects Norway against both external threats and political pressure. From the start of the Cold War in 1948-49 until very recently, the Soviet Union has been regarded as the only military threat against Norwegian territory. The political changes within the Soviet Union and in East Europe have quite naturally raised the question of whether this threat still exists. Further, the member nations of the European Community (E.C.) to a certain extent coordinate and discuss foreign and security policy, and the Western European Union (W.E.U.) has been used to address military actions outside the Nato area. All this has suggested the possibility that Nato has fulfilled its role and should be replaced by a more flexible defense mechanism within the E.C.

Facing both a change in the threat and an uncertain future for Nato, Norway must reconsider at least parts of the security policy and military strategy that will take it well into the next century. Not being a member of the European Community makes this even more pressing.

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This paper was written in spring 1991 when Captain Seim was a student at the Naval Command College of the U.S. Naval War College, from which he graduated in June of that year.

The views expressed in this article are the author's and are not necessarily shared by the Royal Norwegian Navy.

This paper considers what options Norway has that will substitute for its present membership in Nato. It looks in particular into future possible alliances and, in general terms, describes the national military strategy required.

Norwegian National Interests and Security Objectives

Norwegian national interests have not been clearly stated by the politicians. In general they can, however, be defined as defense of the homeland, economic well-being, a favorable world order, and promotion of values.[1]

Defense of the homeland is the most vital national interest. Our security policy is aimed toward this goal, and there has long been broad agreement about the fundamental objectives. These are stated, for example, in Report 54 (1987-88) to the Storting (Norwegian parliament). The objectives are preventing war in our area, safeguarding our sovereignty and freedom of action as well as our right to shape our own society, and contributing to peaceful development in the rest of the world. The first two objectives are related directly to the defense of the homeland, while the third, of a more general character, will in the longer term contribute to achieving the others.

Instruments of security policy include both defensive military action and political reassurance initiatives. The latter involves arms control, arms reduction, and Norwegian prohibitions on foreign bases and nuclear weapons in peacetime.

Norway has heretofore relied on a strong national defense and membership within Nato to provide protection against the threat represented by the Soviet Union. At present there is no reason to believe that the security policy objectives stated here will be changed in the foreseeable future. As to means, however, in particular the Nato alliance, there is reason to believe that Norway should look for, or at least consider, other alternatives in the future.

Economic well-being is fundamental to providing the means necessary to achieve our basic security goals. The Norwegian economy has since the end of World War II enjoyed an almost continuous rise in prosperity. In the 1949-1985 period the gross national product rose 4.2 percent per annum in fixed kroner, a rise of 440 percent in thirty-five years.[2] Since 1985, however, the economy has undergone a severe setback that has forced the government to implement strict measures to get it back onto an even keel. This also affects defense spending; in 1990 the defense budget ceased to have any real growth. From 1990 until 2000 the armed forces will probably get thirty to forty billion Norwegian kroner (five to seven billion U.S. dollars) less than is needed to maintain present force structure and activity. This will be a major factor in force planning.

One of the most crucial questions concerning the economy is what sort of relationship Norway will establish with the European Community in the years to come. Around seventy percent of Norway's exports go to the twelve member countries of the E.C., but Norway is also a member of the European Free Trade

Association (EFTA).[3] Negotiations between the EFTA and E.C. over internal market adjustment issues are now in progress. The outcome will to a large extent determine if Norway will apply for membership in the E.C. or remain outside. Besides its economic implications, this decision will also be of the greatest importance for our security policy in the years to come.

As to our national interests in a *favorable world order* and *promotion of values*, Norway as a small nation does not have the means to achieve any such major goals on her own; this can only be done through cooperation with other nations. Since World War II Norway has regarded the United Nations as a cornerstone of the country's foreign policy. Other means are, of course, Norway's Nato membership and its work toward arms control and mutual disarmament.

Looking into the future, the U.N. will probably be of even greater importance than today. The recent war in the Persian Gulf, where an aggressive nation was forced to comply with the resolutions of the Security Council, gives good reason to believe this.

The Threat

The strategic importance of Norway is linked to its geographic position. The country stretches from fifty-eight to seventy-one degrees north latitude, with a coastline of 2,650 kilometers facing the Skagerrak and the North, Norwegian, and Barents Seas (see map). Due to the effect of the Gulf Stream the whole coastline, with its numerous fjords and harbours, is ice-free throughout the year.

As a consequence, in the last century it was two dominant European land powers that have represented the greatest threats against our territory—first Germany and then the Soviet Union. Both were trying to achieve world dominance, and both faced sea powers (Great Britain and the United States, respectively) as their main adversaries.

Norway managed to stay out of World War I due to a relatively strong national defense and the ability of the British Royal Navy to control the North and Norwegian Seas. In World War II German forces occupied Norway for five years; the German navy, which required bases with access to the open sea, was the main advocate of the strategy that led to the attack. Faced after World War II with a threat from another major land power, Norway joined the Nato alliance, which included two major sea powers, the United States and Great Britain. This has so far served us well.

Looking into the future, it is not likely that the direct military threat will be linked to anything else than our geographical position. Even though Norway possesses some natural resources, most importantly crude oil, this hardly represents a big enough "reward" to induce any nation to attack it. Rather, the potential threat in the future will be represented by a major land power striving to achieve sea power.

Europe today is moving toward a new political reality. German unification has taken place, Germany remaining a Nato member; the Warsaw Pact has fallen apart, leaving the Soviet Union without any military allies in Europe; and inside the Soviet Union enormous domestic problems have to be solved if the nation is to survive in any form. However, there is no reason to believe that even if the union falls entirely apart Russia will not play a major role in a future Europe and remain itself a major military power.

It is most unlikely that a reunified Germany will present any form of military threat to its neighbors in the foreseeable future. The lessons Germany learned from the last war and its close cooperation with other nations within both Nato and the European Community during the last few decades have changed Germany's previous destructive nationalism. To Norway the implication is that the only nation left in Europe that could represent any *real* threat in the future is either the Soviet Union, or if the union collapses, Russia.

"The strategic importance of Norway is linked to its geographic position. . . . Looking into the future, it is not likely that the direct military threat will be linked to anything else. . . ."

Historically one of the main goals of Russian or Soviet foreign and security policy has been to secure naval bases with access to the open sea. Norway's geographical position is such that two of the Soviet Union's most important naval base areas can be threatened from Norwegian soil. To the south, the Baltic approaches are close to the Norwegian coast and airfields; to the north, Norway borders the Kola Peninsula, which contains the world's highest concentration of offensive maritime power. The large Soviet Northern Fleet base complex, from the Zapadnaya to the Kola Fjords, is situated only about forty to seventy kilometers from the Norwegian border. Within this area we find the home bases for the Typhoon and Delta IV strategic submarines, as well as such major surface forces as the cruiser *Kirov* and the aircraft carrier *Kuznetsov*.

To demonstrate how important Kola is to the Soviet Union/Russia, it is enough to remember that fifty-six percent of the total fleet of SSBN-SSGNs is located in the Northern Fleet. In addition to the fleet, naval infantry and aircraft as well as units from the air force and army have to be included. In case of crisis or war, it is obvious that, from a military point of view, adding parts of North Norway to Soviet/Russian territory would greatly improve the defence of this vital area. Another and less costly option would be to prevent any other "hostile" power (i.e., Nato or the United States) from using Norwegian territory by denying it access to North Norway.

The Soviet navy has an important role in the present situation. Its general missions are:[4]


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NAUTICAL MILES
jerry lamothe

• Operating and protecting the Northern and Pacific Ocean Fleets' strategic nuclear ballistic force;

• Protecting the seaward approaches of the Soviet Union from air, sea, or amphibious attacks (especially from nuclear-capable forces such as attack submarines, aircraft carrier battle groups, air and sea-launched cruise missiles; and,

• Supporting Soviet ground forces by securing contiguous maritime flanks (by naval fire and logistical support, amphibious assault, and disrupting enemy sea lines of communication).

In view of the nature of the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) negotiations, there are no signs that reduced force levels in Central Europe will have any effect on the naval side; arms control at sea is not a topic of formal discussion between East and West. This has traditionally been an area where the United States has shown particular reluctance. Taking into account the country's dependence on sea-borne trade and the need for sea power to protect her national interests, this is not surprising. Being a traditional land power, the Soviet Union/Russia has not the same need for maritime freedom of action as the U.S. It has, however, clearly seen the need for a strong navy to support both her military and political goals. The Soviet Union is at present carrying out a program of scrapping obsolescent naval ships and building up a smaller but qualitatively better, and probably more capable, force. Looking at the operational pattern, it is apparent that the Soviets are now concentrating more on their home waters. In view of the mission of their navy, economic constraints, and reduced superpower ambitions, this is not surprising.

When implemented, the Start (Strategic Arms Reduction Talks) agreement will result in a reduction of strategic submarines (SSBNs) and sea-based intercontinental ballistic missiles. The relative number compared to land-based intercontinental missiles and long-range bombers will, however, increase. On the Soviet/Russian side this could result in the scrapping of older strategic submarines in favour of the modern Typhoon and Delta classes. This would increase the relative importance of these weapon platforms, and of the Kola base.

Looking at the military threat in general, it has been reduced considerably. In the north, however, the military capacity at Kola is still very high. This, combined with the unstable political situation in the Soviet Union/Russia, results in a potential threat Norway can not disregard.

Possible Alliances

As long as the Nato alliance remains a credible defense organization, Norway will have no need to look for other security arrangements. However, as has been pointed out, this situation can very well change within the next five to ten years. In choosing a new defense alliance, Norway would need to address the following basic security requirements:

• The alliance, or alliance partner, should have armed forces powerful enough to deter an attack on Norway from the Soviet Union or Russia. If deterrence fails, it must be able to send reinforcements by sea or air.

• The alliance, or partner, should posses substantial sea power. In principle it should be able to deny the Soviet Union (Russia) any prospect of invading Norway by sea or exercising sea control or sea denial in the Norwegian and North Seas.

As to potential future alliances, there are three alternatives of interest: a Nordic defense cooperation arrangement between Norway, Sweden, Denmark, and Finland; a defense union with the European Community; and a defense alliance with the United States.

Nordic Defense Cooperation. In 1948-49, Nordic countries tried to solve their security problems through cooperation on defense. Negotiations between Norway, Sweden, and Denmark were started, but broke down in 1949. Eventually Norway and Denmark joined the Nato alliance, and Sweden continued her policy of nonalignment in peace and neutrality in war. Finland's military forces were limited by the 1945 Paris Peace Treaty; in 1948 the Finns formalized their country's strategic position in an agreement with the Soviet Union on "Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance."

Since 1949 Norway has probably slightly improved her combat power. Sweden, on the other hand, has to a great extent reduced her forces, in particular the navy but also the air force and army. Denmark has also seen a rather drastic reduction of forces, especially during the last ten years. Finland, however, has probably increased her military capability. As previously mentioned, Finland has had certain restrictions on weaponry and the numbers of its standing forces. After the reunification of the two German states, Finland declared that she no longer regarded these restriction as valid. Consequently there are now no formal limitations on the structure and size of future Finnish armed forces. The army has traditionally had the highest priority. In the years to come, it is planned to carry out a comprehensive renewal of equipment that will result in a general strengthening of the armed forces. At present the total mobilization force numbers approximately 700,000 men.[5]

Common to all four countries is military service based on conscription. Accordingly, standing forces are relatively small, and the armies in particular have a high number of personnel in basic training. In general, all these forces are structured to fight a defensive war within their respective countries and have only a limited capability to operate outside them. An important factor here is logistics, which to a great extent would be provided from civilian resources.

It is quite clear that the combined forces of the Nordic countries do not, as Norwegian alliance needs require, dispose a military force great enough to prevent an attack against Norway from the Soviet Union. As demonstrated in

sea-denial exercises off the coast of North Norway, the navies of the Nordic countries, being primarily coastal forces, do not have the capability to achieve more than local control in limited areas along their own coasts.

Of greater importance than present military capabilities, of course, is the political will to form an alliance. Without going into detail, there is good reason to believe that Sweden, Finland, and Denmark will consider their security interests best served by maintaining their present policies. If the dissolution of Nato should happen within the next year, it will not have any immediate impact on Sweden or Finland. Denmark, a member nation, would, like Norway, have to consider other possible alliances. Being a member of the European Community, it is most likely that Denmark would look to that body for her basic security needs. In this connection it is also of interest that Sweden has stated that she will apply for membership within the E.C.; there is reason to believe that Finland is also moving in that direction. What this would mean for the future security and defense policies of these two nations has not been debated in any great depth; however, any change in the present situation could be of great importance to Norway.

Defense Union within the European Community. At present the European Community as such is not able to deal with military matters; up to now the Nato structure has been considered sufficient for basic security and military coordination within Europe. However, since the collapse of communism and the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, many regard the long-morbid Western European Union as a suitable body for coordinating the military strategy and activity of the future Community.[6] The inability of Nato to operate out of its area has of course made this a pressing matter.

Italy, which held the rotating presidency of the E.C. in the second half of 1990, went so far as to suggest that the W.E.U. be absorbed by the Community, although three E.C. members—Denmark, Greece, and Ireland—are not members of the Union, and Ireland is neutral. Jacques Delors, the president of the European Community, has also strongly endorsed plans by Community governments to discuss integration of their foreign and military policies.

As possible defense partners for Norway in place of Nato, a potential European Community-based defense union is obviously of great interest. Considering only the military side, the force balance within Europe after CFE will be more favorable to the Europeans than previously. Therefore, if Nato should be succeeded by a European defense union (or more probably by a common European pillar within a future Nato), U.S. forces in Europe will be reduced—though President Bush has recently given assurances that they will not be pulled out altogether. Plans to reduce the existing troops to approximately 100,000 are already being worked out as a part of the overall U.S. reduction of its armed forces. An important factor here is of course nuclear deterrence; Europe would

still need assurance from the United States in this field. Both France and Great Britain do, however, have a nuclear capability that can not be disregarded by a potential aggressor.

Norway would be able, then, to get the necessary element of deterrence as a member of a European defense union. The matter of possible reinforcements to Norway requires more in-depth study; however, with the reduced threat from the Soviet Union toward Central Europe, forces from Great Britain, Germany, and France could be allocated to Norway. (Historically this is not a new situation; after the German attack on Norway in 1940, both British and French forces came to assist.) Within Nato, British and recently German forces as well have been earmarked to reinforce Norway in case of crisis or war.

"The naval aspect would probably be the most critical. . . . It is obvious that even with a separate European defense union, U.S. naval forces capable of rapid deployment to the Norwegian Sea will be of great importance."

The naval aspect would probably be the most critical. Even with French participation, the European countries would not be able to muster a naval force with enough offensive power to counter the Northern Fleet. This implies that North Norway, at least, runs the risk of being isolated in case of crisis or war. Being a member of an alliance would, of course, limit the overall possibility of this happening; however, it is obvious that even with a separate European defense union, U.S. naval forces capable of rapid deployment to the Norwegian Sea will be of great importance.

It is difficult to foresee whether joining a defense union with the European Community would require membership in the E.C. itself. At present Norway is not a member, and the subject is still a rather tense one within Norwegian society. So far the security policy and military implications of Norway's remaining outside the organization have been given little notice. This has its background in the fact that Nato is still regarded as a viable organization and the resulting perception that there is no need to discuss alternatives. Recent developments within the E.C. toward a monetary and political union have, however, changed this. It is a genuine fear that Norway, not being a member of the Community or the Western European Union, will be in a position where basic security needs will not be covered. These arguments are now being brought more and more strongly into the discussion on the future relationship between Norway and the E.C.

Defense Alliance with the United States. Norway has several bilateral agreements within the Nato alliance for mutual support in case of crisis or war. At present the equipment for one American Marine Expeditionary Brigade is pre-stocked

in Troendelag. Use of Norwegian airfields by U.S. and other allied air forces is provided for and regulated by the Collocated Operating Bases Agreement. There are also several other agreements and contingency plans covering the potential use of U.S. forces in support of Norway or the Northern Flank as such. Norway, being a member of Nato, also benefits from the overall deterrence represented by the United States—its forces in Europe, its naval presence, its ability to project sea power in the Norwegian and Barents Seas, and its strategic nuclear forces.

As to a future alliance, it is of course a promising option for Norway to seek the United States as a defense partner. The necessary national security requirements could be met simply by maintaining today's situation. Being in an alliance with a superpower like the United States would also give considerable advantages with respect to a threat from the Soviet Union or Russia.

From the U.S. point of view, it will probably be of value to continue cooperation with Norway as long as the threat from the strategic submarine force at Kola is regarded as a vital interest of the United States. Should this threat disappear, however, it is quite uncertain if such an alliance would involve sufficiently vital American interests to justify the resources required. With a stable situation in Central Europe, and the European Community having established its own defense union, the United States would probably be primarily concerned with contingencies in other parts of the world. This is a process which in fact has already started; the U.S. is redefining its national interests and, in turn, the structure and future strategy of its armed forces. As a realistic goal, Norway should work to ensure that the United States maintains at least the necessary naval power in the North Atlantic and the Norwegian Sea to counter Soviet or Russian naval forces in the area.

Strategy and Force Structure

It is not possible to predict if Nato will continue in its present form or be transformed into another type of organization. There are, however, good arguments for its continued relevance. They were stated by the Norwegian minister of defense, Johan Joergen Holst, in an address on "Future Tasks of the Atlantic Alliance" delivered on 23 February 1991 to the Security Policy Conference of the German Atlantic Association.

- It provides a framework for continued North American engagement in the security of Europe, on the basis of commitments to collective defense.
- It ensures essential military equivalence with the Soviet Union, providing against the danger of a future renaissance of imperial ambitions or spillover from domestic turmoil or breakdown.
- It maintains the coherence of the security order in Europe, from the Atlantic to the Urals and from the Barents Sea to the Mediterranean.

• It provides a framework for German participation in the management of security in Europe on the basis of equality with her partners.

• It provides a framework for containing the spread of nuclear weapons.

• It underwrites the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) process and the construction of a cooperative security order in the region.[7]

With regard to the Norwegian national armed forces, there is no military justification for a substantial reduction. The threat, as previously described, will in the future be mainly represented by the forces in the Kola. Unfortunately for Norway, there are basic strategic interests of the Soviet Union and Russia still remaining in this area; a potential threat results even if Norway is not a target in itself. However, the economic situation can lead, and actually has led, to increasing cuts in the Norwegian defense budget. The availability of resources may consequently reduce our ability to keep a balanced national force, and increase thereby the risks we have to accept.

The most serious of these risks is probably the impact a less competent Norwegian defense would have on the will of our allies to send reinforcements in case of crisis or war. If we reduce our own ability to fight an effective battle until allied reinforcements can arrive, will any of our partners commit their troops to assist us? In my view this is not very likely. When the threat from the Soviet Union was seen to be high, it was in the interest of the Nato alliance and in particular the United States to support the Northern Flank. However, with the lessening of this threat to the United States and the Nato alliance, the U.S.

"If we reduce our own ability to fight an effective battle until allied reinforcements can arrive, will any of our partners commit their troops to assist us?"

Navy is in the process of reducing its force to 450 ships with twelve carrier battle groups.[8] It will probably be much harder in the future to get on the priority list for the support of these ships. At present the U.S. Marine Expeditionary Brigade, the British-Dutch commando brigade earmarked for use in Norway, and the newly established "Nato Composite Force" (U.S., German, and Norwegian) are not meant to carry out opposed landings. They are to be brought to an area where they can be organized and then taken to the front line. If Norway limits its ability to resist an invasion long enough to allow reinforcements to arrive relatively safely, they may never show up at all.

Another important area which may suffer from defense cuts is our ability to control allied forces that do come to Norway. It has been a clear policy that Norwegian officers will control both Norwegian and allied forces operating within the country. However, with a possible reduction of Norway's operational

staffs and less money for exercises, the ability to do so might very well be reduced to a level not acceptable to our allies.

Possible means to reduce the impact of reduced resources include increased efficiency and better use of available resources, reduction of personnel not contributing to defense, restructuring the present defense organization, reducing the number of bases and standing forces in peacetime, prestocking equipment in North Norway, and implementing new concepts for training (with more use of simulators). These are only some general means which have to be considered in the future if national objectives are to be met. It is, however, beyond the aim of this paper to go into more detail about planning of forces.

With regard to the future policy to keep tensions low, in our area in particular and within Europe in general, we look to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe as a vehicle to create such conditions. This will probably take time; at present we are waiting for the first part of the CFE treaty to be implemented. The next step in the negotiations ("CFE-1A") will deal with personnel reductions. Norway will work in particular for the reduction of forces in the Kola and close to its own borders.

Norwegian national interests in general are not likely to change in the near future. National security objectives as well will remain as they are today. As to the possible future threat, it will still be represented by the Soviet Union, or Russia. Limitations of conventional forces in Europe and land-based nuclear weapons could result in an increased importance of the Soviet (Russian) navy, in particular the Northern Fleet. This could in turn result in the long term in an increased threat against North Norway. It is important for Norway to maintain the present level of national forces and to be a member of an alliance that has the ability to counter the threat from, in particular, the naval forces of the Kola. At present, Nato membership covers our security requirements; in the event that Nato is dissolved, the best solution for Norway would be defense cooperation with the European Community. In addition, a U.S. naval presence in the Atlantic and the Norwegian Sea would be most important to counter the Northern Fleet and prevent Norway from being isolated in case of crisis or war.

In further defense planning it is important to find solutions which can limit the impact of the reduced resources allocated for defense spending. If this cannot be achieved, Norway will have to accept an increased risk.

Notes

1. Naval War College Force Planning Faculty, *Fundamentals of Force Planning* (Newport, R.I.: Naval War College Press), v. 2, p. 110.

2. Tom Dagre, "Change of Direction for Norway's Economy," *Norway Information* (Oslo: Norinform, May 1989), p. 1.

3. Helge Loland, "Some Questions of Norwegian Foreign Policy," *Norway Information* (Oslo, Norinform: 7 January 1990), p. 3.

4. *Soviet Military Power, 1990* (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1990), chap. 4.

5. International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance 1990-1991* (London: Brassey's, 1990), p. 90.

6. The Western European Union (W.E.U.) was established 6 May 1955 in London to promote European cooperation on defense and security matters. Its members are Belgium, Great Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain.

7. Johan Joergen Holst, "New Dimensions of Security," *Ministry of Defence Information*, no. 2 (Oslo: Royal Ministry of Defence, Press and Information Department, February 1991), pp. 39-40.

8. Information given in a brief at the Pentagon by the Chief of Naval Operations staff to students of the Naval War College's Naval Command College, April 1991.

Ψ

OSLO – A majority of the Norwegian voters is opposed to cutting defense costs below today's level. Furthermore, more women than men tend to be in favor of increasing the defense budget, according to an opinion poll performed by Opinion A/S. Sixty-six percent of the voters say they prefer to keep the defense expenses at today's level, or even increase the defense budget. However, the poll showed a vast difference in attitude between men and women, figures not registered in previous polls. Men seem to be more inclined to favor further defense expense cuts than women, while women outnumber men two to one among those in favor of increasing the defense expenditures, according to the Oslo daily *Aftenposten*.

Norway Times
5 March 1992

A World of Difference
Soviet Antisubmarine Warfare in 1991

Milan N. Vego

THE FINAL YEARS OF THE EXISTENCE of the Soviet Union—a period that encompassed also the dissolution of the Warsaw Treaty Organization—were, notwithstanding, years of substantial development of antisubmarine warfare thought and capability in the Soviet navy. Some of this progress was readily visible to the West, particularly in the introduction of highly capable general-purpose nuclear submarines (SSNs). Evidence of concomitant development of operational doctrine (in the Western use of the term) was also available to the West in open sources, many of them from the former members of the W.T.O. However, implicit in this material (but yielding only to the most patient and painstaking study) there were also to be seen the foundations of this characteristically elaborate body of theory. It is possible today to describe with considerable detail, accuracy, and confidence the structure and content of Soviet antisubmarine theory as it was in 1991. We can do so for that year with probably more authority than was ever before possible.

But today, of course, the Soviet navy itself is no more. It may, as it appears at this writing, be divided among some of the sovereign states that once formed the Soviet Union: Russia, of course, and Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Azerbaijan, and perhaps the Baltic States as well. Soviet naval analyses as such, once so urgent, are now historical. There is certainly much historical interest in a full accounting of the formal underpinnings of a Soviet naval capability that had been of such concern to the West. Perhaps, however, the matter has even more relevance: it will be, after all, the Russian Republic that inherits most or all of the formerly Soviet SSNs, in their Arctic and Pacific bases.

What will the new republic choose to do with its ready-made navy and with its many submarines? Although the political leadership is entirely new (in a sense, at least), the Russian naval leadership comprises the men, or many of them, that directed and operated the warships and submarines when they flew the old flag. It is arguable that the new nation will face, or believe it faces, defensive challenges

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at sea much like those the old union had addressed, and further that it will set about them in similar ways. Among all the radical transformations, then, we may look for certain continuities. The prospect for carry-over is likely enough in the area of antisubmarine warfare that a study of the antisubmarine thinking of the *Russian* navy may well begin with a snapshot of what was bequeathed it by its Soviet predecessor.

Because they carry the most authoritative Soviet views on a given subject (especially definitions), the most valuable Soviet and Eastern European sources are encyclopedias and dictionaries. The Soviets' penchant for defining precisely each military or naval term had deep roots in the military culture and traditions of Imperial Russia. Marxist-Leninist ideology only reinforced and further dogmatized these habits. It will be evident that the Soviets used a great number of terms to describe forms of activity which appear to be identical or to differ from one another only by a hair's breadth. However, this was how Soviet officers talked with and wrote for one another.

During their long years under Soviet dominion, all the Eastern European military services adopted the Marxist-Leninist theory on war and revolution and almost slavishly copied everything the Soviets did. This is evident in the definitions cited, for example, in the East German and the Yugoslav military dictionaries and encyclopedias. Whenever a Soviet source is cited here, East German or Yugoslav sources are cited as well.

Analysis based on open Soviet and Eastern European sources does have limitations. Presumably some conceptual developments of the last months and weeks before the demise of the Soviet Union went uncaptured. (Some major figures devoted themselves to politics, such as Rear Admiral Vyacheslav Shcherbakov of the Kuznetsov Naval Academy, who became vice mayor of Leningrad.) In general, the materials are inconsistent at times, and often downright contradictory; there is often too much data on one subject and not enough on others; and the sources may describe procedures that were already out of date. However, if properly read and interpreted, such literature can yield a reasonably reliable picture of how the Soviets really thought about what they called the "struggle against submarines," and how they intended to wage it.

Missions and Tasks

Because of the perceived need to protect the Soviet Union from ballistic missiles fired by Western submarines, "the struggle against submarines" was its navy's principal concern.[1] The arming of U.S. attack submarines with Tomahawk land-attack cruise missiles added importance to the mission. These

submarines would pose a serious threat in any general conflict because they could deliver precise and highly destructive strikes against an opponent's naval bases and other coastal installations from long ranges with little or no warning.

The Soviet armed forces had three principal missions: to repulse an opponent's attack (*napadeniye*) from air or space, to suppress his military-economic potential, and to destroy his armed forces. Within this framework, the chief missions of the Soviet navy specifically were to repel air or space attacks from the ocean axes, to help demolish the enemy's most important installations ashore, to interfere with his oceanic and sea communications, to destroy his naval forces at sea and in their bases, and to cooperate with Soviet ground forces in their own operations.

Submarine and antisubmarine warfare were concerned with the first and second of these naval missions: the first involved destroying the enemy's missile submarines, the second belonged to Soviet ballistic missile and cruise missile submarines. But to be successful these Soviet attack and missile submarines had to be protected in their sanctuaries (in the West arbitrarily called "bastions") and operating areas. Oscar-class nuclear-powered cruise-missile submarines (SSGNs) also needed protection during their sea transit and when they arrived in their assigned patrolling areas.

Prerequisites

The greatest threat to one's own ballistic and cruise missile submarines comes from enemy attack submarines. The struggle against them is in turn an integral part—in fact in Soviet thought it was the most important part—of the navy's overall efforts to attain "mastery at sea" (*gospodstvo na more*) in a specific part of the ocean or in the seas adjacent to the Soviet-controlled shores. The Soviets reportedly planned to achieve sea mastery in the area extending about four hundred nautical miles from the Kola and Kamchatka peninsulas in the first two weeks of a general conflict, and ultimately to extend this area to about eight hundred nautical miles seaward. At the outset of hostilities the main effort of the Soviet fleets would have been directed toward attaining such mastery in the operating area of their "strategic" submarines. Gaining mastery of the sea included destroying the enemy's submarine bases and command-and-control centers on the coast. Within the sea area itself, the actions against enemy submarines would have involved establishing antisubmarine warfare (ASW) barriers, defending non-ASW warships and convoys, laying mines at the approaches to enemy bases, and destroying the West's Sound Ocean Surveillance System (Sosus).[2]

To protect their missile submarines in their sanctuaries and during their deployment at sea, the Soviet navy had to attain and then maintain what the Soviets called (as did their Eastern European allies) a "favorable operational

regime" or "combat survivability of basing and deployment areas." This concept assumed a reliable system for basing, preparing, and deploying one's own forces and for providing early warning of an approaching enemy. "Favorable operational regime" should not by any means be confused with the term "sea mastery," because the latter objective cannot be attained without first assuring a favorable operational regime. Such a regime primarily depends on coastal surveillance systems and coastal missile-artillery troops, and upon properly fitting out naval basing areas. It also required that Soviet forces be able to find and destroy hostile submarines threatening Soviet ships at sea or in their bases, to protect their own coastal installations from missiles, and to prevent enemy submarines from conducting reconnaissance or minelaying in nearby coastal and offshore waters.[3]

Antisubmarine Forces

ASW assets included not only the navy's general-purpose submarines, fixed-wing aircraft, helicopters, and surface ships, but also the air force and the air defense forces.[4] The air force's Long-Range Aviation component would have delivered "strategic strikes" against the enemy's submarine bases and other coastal facilities while air defense forces controlled those reconnaissance satellites watching hostile submarines and their facilities.

The Soviets considered their nuclear-powered torpedo attack submarines to be the most effective means they had to search for, detect, and destroy hostile submarines. They were therefore the first line of defense against enemy SSNs threatening Soviet ships of all sorts. They were also the primary instrument for hunting down and attacking enemy ballistic-missile submarines at the approaches to the latter's bases and in their operating areas.

Though diesel-electric attack submarines are too limited in range to be effective in open-ocean ASW, their high maneuverability and low self-generated noise (when running on batteries) made them useful for ASW in sea areas close to Soviet-controlled shores, along barriers, or in straits and narrows where hostile submarines were expected to transit. Accordingly the Soviets used the Kilo class, and perhaps also the Tango class, as their second line of defense.

Surface ships, the most versatile of antisubmarine platforms, were the basic component of forces deployed in the inner ASW sub-zone (defined below under the heading of "ASW defense"), and they remained irreplaceable for point defense of naval formations and convoys at sea. Surface ships used to be much faster than submarines, but this advantage has diminished drastically. Though generally they have an inferior sonar detection range compared with modern submarines, they are fitted with a variety of sensors and are able to maintain contact with a hostile submarine once established. They also carry a powerful antisubmarine armament.

Aviation was tasked with combating enemy submarines both in the sea and ocean TVDs (theaters of military operation). Its main advantage over other forces is the speed with which aircraft are able to arrive in a designated search area, to sweep large areas, and to shift their efforts from one area to another. They are stealthy in tracking and highly effective in attack. However, their endurance (especially that of helicopters) and armament are slight compared with those of surface ships. Also, Soviet aircraft found it difficult to maintain contact with submerged submarines and to localize contacts precisely.[5]

Tactical Organization

The basic tactical-sized submarine unit was a group of two or more boats, usually of the same class, kept together for the duration of the mission at hand. The comparable ASW aviation unit (called an "air search-strike group") consisted of four to six single-type fixed-wing aircraft or helicopters organized to search, to strike, or do both; it could be used independently or as an adjunct of a surface force or convoy escort.[6]

The primary surface tactical-sized antisubmarine unit consisted of two or three ships usually of the same class. The larger tactical-sized forces, consisting of four to six ships of various types, were called "ship search groups" and "ship search-strike groups." A ship search-strike group was likely to include an ASW cruiser as flagship. When such a force was in a remote area, it usually included one or two destroyers or guard ships (frigates, as the latter are called in the West) armed with surface-to-air missiles, to improve its survivability under air attack.[7]

A composite force, called a "search-strike group," consisted of a ship search-strike group joined with fixed-wing aircraft or helicopters. In one exercise, such a group included two *Udaloy*-class "large ASW ships," one Krivak-type "guard ship," and several fixed-wing ASW aircraft.

Force Control

Soviet officers writing on ASW in their professional publications stressed the need for the highest degree of centralization and cooperation. In fact, the Soviet ASW concept was based on the premise that success at sea is unlikely when single types of forces—attack submarines, aircraft, or surface ships—are employed alone. Therefore cooperative action, whether in sea or oceanic areas, along barriers, or in defense of naval formations and convoys, was the basic principle for the employment Soviet ASW forces.[8]

As an ideal, cooperation of diverse forces meant that the task of each element be assigned clearly, that each search sector be determined accurately, and that timing of the actions of all participating forces be coordinated. The Soviets hoped in this way not only to avoid mutual interference and attacks upon each other

but also to compensate for the superior operational and tactical characteristics of Western submarines.[9] (At least, this was a concern when Soviet submarines generally were greatly inferior to their potential foes.) To achieve these results, the commander, whether ashore or afloat, had to exercise tight control over all forces engaged in his sea or ocean area. Such control demands smooth exchange of information during both planning and execution, and this necessity required highly centralized collection, evaluation, and display of situational data.

Unfortunately for the theory, communications between Soviet attack submarines and surface ships were in fact inadequate. Accordingly, cooperation was in practice a matter predominantly of mutual support between surface ships and aviation only. Force cooperation in open-ocean ASW essentially consisted of coordinating independent searches by SSNs, tactical-sized groups of fixed-wing aircraft, and large surface ships so as to accomplish a single operational objective. This objective could be to neutralize the threat of enemy SSNs in an operational-sized part of a maritime TVD, or to prevent such SSNs from penetrating a Soviet ASW barrier established in an important strait or narrows.

As for the future, if the Russians can develop reliable means of underwater communications to permit submarines to act in tactical concert with each other and with surface ships, their ASW platforms will be able to fire their weapons from positions beyond the enemy's detection and weapons range.[10]

Components of the Struggle against Submarines

The principal components of the Soviet struggle against submarines were reconnaissance, defense, and support.

Reconnaissance. One of the most important requirements of antisubmarine warfare is timely and continuous underwater surveillance. This is a large-scale effort and requires significant support from other forces. The Soviets considered it essential that they be able both to detect hostile submarines at the beginning of their deployment and to strike them anywhere in their operational area. This required the ability to sustain an uninterrupted search for them throughout wide sea or oceanic TVDs.[11] This in turn demanded precise knowledge (gained in peacetime) of the waters and seabed, both in the open ocean and in the enclosed seas washing the Soviet coastline. Yet in practice the Soviets searched for hostile submarines only a few hundred nautical miles to seaward of their own ports.

The main methods used by the Soviets in ASW reconnaissance were: tracking, trailing, searching, patrolling, and sweeping (the last three to be defined below); they were supplemented by surveillance with fixed sea and shore-based submarine detection sensors. Tracking Western SSBNs was once one of the principal tasks laid upon Soviet ASW forces. However, the main prerequisite for success here is covertness; since until recently Soviet SSNs were relatively

noisy, they found that tracking Western SSBNs for days or even a few hours was extremely difficult if not impossible. Trailing became a supposedly a more rewarding, if more difficult, variant of tracking. While tracking a potentially hostile submarine is conducted from longer range and from a variety of positions, trailing is done at short range and generally from stern target angles. But Soviet SSNs were not able, and (at least according to a source now old) never tried, to trail Western SSBNs.[12]

Defense. Submarine defense consists, said the Soviets, of operational and tactical-sized combat actions and also of special measures aimed at preventing reconnaissance, minelaying, and other forms of attack by hostile submarines. Such defense also had to ensure the safety of one's basing system, of ships of all sorts, and of straits and narrows.[13]

On the strategic level, ASW was part of what the Soviets called "universal defense" (*universal'naya oborona*). This concept of the defense of the Soviet homeland against an attack coming from across the sea was apparently adopted in the late 1980s, concurrently with the announced shift toward the military doctrine of "reasonable sufficiency." Among other things, universal defense aimed to ensure protection against any type of threat to coastal installations and to operational-sized forces (flotillas and *eskadras*) at sea.

The outermost boundary of the Soviet universal defense zone extended to about 750 nautical miles seaward from the coast. The entire zone was divided into three sub-zones, called the self-defense, near, and distant defense zones. The self-defense zone, which extended from the center of a defended facility out to a radius of eight or sixteen nautical miles, had as its aim to destroy among other things enemy submarines and their torpedoes or missiles. This was addressed primarily by shipboard systems, including helicopters. In the near defense zone (from eight or sixteen nautical miles out to fifty-four) submarine defense was provided by ship search-strike groups, air search-strike groups, and (composite) search-strike groups. In the distant defense zone, covering the area from fifty-four to 755 nautical miles off the coast, one would have expected to find fixed-wing aircraft and torpedo attack submarines. Their task was to ensure the timely detection of hostile forces, to provide warning of any threat, and to destroy the enemy or at least make it difficult for him to strike (see table).[14]

Depending on the size of the defended area, the Soviets had three methods of ASW defense: *zonal*, *defense of an object*, and a *combination* of these.[15]

Zonal defense (or area defense, as it is known in the West) was organized to protect straits and narrows, coastal waters, naval bases, and commercial ports.[16] Defense of straits and narrows through which enemy submarines were expected to transit was established by forming barriers astride their entrances. These barriers usually consisted of shore-based sonars (and other means of detecting

DEFENSE ZONES		TASKS	FORCES AND ASSETS
NAME	EXTENT (nmi)		
SELF-DEFENSE	0 - 8 (16)	● TO DESTROY ENEMY MISSILES, GUIDED BOMBS, AIRCRAFT, TORPEDOES, SUBMARINES, COMBAT CRAFT, AND MINES	● SHIPBOARD WEAPONS AND ASSETS ● SHIPBOARD HELICOPTERS ● MINESWEEPERS
NEAR	16 - 54	● TO DESTROY HOSTILE AIRCRAFT, SUBMARINES, COMBAT CRAFT, MISSILES IN FLIGHT, AERIAL GUIDED BOMBS, TORPEDOES, AND MINES	● SHIP-STRIKE GROUPS (KUGs) ● SHIP SEARCH-STRIKE GROUPS (KPUGs) ● AIR SEARCH-STRIKE GROUPS (AVPUGs) ● AIR-SHIP SEARCH STRIKE GROUPS (APUGs) ● MINESWEEPING GROUPS (KTGs) ● MINESWEEPING HELICOPTER GROUPS VTGs)
DISTANT	54 - 755	● TO TIMELY DETECT HOSTILE PLATFORMS ● TO PROVIDE WARNING TO OWN SHIPS ● TO DESTROY HOSTILE PLATFORMS OR MAKE IT MORE DIFFICULT THEIR STRIKES AGAINST OWN FORCES	● TACTICAL RECONNAISSANCE GROUPS ● SINGLE MULTIPURPOSE SUBMARINES ● RECONNAISSANCE-STRIKE GROUPS OF SURFACE SHIPS ● ASW AVIATION ● ATTACK AVIATION

Universal Defense of the Fleet Forces

and tracking submarines), nets, mine barriers, and one or more ship search-strike groups and air search-strike groups based nearby.[17]

In the case of ports and bases, enemy submarines had to be destroyed at distances beyond their missile or torpedo range. In all cases, security was provided in part by ships or groups of ships and aircraft, but primary reliance was placed upon fixed underwater sensors and obstacles, especially mines and nets at base and anchorage entrances. All these measures were reportedly organized in peacetime and intensified as needed in the course of hostilities at sea.[18]

Area defense was organized by "antisubmarine defense zones."[19] Each such defense zone consisted of a *distant* and a *near* sub-zone. In general, the near or inner sub-zone extended out from sixty to one hundred nautical miles from the coast. But the inner boundary might have been recently changed to fifty-four nautical miles so to conform to the boundaries of "universal defense." It is not clear how much farther the distant, or outer, sub-zone reached. Presumably forces operating there would have been restricted to reliable command-and-control distance, implying an outer limit of a thousand nautical miles or so from a Soviet-controlled shore. However, the outer submarine defense sub-zones off the Kola and Kamchatka peninsulas probably extended no more than four hundred nautical miles seaward, and approximately twice as much in wartime.

Normally, Soviet forces operating in the outer sub-zone were controlled directly by the commander in chief of the nearest home-based fleet, for in the Soviet view it was in the outer sub-zone that most operational-strategic and strategic ASW would take place—that is, in the Sea of Okhotsk and in the Barents, Greenland, and Bering seas.[20] The forces in the outer sub-zone had to be able to defend themselves from attack of any sort or from any source. This requirement was a major motivation for the development of aircraft carriers and other aircraft-carrying and air defense ships.

Defense of the inner sub-zone, on the other hand, was organized by commanders of local naval bases. An inner sub-zone existed in the operating area of each Soviet fleet; however, only the Northern and Pacific Fleets had both inner and outer sub-zones. Ships and aircraft defending against submarines in the inner sub-zone depended for guidance upon fixed shore and sea-based submarine detection sensors.[21]

No matter what its type, each ASW sub-zone was divided into patrol areas, each of which in turn normally encompassed several patrol sectors. Each sector was guarded by a single ship.[22]

The Soviets called the principal components of an ASW area sub-zone *barriers*, *positions*, and *obstacles*. Although these terms resemble each other, there were real differences in their meanings.

An antisubmarine barrier normally consisted of minefields, nets, and surveillance or tracking sensors on the seabed or coast, and was patrolled by surface ships and fixed-wing aircraft or helicopters. It was an integral part of a defensive

zone. It could be established close to the Soviet-controlled shore (if intended against enemy SSNs) but might be established beyond the range of coastal antiship missiles and guns. A barrier normally included diverse types of moored and bottom influence mines laid in from three hundred to 625 feet of water.[23] (See diagram.)

An antisubmarine position, which could be part of a barrier, consisted of the same kinds of forces and sensors as barriers and in the same kinds of places, but collected around a single point rather than arrayed along a line. When an antisubmarine position was part of a barrier, demarcation or off-limits zones were set up between adjacent positions to guard against inadvertent attack by friendly forces.[24]

Antisubmarine obstacles were simply nets and mines laid to hinder or destroy hostile submarines departing their bases, transiting straits, or penetrating defense areas of Soviet bases or ports. Depending on their location, obstacles could be either independent or part of a barrier.[25]

Defense of an object, or point defense as it is known in the West, was concerned with protection of individual ships and ship forces or convoys during their sea transit or in bases and anchorages. It consisted of a series of measures and combat actions aimed at preventing hostile submarines from carrying out strikes with torpedoes or antiship missiles. Specifically, ASW defense of an object encompassed search for and detection of enemy submarines, informing friendly ship forces or convoys about the detected submarine, preventing a hostile submarine from attaining a position for using its weapons, destroying it and its torpedoes or missiles after launch, and restoring battle-worthiness after a strike by a hostile submarine.

ASW defense of individual ships included measures to reduce the probability of encountering a hostile submarine, camouflage measures (cover, concealment, and deception as known in the West), detection and destruction of an enemy submarine, and jamming the enemy submarine's surveillance sensors and weapon homing systems.[26]

World War II seems to have shown the Soviets that defense against highly maneuverable submarines on the open sea can be successful only through combining area and point-defense systems. This would include establishing a system of surveillance over a wide area for a specified period of time, complemented by close coordination of actions by screening forces and forces of distant cover.[27] The latter pertained to specially created "groupings" of forces deployed at a certain distance from the area in which a naval operation or battle takes place. The aim of these forces would be to intercept the opponent and prevent his strikes against the main body. Forces of distant cover consisted of tactical-sized forces of surface ships, submarines, naval aviation, and coastal missile-artillery troops.[28]

ASW Support. In contrast to ASW defense, ASW support was the support of an operation, battle, or combat actions in general. Increasingly, however, ASW defense and ASW support came to resemble each other, with the line dividing them often difficult to distinguish. The various types of combat support in the Soviet navy also increasingly overlapped. For example, there was almost no type of combat support that did not in one form or another include radio-electronic combat or camouflage measures. Another trend visible in the recent years was the growing interrelationship between support at the tactical level ("combat support") and at operational level ("operational support"). In fact, the tasks of combat support were increasingly taken over by operational support. The reason for this was the steadily enlarging scope of combat actions, which in turn required greater centralization of control of forces and assets in a theater. For example, the commander of a tactical-sized force might be unable to ensure independently the tactical deployment and effective use of his forces and assets in combat because he did not control the necessary supporting forces and assets, which only the operational-sized force commander could provide. Therefore, the scope of support depended to a great degree on the effectiveness of the planning of a naval operation as a whole.[29]

Support of combat actions in general was described by the Soviets as a series of interrelated measures directed at maintaining one's own troops and forces in high combat readiness, ensuring their combat capability, and creating favorable conditions for an organized and timely entrance into battle and then successful conduct of combat actions. It also included measures aimed at preventing or forestalling a surprise enemy attack and reducing the effectiveness of enemy strikes against friendly troops or forces.[30]

The role and significance of "antisubmarine support" in the Soviet navy grew steadily after the mid-1970s, largely because of the need to protect both SSBNs in their sanctuaries and large cruise-missile submarines en route to and on station. ASW support was specifically aimed at increasing the survivability of one's own ships and vessels from enemy submarine strikes—upon their bases on anchorages and during their deployment, sea transit, and execution of their combat actions.

The essence of ASW support lay in organizing surveillance and display of the subsurface situation in a given sea or ocean area, searching for and destroying hostile submarines where their threat was the greatest, establishing (ahead of time) ASW barriers at the approaches to one's naval bases and other areas, and concentrating diverse ASW forces to screen ship forces or convoys. Properly organized ASW support had to ensure timely detection and destruction of enemy submarines before they reached a position from which they could use their weapons.

To make attack difficult or to reduce the effectiveness of possible attack by hostile submarines, the Soviets envisaged the wide use of diverse passive measures. Thus their ships would select their sailing routes and time their



Source: "Potivolodochnyy rubezh" (Antisubmarine Barrier) VMS p. 346

movements to minimize the danger from enemy submarines. During sea transit, the Soviet ships sailed in an "antisubmarine" formation or composite anti-air, anti-submarine, and anti-combat-craft formation. They sailed at the most favorable speeds, conducted ASW avoidance maneuvers, used camouflage measures, and jammed the enemy submarine's sensors and homing weapons.[31]

Forms of Combat Employment

The Soviets used the term "combat actions" to describe the combat employment of their forces at the operational and tactical levels, while the term "military actions" pertained to actions at the strategic scale. Any combat or military action had its "type," "form," and "method." These terms might sound awkward to an English speaker, but their meaning must be described in order to understand the Soviet concepts. The "type" of combat action depended on the character of the employment of one's forces for attaining assigned objectives. The basic types of combat action were "offensive" and "defensive."[32]

The "form" of combat action depended on its scale, the capabilities of the particular service of the country's armed forces, the objective to be accomplished (tactical, operational, or strategic), and the character of the combat task. The basic forms of combat actions in the Soviet navy were attacks, strikes, battles, engagements, operations, and systematic combat actions.[33]

The "methods" of combat action depended on whether the action was offensive or defensive and on what service the forces or combat arms had come from. They included the sequence of the employment of one's forces and assets to resolve the tasks of an operation or a battle, the sector of the main and secondary strikes or attacks, the operational disposition (for operational-sized forces) or combat formation (for tactical-sized forces), and the character of maneuver of one's forces and assets.[34]

Reportedly only about ten percent of Soviet ASW actions were "offensive" in character. The most important of these were the missile and bomber strikes against enemy submarine bases and construction and repair yards. Searching for and engaging hostile submarines, especially SSBNs, in their operating areas were also considered offensive actions. The other ninety percent of the Soviet ASW effort was concentrated upon those defensive actions we have examined.

At the strategic level, the main form of ASW combat employment was the strategic strike; at the operational-strategic and operational level, it was the independent naval operation. Operational objectives in the struggle against submarines were also accomplished by engagements (*srazheniye*) and what the Soviets called "systematic combat actions" or day-to-day actions of fleet forces. Tactical objectives were achieved by tactical attacks, tactical strikes, and naval battles. These could be attacks either carried out independently or as a part of combat actions intended to achieve operational objectives.

Strategic Strikes. Ballistic and cruise missile submarines played an important part (at least theoretically) in the struggle against enemy submarines through the destruction of their bases and building yards, command centers, and navigational support facilities. This destruction was to be accomplished primarily by strategic strikes with nuclear weapons. A nuclear strike could be inflicted on one target or on a small group of them with a single weapon, or on one or more targets simultaneously by using several weapons, or on many targets simultaneously (or nearly so) by the use of a large number of weapons. The air force and the strategic rocket force were expected to contribute to this ASW action by hitting hostile SSBNs in their bases and yards.[35]

Independent Naval Operations. A naval operation, in general, was described by the Soviets as a series of naval engagements, battles, and strikes coordinated with respect to their objective, place, and time. It could be conducted by diverse naval formations independently or in cooperation with formations of other services of the Soviet armed forces.[36]

Within the field of antisubmarine warfare, the Soviets envisioned at least four types of independent naval operations. First was *destroying the opponent's missile submarines.* This would be accomplished by searching for and destroying ballistic missile submarines near their bases, in their patrol areas, and everywhere in between. Simultaneously, fleet elements would attack any hostile forces afloat or ashore providing distant support to these submarines.[37] An example of such an operation would be the deployment of attack submarines, ASW aircraft, and surface ships in the North Atlantic and the Arctic Ocean to search for, detect, and destroy U.S. SSBNs and Tomahawk-armed SSNs. At the same time, a number of Soviet SSNs would be deployed in ambush positions off Western SSBN bases.

A second type of independent naval operation—*destroying the opponent's ASW forces*—attempted to create conditions in which Soviet submarines of all kinds could operate safely. This would be done by destroying fixed detection systems and command centers, and by sinking enemy ASW forces at sea or in their bases.

A third independent naval operation involving ASW was the *protection of the flow of one's own maritime traffic* from enemy submarine attacks.[38]

The Soviet navy in recent years identified the "*antisubmarine search operation*" as a new, fourth, type of independent naval operation, offering thereby perhaps the best possible evidence of the great significance searching for hostile submarines had for it. An ASW search operation required coordination of all efforts so as to clarify a situation in the shortest possible time.[39]

Engagements. In the West, the Soviet term for a naval battle or attack was often erroneously translated as "engagement." But this is a term to which the Soviets attached a different and very precise meaning; to them, a naval engagement was

not just a battle, but the sum of the most important battles and strikes, counter-strikes, attacks and counter-attacks conducted by their forces fleet and aimed at attaining a single operational objective. The main features of a naval engagement were its long duration and the large area in which it takes place. A naval battle as such, as we will see, was both briefer and smaller.[40] An example of a naval engagement would be a prolonged effort on the part of Soviet surface ships, attack submarines, and aircraft to destroy a large concentration of enemy SSNs trying to penetrate the Sea of Okhotsk or the Barents Sea.

Systematic Combat Actions. This term refers to the most frequent way in which Soviet ASW forces were employed in both peacetime and in war: that is, their day-to-day activities. With modest individual objectives, "systematic" actions would take place along probable hostile submarine deployment routes and patrol areas, on ASW barriers, and in straits and narrows.[41] They would include both combat and protective measures, carried out by tactical-sized forces over an extended period of time. Their collective objective would be to turn an unfavorable operational situation to one's own advantage, to create and maintain a favorable operational regime, and to prevent operational surprise at sea.

The variety of activities which came under this heading included most of the things navies do: conducting reconnaissance and patrol; defending against attack by submarines, aircraft, minelayers, fast patrol boats, and combat swimmers; striking enemy surface combatants, merchant ships, airfields, naval bases, and coastal installations; laying defensive minefields; sweeping enemy-laid mines in Soviet waters; countering hostile reconnaissance; and conducting radio-electronic combat.[42]

Tactical Combat Actions. The main forms of antisubmarine combat were called attacks, tactical strikes, and naval battles. Normally, an attack was part of a strike or a battle. However, in some cases it might be an independent action.

Attack. An attack involved closing in to attain a favorable firing position, using weapons and radio-electronic combat assets against the target, disengaging or withdrawing, or maneuvering to use weapons again against the same or another target. An attack could be carried out independently or in mutual support by submarines, surface ships, or aircraft. The principal types of attack against a hostile submarine were by torpedo and depth charge (formerly called "antisubmarine attack").[43] An example of a naval attack would be a Soviet SSN launching torpedoes against an enemy SSN or a single ASW surface ship firing multiple-rocket ASW launchers either singly or in combination with torpedoes.

Tactical Strike. This action was a bold, rapid-effect action by either a single unit or a tactical group aimed at swiftly destroying a target. A swiftly mounted action by a tactical group of ASW surface ships in cooperation with land-based

helicopters against a single enemy submarine at the approaches to a Soviet base, or trying to penetrate an ASW barrier in a strait, would be a tactical strike.

Naval Battle. The battle was the highest and most common form of tactical employment of Soviet fleet forces. It might be fought either independently or as part of a naval operation or of systematic combat actions. It consisted of a series of strikes, attacks, and maneuvers by individual ships or their tactical groups coordinated with respect to target, place, and time, and conducted according to a common plan to achieve a common tactical objective. The objective was usually to destroy the opponent or to inflict such losses on him as to force him to abandon his efforts.[44]

Methods of Combat Employment

The principal methods of combat employment of Soviet ASW forces were searching, patrolling, sweeping, screening, ambushing, blockading, and mining.[45]

Searching. Soviet forces searched for submarines mainly in the enclosed and marginal seas of the Arctic and Pacific. Most waters adjacent to the Soviet coasts pose great problems for effective use of sensors and weapons: the Baltic and Barents seas are shallow, while the Black Sea and Sea of Okhotsk are too shallow to form convergence zones but too deep to behave predictably as shallows do. In the Sea of Okhotsk and in many parts of the Baltic, the difficulties are compounded by seasonal ice (which degrades sonar performance by causing reverberation and high ambient noise). In the central Arctic Ocean, ice-covered waters are the dominating feature year-round.

Patrolling. Patrols were organized to detect and attack enemy submarines in transit or trying to break into defended areas, and could be conducted by surface ship, fixed-wing ASW aircraft, or general-purpose submarines.

Sweeping. A sweep was made to detect and destroy or drive out submarines in an area where, for instance, one's own ships were soon expected to transit; it was also called a *control sweep.* In general, a sweep was conducted wherever, though there was no datum, a submarine's presence was suspected or must be assumed.[46]

Screening. ASW screening was an integral part of defense and protection of a ship force or convoy against all types of threat, that is, from the air, surface, and subsurface. It was organized in bases, during sea transit, and in a naval battle. Screening was conducted by air patrols, groups of ships for tactical reconnaissance, and forces and assets of anti-air, anti-submarine, anti-craft, and anti-mine defense, and radio-electronic combat.

In general, screening encompassed a series of combat actions and measures intended to prevent surprise strike by enemy aircraft, submarines, and combat craft and to ensure necessary time and favorable conditions for one's own ships' transition into a combat formation and execution of combat actions. The Soviets differentiated between near and distant screens. Both near and distant ASW screening of a ship force or convoy was conducted by using fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters in cooperation with other forces of ASW defense.[47]

The near or close-in ASW screen was organized to prevent a hostile submarine from attaining a salvo position for its torpedoes or firing position for its antiship missiles. The maximum effective salvo range of submarine-launched torpedoes is currently about ten nautical miles from a ship or formation center. However, since modern attack submarines and U.S. submarines in particular would generally use missiles to attack surface ships, distances of from thirty to sixty nautical miles were actually involved. Here, then, is a link between antisubmarine defense and air defense, in that screening ships must be able to destroy a submarine's missiles with surface-to-air missiles and rapid-firing guns.

The distant or outer screen could reach out up to one hundred nautical miles. Forces assigned to this screen had to detect and immediately engage hostile submarines, and also warn friendly forces. The main body could then send any available ASW forces and assets to help pursue and destroy the detected submarine and, if possible, change course to avoid the area.[48]

Ambushing. The Soviets proposed to destroy enemy submarines by deploying their SSNs in ambushes that were set up especially in approaches to enemy submarine bases or in narrows between these and the open sea.[49] For example, there were reports in the U.S. press that in the mid-1980s the Soviets deployed two or more Victor IIIs off U.S. SSBN bases at Bangor, Washington, and Charleston, South Carolina. In April 1987 the Soviets conducted an exercise with five SSNs, including Victor IIIs, east of Bermuda, apparently to practice ambushing U.S. SSBNs in front of their Charleston base.[50]

Blockading. One of the most effective ways of neutralizing the threat of hostile submarines was to blockade them in their bases or operating areas. The Soviets considered mines to be the most effective weapon to accomplish this objective. They envisioned extensive use of mines to close the exits of enemy submarine bases, blockade straits or narrows in the distant parts of the oceans, and create ASW barriers.

Mining. The mine was one of the most important elements in the Soviet organization of ASW defense zones. It played an especially great role in barriers protecting Soviet strategic submarines in their sanctuaries and patrolling areas. The Soviets also used mines widely for defensive barriers protecting their naval

bases, commercial ports, and coastal shipping routes. Moreover, mine barriers could be placed so as to destroy hostile submarines or prevent their penetration into waters where Soviet surface ships were engaged in combat operations.

Conceptually, the "struggle against submarines" was all-encompassing, in that the Soviets believed that it was necessary to engage enemy submarines everywhere that they operated. As we have seen, the Soviets also envisaged, in general war, striking hostile submarine command and control centers, bases, and repair yards. Soviet ASW capabilities, however, were more modest in fact than in theory. In practice, their effort in this field was limited essentially to the enclosed seas and restricted coastal waters bordering the open ocean, out only to the limit of effective air cover provided by land-based aviation and, later, by the new *Admiral of the Fleet Kuznetsov*-class (ex-*Tbilisi*-class) aircraft carriers.

The Soviets clearly preferred area defense to point defense, and they relied more than Western navies do on seabed and coastal submarine detection sensors to defend their bases, ports, and narrow seas.

If the Russians wish to make the ASW zone concept they have inherited fully viable, they must become able to protect their forces from hostile action, especially from the air, and they must also build a larger and more effective maneuvering ASW force than the Soviet navy had. More importantly, they need revolutionary advances in submarine detection, based perhaps on nonacoustic sensors. Until these requirements are met, Russian ASW will remain what Soviet ASW was in practice: much less effective than its theory would have led us to believe.

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Ψ

The Future of Conventional Deterrence

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THE 1990s WILL SEE THE EMERGENCE OF A NEW and qualitatively different world order that will require the United States to recast its traditional approaches to foreign policy and national security. For four decades national security policy in the United States, largely defined by the superpower rivalry, was heavily dependent upon strategic nuclear deterrence. Today, as the era of bipolarity recedes, we may confidently expect new and different challenges to our important interests abroad. Nuclear weapons will not be as effective in deterring the kind of potential adversaries we are likely to see, because nuclear weapons will not serve as a credible response against regional powers in the developing world. For the first time since 1945, we will see conventional deterrence resuming its place at the center of U.S. national security policy.

Deterrence is commonly defined as preventing an opponent from pursuing a specific course of action by creating the expectation that the perceived costs of the act would exceed the perceived gains.[1] Deterrence should be distinguished from *compellence*, which seeks to oblige an adversary to do one's will through the threat or use of force. While military force is the key in both cases, the distinction is one of its active versus passive use.[2] In the recent crisis in the Gulf, the deployment of airborne troops to Saudi Arabia in early August represented a clear attempt to deter an Iraqi invasion of the kingdom. Our diplomatic, economic, and military efforts to force Iraq out of Kuwait, on the other hand, were an attempt to compel withdrawal—a substantively different and arguably more difficult undertaking.[3]

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Deterrence in the Cold War Era

After the end of the Second World War, the rise of the Soviet Union as the chief threat to U.S. security engendered a wholly unique response. Pressures for rapid demobilization, and a strong U.S. technological advantage (particularly in nuclear weapons), caused a rapid devaluation of American conventional forces. Land, naval, and tactical air forces shrank rapidly, while strategic air forces assumed the chief burden of deterring a military confrontation with the Soviet Union.

The Korean conflict should have served as a sharp reminder of the continuing utility of conventional forces for deterrence in circumstances where nuclear weapons were not, for political or strategic reasons, appropriate. After Korea, however, the United States returned to a policy of reliance on strategic nuclear forces to deter the U.S.S.R. Perhaps paradoxically, conventional forces were especially de-emphasized in the administration of Dwight D. Eisenhower. The "New Look" doctrine of massive retaliation, as articulated by its chief architect, John Foster Dulles, called for instant and large-scale use of nuclear weapons to deter or defeat Soviet-sponsored threats to national security.[4] Soviet nuclear capabilities continued to grow in the 1950s, and by the end of the decade the U.S.S.R. could deploy a small number of ballistic missiles to threaten the continental United States. As the Kennedy administration came into office, U.S. reliance on strategic nuclear deterrence and on the mystique of nuclear weapons had almost completely eclipsed conventional forces in the strategic calculus.[5]

The 1960s and 1970s saw a partial revival of the concept of conventional deterrence in the doctrine of "Flexible Response." Heavily influenced by Maxwell Taylor, the Flexible Response doctrine recognized that an all-or-nothing threat of nuclear retaliation lacked credibility in many potential regional or secondary scenarios.[6] While retaining the emphasis on containment that had become a fixture of American foreign policy, the Kennedy (and later Johnson) administration moved to strengthen and diversify conventional forces to provide a better capability to respond across the spectrum of conflict. At no time did U.S. conventional forces ever threaten to displace strategic nuclear forces as the backbone of deterrence, but the existence of a significant conventional component in the deterrence equation dates from this time.

Disengagement from Vietnam and the achievement of nuclear parity by the Soviet Union reinvigorated nuclear deterrence in the 1970s, and the salience of the conventional component declined. Reduced defense outlays, a decline in quality throughout the force, and a profound sense of demoralization and an unwillingness to use conventional forces after the Vietnam experience all contributed to this trend. The proliferation in this period of Soviet-backed insurgencies in the Third World was undoubtedly stimulated, at least in part, by

a perceived reluctance on the part of the United States to commit its conventional forces to contain Soviet adventurism abroad.[7]

The 1980s saw a striking improvement in the quality of the U.S. military establishment and a resurgence in conventional forces to match improvements in nuclear forces. Containment still provided the framework for U.S. foreign policy, and Flexible Response continued to serve as the official basis of U.S. and Nato defense planning.[8] Yet while force modernization, prepositioning of equipment for reinforcing echelons, and new doctrine improved the conventional component of deterrence, Nato continued to rely on nuclear weapons—and the strong possibility of rapid escalation across the nuclear threshold—to deter. Lacking a system of conscription and unwilling to fund the kind of conventional forces that could hope to stop the Warsaw Pact at the inter-German border, the United States did not move to reverse the balance of its nuclear and conventional forces. Its strategy of fielding diversified and survivable strategic nuclear weapons to deter a strategic nuclear exchange, and modest forward-deployed forces (U.S. and allied, with tactical and theater nuclear weapons) to deter aggression in Europe and Korea, continued essentially unchanged. This model, broadly applied, is descriptive of the U.S. approach to deterrence throughout the Cold War period.

The dominance of nuclear weapons in deterrence is also reflected in the literature. A large body of sophisticated analysis exists on the subject of nuclear deterrence, while conventional deterrence as a separate and bounded analytical concept in its own right has been largely neglected.[9]

Theory of Conventional Deterrence

Some preliminary and cautionary notes are in order. The existence of both nuclear and conventional forces (both of which are represented in each of the American armed services) implies a relationship between the two that should be kept in mind. No theory of deterrence can ignore the fact that both capabilities will influence the behavior and decision-making processes of potential adversaries. While the probability of their use may increase or decrease according to the nature of the threat and the relative balance of forces, in all but the smallest or lowest-intensity scenarios nuclear weapons will play a role in deterrence even when conventional forces clearly predominate.

An obvious, and forceful, argument is that nuclear and ballistic missile proliferation in the Third World will keep nuclear deterrence at center stage in U.S. national security strategy. However, while proliferation undoubtedly complicates the security calculus, it will not prevent the supersession of strategic nuclear forces by conventional ones as primary agents of deterrence. Regional powers possessing small, crude nuclear arsenals will not be tempted to press the United States when faced by credible and capable conventional forces,

particularly when any nuclear exchange will be immeasurably more costly to the lesser power. Arguably, a U.S. nuclear response to an opponent's first use that was confined to his military forces could be politically feasible for the United States. Any rational cost-gain calculation suggests that possession of small numbers of nuclear weapons will not in and of itself make adventurism much more likely.

Nuclear proliferation makes conventional deterrence all the more important, but not necessarily more difficult. Nuclear *compellence*, on the other hand, becomes both more difficult and fraught with risk, for two reasons. First, a genuine threat to use nuclear weapons against a regional adversary with nuclear weapons of its own might not appear credible given the almost inevitable political repercussions stemming from massive casualties or from crossing what is seen as a moral threshold. Second, if accepted, the threat could elicit a spasm launch by the adversary. Massive U.S. casualties and lack of international support for a U.S. response in kind (a nuclear attack on threatening U.S. forces, if confined to military targets, by a smaller power would seem justifiable to many Third World nations) would create grave political obstacles to effective nuclear retaliation. Thus it becomes crucial to deter so that it will not be necessary to compel.

Perceptions. The heart of deterrence, whether nuclear, conventional, or a combination of both, is the ability to create fear by threatening pain. The psychology of deterrence is thus its most elemental feature.[10] Even where very powerful forces are arrayed, deterrence may fail if the threat to use force is not perceived as credible. Credibility is more than a quantitative measure of the balance of forces, and more than a qualitative assessment of technological sophistication or fighting capacity. Deterrence also encompasses the will or resolve of the decision maker, first to commit force and then to stay the course when the costs begin to mount—and also, indeed, his perception of the will and resolve of his opposite number.

To some extent the credibility of the threat to use force in response to provocation is a function of domestic political considerations and the structure of the state seeking to deter. Totalitarian or authoritarian states are characterized by a highly centralized decision setting that is resistant to and largely independent of outside pressures; public opinion or consensus among bureaucratic elites may not be a factor in the decision to use force. Because the decision to fight can be taken by a single dominant personality or a small group of leaders, with no need to seek consensus or satisfy a brittle or fragile popular constituency, the credibility of a threat by such states to use force may be very high indeed.

By the same token, Western industrialized democracies, though they may field very potent and capable combat forces, can yet suffer from a perceived lack of resolution or political will. The very factors which contribute to the strength

and stability of their political systems—democratic accountability, separated powers, a free press, and guaranteed rights to organize, petition, and express differing political points of view—can paralyze or hinder their decision to mobilize and deploy military forces. The oft-noted American tendency to treat wars or conflicts as ideological crusades is undoubtedly a reflection of the necessity to create and sustain unity and consensus in a polity noted for its heterogeneity.

The threat of pain, however great, is distinguishable from the threat of annihilation, whether physical or political.[11] This raises the question of what can be called the *threshold of pain*. Conventional deterrence, unlike nuclear deterrence, is really about war at the margins. The economic deprivation and massive casualties, for instance, inflicted upon North Vietnam (not only in the second Indochina conflict but also in the first) represented a level of pain immeasurably higher on an objective scale than that suffered by the Americans or the French; on a relative scale, however, this was not the case at all. Vietnamese passions were fully engaged, their political objectives virtually unlimited. When compared to the open-ended commitments and vaguely defined political objectives of the Western powers, the Vietnamese possessed much greater determination, endurance, and resolve. Some appreciation of an opponent's capacity to endure pain, again as much a psychological question as a physical one, is needed before one can accurately formulate the calculus of costs versus gains.

Inflicting Pain. Resolve is necessary, then, for credibility—but it is not sufficient. The forces themselves must be perceived as capable of inflicting a level of damage, a degree of pain, if you will, great enough to deter. The different components of conventional deterrence are very closely interrelated and mutually dependent, but for theoretical purposes we can add capability, sustainability, and deployability; these, along with political resolve, complete our paradigm.

Capability—the ability of military forces to carry out their wartime missions (in a word, to fight)—is a function both of their size, nature, and quality. As lethality increases with technology it becomes progressively more difficult to determine the minimum level of force needed to deter, or if deterrence fails, to prevail, in a given scenario.[12] Air power may in certain circumstances supply a deficiency in ground forces, and smaller but high-quality conventional forces may suffice in place of a larger force which is more poorly trained, equipped, or led.[13] What is most vital, however, is to consider not how we might view the combat capability of our forces but how that capability is perceived by our opponent. The two can be worlds apart.

Sustainability is critical to the perception of strength because of the inordinate material demands made upon modern states when they go to war. The Falklands War illustrated how the deterrent effect represented by very high-quality combat forces can be weakened by the impression that sustaining such a force will be

difficult or impossible. Britain's ability to operate at the end of an extremely long logistical tail was astonishing and played a major role in her eventual victory. But the British government's reduction in spending for force projection and sustainment in the months prior to the Argentine invasion played its part in the failure of deterrence that brought about the conflict in the first place. Battlefield systems, fuel and ammunition, spare parts, personnel replacements, and water and rations are consumed rapidly and must be replaced for continued effectiveness. Sustainability is nearly all-encompassing: industrial infrastructure, reserve stocks, trained reserves, and the ability to resupply at very great distances from the homeland all play a part in supporting combat forces abroad.

"For the first time since 1945, we will see conventional deterrence resuming its place at the center of U.S. national security policy."

Deployability, or strategic mobility, is closely related to sustainability in that the same assets are employed. The same military air-lift and sea-lift resources that provide the means to project a force are also used to sustain it. The ability to project force in strength represents a singular advantage for the United States; no other nation possesses the ability to move large combat forces over strategic distances on short notice and keep them supplied. It is important to note that while strategic air lift can move politically significant military forces to the point of confrontation, only sea lift can move and sustain heavy ground forces. The airplane will not be an efficient platform for transporting main battle tanks for a very long time to come. As Mahan noted in the nineteenth century, maritime power means more than naval warships.[14] It also means a merchant fleet, trained merchant mariners, dockyard facilities, and a healthy shipbuilding industry.

Whereas the military capacity and political resolve of the individual state are the foundations of conventional deterrence, alliances or coalitions (whether existing or formed in response to specific crises) are now more the rule than the exception. The end of the Cold War did away with the ready-made ideological justification of anti-communism and is making the process of building domestic and international support for the threat or use of force more difficult. The support (moral or otherwise) of other nations and the international community will be more, not less, essential. This may not mean that a lack of U.N. support, for example, will induce states to forgo the military instrument entirely; the demise, however, of the ideological rivalry that previously characterized most conflicts now places a premium on the moral imprimatur of international approval as a basis for the use of force.

Heretofore we have used the concepts of force and threat of force almost interchangeably. This is intentional because though measurable uncertainty can contribute to the nuclear variety of deterrence, we doubt that it can work for

the conventional case. That is, though any reasonable chance of a nuclear response is generally sufficient to deter because of the catastrophic consequences of miscalculation, this is not necessarily true in the conventional realm. There, because the credibility of the threatened response is so important, the threat of force may be almost indistinguishable from an a priori decision to use force. The threat which does not appear to be genuine is not a credible threat. Thus, to effectively deter with conventional forces one must strive to create in the opponent high confidence that the response threatened will in fact be delivered. That may mean taking steps which look like war. Indeed, that is the whole point. If we can succeed in convincing an opponent that a specific act on his part will inevitably result in more pain than gain, deterrence is almost assured.

Contiguous versus Extended Conventional Deterrence

As the international order restructures itself along more multipolar lines, we can anticipate that deterrence strategies that incorporate standing conventional forces forward-deployed in close proximity to the adversary will give way to strategies relying more on the threat of retaliation by expeditionary forces launched from outside the region. Previously the United States wielded *contiguous* conventional deterrence, stationing ground forces directly opposite opposing forces in high-value areas (such as Europe or Korea), guaranteeing an instant and certain response to aggression. Deterrence by strategic nuclear forces operated in much the same way, since a nuclear strike by either side was instantly detectable, with retaliation certain in a matter of minutes.

With the decreased salience of contiguous deterrence now comes a potential increase in the possibility of conflict in areas other than Central Europe. It was long argued that a stable strategic nuclear balance subsumed instabilities at the theater nuclear and the tactical conventional levels.[15] Today, however, with a stable nuclear balance at lower levels of tension and a prospect even of an end to nuclear rivalry between the superpowers, the conventional capabilities of many Third World countries rise dramatically in importance.

Additionally, during the bipolar Cold War the superpowers tended, due to the fears of escalation, to respond immediately to unsettling events anywhere in the world. Any gain by one was often seen as a loss for the other;[16] consequently the superpowers frequently acted to dampen conflict on the periphery.[17] With the erosion of Soviet power and influence, and the low probability that the Soviets will reassert themselves globally in the near future, the potential for conflict in the developing world is measurably increased.

Arms control agreements, arms reductions, the disappearance of the Soviet threat, and the emergence (or reemergence) of regional threats have now created a new basis for deterrence. *Extended conventional deterrence*—deterring distant adversaries and protecting friendly states with the threat of projecting

conventional force—will become the centerpiece of U.S. strategic deterrence as we move into the next century.[18] This is especially true now that the U.S. Navy is removing tactical nuclear weapons from its ships and submarines. As our standing presence overseas declines in response to powerful changes in the international system, our ability and will to project conventional force abroad in defense of vital interests becomes correspondingly more important.

We emphasize that this discussion does not weight any form of conventional power—air, sea, space, or ground—more than another. The composition of forces is highly situation-dependent and in a given situation one service may predominate. For most imaginable scenarios posing serious threats to U.S. interests, all four capabilities will be important. Modern war is, after all, multi-dimensional and multi-faceted. The air-sea-ground distinctions we often hold so dear are largely artificial in light of the interconnectedness of modern war.

We have described deterrence as the attempt to influence an adversary to forgo a contemplated course of action for fear that costs would exceed potential gains, and we have introduced a new paradigm that alters the positions of nuclear and conventional forces in deterrence theory. We have also distinguished between extended and contiguous conventional deterrence, and stressed the necessity for political resolve, for capable forces, and for a strong force projection capability as the foundations of deterrence in the place of strategic nuclear weapons and forward-deployed forces. The recent crisis in the Gulf provides an illustrative example, a good opportunity to test these theoretical prescriptions against reality.

The Failure of Deterrence in the Persian Gulf, 1990

Though some disagree, we can view the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait as a deterrence failure. Despite expressions of concern for the stability of the Gulf region and for the free flow of oil (such as the Carter Doctrine, the Awacs sale, the formation of Central Command, and the Persian Gulf deployment of 1987-1988), the U.S. government sent mixed signals when it tilted toward Iraq in the Gulf War and when it failed to react vigorously to Iraqi rhetoric and troop deployments against Kuwait in July 1990. This experience points out how difficult it is to frame and articulate in advance the interests we deem worth fighting for. Obviously we can not threaten to use force in all or even most instances where U.S. interests are threatened. In this case, an explicit or implicit declaration of intent, because of the implications for Saudi security and the world price of oil, to oppose military action against Kuwait with force could have strengthened deterrence significantly.

Would such a threat have been credible? Saddam may well have reasoned that our announced plans to make deep cuts in ground forces and defense outlays, as well as our apparent aversion to the use of force except in low-intensity situations, signalled an unwillingness to respond decisively. He may have assessed further that we might fear a hostile Arab reaction to a large U.S. presence in the Gulf (which could complicate Arab-Israeli relations already strained by the Intifada); this also would have encouraged him to discount a military response from the United States. Finally, a seeming U.S. inability to move large ground forces quickly by sea may well have convinced Saddam that he had little to fear from American threats to use force—at least any made prior to his invasion of Kuwait.

Yet there are grounds to assert that deterrence failed chiefly because we had failed to articulate clearly our interests and our resolve to defend them—in other words, that this deterrence failure was primarily political. In the authors' view, Saddam would not have invaded Kuwait had he foreseen the magnitude of the American and allied response. There were, to be sure, problems with projecting

"Extended conventional deterrence . . . will become the centerpiece of U.S. strategic deterrence as we move into the next century."

large and heavy ground forces over strategic distances. These difficulties were mitigated by our ability to mass overwhelming air power and to shut off Iraqi oil exports by land and sea, and by the prospect of yet another demonstration of our capacity for logistical innovation and strategic reach. Militarily, Saddam could not win unless U.S. resolve faltered—which, of course, is exactly what Iraq counted on.

Even had this crisis ultimately resolved itself otherwise than it did, perhaps politically through negotiation or economically through the U.N. embargo, America's ability to deter with conventional forces would have been likely to improve, at least for the near term. We showed ourselves capable and willing to deploy extraordinary forces at great distances to protect our interests. We did so with the approbation of the international community and the support of moderate regimes in the region. Perhaps most importantly, the U.S. military response was supported by a solid majority at home.

These advantages will not necessarily inhere in future crises. We must be careful not to apply too broadly specific lessons drawn from our experiences in the Gulf. If anything is certain, it is that future crises will have their own context and present their own challenges. Thus it is important to recognize the broad foundations of change, as we have attempted to do here, without being overly prescriptive about future conflict.

Desert Storm is not a script for the future, though many organizations and institutions will so interpret it through the lens of self-interest. Its importance lies in what can be learned about broadly framed military, economic, and diplomatic capabilities and potentialities, not in projecting the unique context of the Gulf War into the future as a model for structuring forces and formulating strategy.

Where conventional capability and credibility combine in support of defined U.S. interests, we can have some confidence in the efficacy of a revived conventional deterrence. But it is a fragile thing, resting not only on tangible resources and demonstrated resolve but also on effective communication of capability and intent, filtered through a screen of domestic politics and international sensibilities.

The problems associated with extended conventional deterrence as an operational model for national security should not be underrated. They are complex and various and must be approached as such. As the world settles into a new and perhaps more unsettling pattern of relations between states, we must avoid impulses to think wishfully, but rather strive to think clearly and accurately about a changing world. One way to start is to rethink our traditional reliance on nuclear weapons and focus on the growing importance of conventional forces. Prudence and pragmatism argue for adaptive policies and strategies that take these changes into account.

Notes

1. John J. Mearsheimer, *Conventional Deterrence* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Univ. Press, 1983), p. 14.
2. Robert J. Art, "To What Ends Military Power," *International Security*, April 1980, p. 8.
3. Robert Jervis, "Offense, Defense and the Security Dilemma," in Robert J. Art and Robert Jervis, eds., *International Politics* (Glenview, Ill.: Scott, Foresman, 1985), 2nd ed., p. 204.
4. William W. Kaufman, *Planning Conventional Forces* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1982), p. 3.
5. *Ibid.*
6. Mearsheimer, p. 13.
7. Angola, Ethiopia-Somalia, Mozambique, Namibia, and South Yemen, as well as the spectacular invasion of Afghanistan, all represented Soviet challenges during this period that elicited only feeble responses from the United States. See Stephen S. Kaplan, *Diplomacy of Power* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1981), pp. 148-190.
8. Richard K. Betts, "Conventional Deterrence: Predictive Uncertainty and Policy Confidence," *World Politics*, January 1985, p. 153.
9. The large body of literature on deterrence is too extensive to summarize here. Suffice it to say that deterrence received new emphasis from the heightened Cold War tensions of the late 1970s and early 1980s. Scholars applied new quantitative and psychological methodologies, which were often at odds with one another, to the study of cases. See "The Rational Deterrence Debate: A Symposium," *World Politics*, January 1989, for an encapsulation of these studies and the competing methodologies. Although some of these studies included cases of purely conventional deterrence (cf. Paul K. Huth, "Extended Deterrence and the Outbreak of War," *American Political Science Review*, June 1988), the clear motivating principle underlying the studies was the importance of deterring a nuclear exchange. Where the studies had an explicitly conventional focus, the principal issue was the defense of the Central Front of Nato and how this ultimately was linked to the escalatory ladder. See the following collections of essays on this debate: James R. Golden, Asa A. Clark, and Bruce E. Arlinghaus, eds., *Conventional Deterrence* (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1984) and Steven E. Miller, ed., *Conventional Forces and American Defense Policy* (New Jersey: Princeton Univ. Press, 1986).

10. "Deterrence is a psychological as well as an objective capability." Amos A. Jordan and William J. Taylor, *U.S. National Security: Policy and Process* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1984), revised ed., p. 224.

11. While the phenomenon is not unknown in modern times, states are not generally wiped off the map in conventional conflicts.

12. In our view, deterrence is not an operational mission, despite frequent pronouncements to the contrary. For example, the first sentence in the army's capstone manual, *FM100-5 Operations*, reads, "The overriding mission of U.S. forces is to deter war." Forces cannot train to deter; they can only train to fight. Deterrence is almost wholly a political phenomenon, albeit one grounded in military strength. It is an effect and a political goal, not a military mission per se, and constant reminders that deterrence, not war-fighting, has top operational priority can confuse and distract both soldiers and leaders. At least at the conventional level, a capacity to fight and fight well contributes most to deterrence.

13. At some point, of course, size will always matter. Quality subsumes state of training, level of leadership, tactical mobility, how well equipped the force is and how high its level of motivation and esprit.

14. Alfred Thayer Mahan, *The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1890), p. 138.

15. This argument is presented in Glenn H. Snyder, "The Balance of Power and the Balance of Terror," Art and Jervis, pp. 226-227.

16. The best theoretical discussion of the requirements of bipolarity is in Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (New York: Random House, 1979). See particularly pp. 170-174.

17. For example, the U.S. and U.S.S.R. acted to dampen the India-Pakistan War of 1971 and the Yom Kippur War of 1973.

18. "Extended" has a double meaning here: first, the sense that the U.S. security shield we extend over our allies (such as Saudi Arabia or Japan) will now have a stronger conventional flavor; second, that we will now have to deter at extended distances from the United States, since reliance on large numbers of forward-deployed troops will decline.

Ψ

Contemporary International Law
Relevant to Today's World?

Horace B. Robertson, Jr.

TO INTRODUCE THE SUBJECT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW to a readership made up in large part of U.S. armed forces officers, whose education, background, and training condition them to be skeptics and pragmatists, is a daunting task. I hope, however, in a brief space to convey at least that there is such a thing as international law and that it has some relevance not only to the ordering of our international system of sovereign nations but also to the decisions one may be called upon to make in positions of responsibility in the United States government.

This overview addresses, first, the role of international law in today's international system; second, its nature, origins, sources, and functions; and finally, the current trends in international law (as I see them) and where they may lead us during the next few decades.

In the latter section I shall briefly address the role of the United Nations in its peace-keeping function and the impact it has had on the law relating to the use of force.

A Few Cautionary Statements

One of the most distinguished American international law scholars of this century, Judge Richard R. Baxter (who before his untimely death was the American judge on the International Court of Justice), stated in a talk to the Naval War College while he was a Professor at Harvard Law School that "International law suffers both from its friends and enemies. Its enemies include the geopoliticians, who hear nothing but the surge and crash of great

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The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

international forces; the Kennanites, who rebel against a 'legalistic' approach to international affairs; and the specialists in international relations, who, not knowing very much about the subject, lump international law, as conceived by Hugo Grotius, with the League of Nations, the United Nations, and the control of the white slave trade. The similarity between some of the friends of international law and most of its enemies is that they overstate the pretended case *for* international law. It is then all too easy to demonstrate that, despite the claims made for international law, the world is still in a deplorable state."[1]

The "enemies" have three basic criticisms: the lack of a central law-giving or legislative body, the lack of an independent third-party dispute-settlement mechanism, and the lack of effective sanctions against lawbreakers.

Let us take a commonplace example to illustrate that these deficiencies need not hamstring the functioning of the system. Consider the simple act of mailing a letter from the United States to a foreign address. What makes such a transaction possible? Take, for example, the case of a letter from Newport, Rhode Island, addressed to a person in Geneva, Switzerland. It takes some fairly sophisticated procedures, involving the postal officials of at least two (and perhaps several more) countries, to get the letter to its destination. One buys a United States stamp from a U.S. post office and pays for it in U.S. currency. En route to Switzerland the letter may cross the territory of Canada, Great Britain, and France (and perhaps Belgium and Ireland as well). The postal authorities of some of these countries undoubtedly assist in speeding the letter on its way. Two questions arise:

- What authority or arrangement permits the letter to cross borders of various countries?
- Do the postal authorities of the other countries receive monetary reimbursement from our postmaster general for their help in delivering the letter from the United States? If so, how much?

The answers are provided by *international law*—here in the form of a series of multilateral postal treaties setting up a Universal Postal Union and establishing detailed regulations governing international postal affairs.[2] These treaties, to which some 170 nation-states are parties, were "legislated" in several international conferences.

All very well, but what if one nation violates the treaty? There is no court with compulsory jurisdiction to adjudicate the matter and no sanctioning body to impose penalties. In fact, however, the Convention is almost universally observed—not out of fear of sanctions but because it is in the mutual interest of the parties to observe it. The "law" creates expectations among states as to how other states will behave. If a state repeatedly or continually fails to fulfill its obligations, other states will eventually terminate postal relations with it.

To illustrate, take a second commonplace example, from domestic law: highway traffic rules. In the United States the law requires all vehicles to travel

on the right-hand half of the road under ordinary circumstances. It imposes criminal penalties on those drivers who violate that law. But is it the fear of criminal penalties that causes us to stay to the right in the face of oncoming traffic? Obviously not. It is rather our expectation that approaching drivers will keep their vehicles to the right (as they also expect of us) and that we will be able to pass safely. Granted, there is a criminal penalty if one violates the law, but the principal motivating force behind obedience to it is the mutual well-being of the members of the society. The same is true among the members of the international society, the nation-states that make up the international community. Naval and aerial navigators know that there are similar binding traffic rules for ships and aircraft in both domestic and international waters and air space.

At this point a skeptic might be tempted to object that though this may be true, we have used only everyday examples far from the central issues of international relations—issues of war and peace, survival of nations, protection of basic human rights, and so forth. Indeed, the ultimate objective of international law is to create an international order in which nations and peoples can live in peace and justice. Like domestic law, however, international law is still an imperfect system. To quote Judge Baxter again, "It is quite clear that man has not been able to legislate war and aggression into defeat or even into retreat, although the institutions which the international community has developed exercise some restraints on the use of force. [International] law cannot cope adequately with the need for peaceful change. If a nation needs more territory or larger markets, the law cannot provide them. It cannot make unhappy people happy; it cannot turn arid desert into a flowering paradise; it cannot bring international tranquility and understanding where discord reigned before. Indeed, it might be safe to say that international law has been most successful in dealing with minor matters and with slighter causes of international friction. Probably it shows a greater facility in preserving the status quo than in doing justice."[3]

This is not surprising. While we would hope that a perfect system of justice would deal with such matters and operate best in times of high tension or crisis, we can note that domestic systems suffer from the same imperfections.

The Nature, Origins, and Sources of International Law

Accepting for the moment the fact that there is a system called "international law" that functions in the international community (though admittedly in an incomplete and imperfect way), let us turn to a brief examination of its nature, origin, and sources.

To this point we have not tried to define "international law." No single, simple definition is possible, but at the risk of oversimplification, let us state one as follows: "International law is that body of rules or norms that are considered legally binding by states in their intercourse with each other." Note several things about this definition:

- It uses the phrase "rules or norms." In some cases the term "norms" is more appropriate than "rules," since the latter implies more specificity than in fact exists in many situations.
- These rules or norms are "legally binding." That is, states comply with them because they are legally obligated to do so, not because they want to or are merely morally obligated to do so.
- They apply to states—that is, sovereign, independent states. Traditionally and historically these rules have not applied to individuals, or to corporations, or any institutions other than states. (As we shall see, however, the categories of persons and institutions that are governed by international law have been expanding. In some areas, international law can now be said to apply to persons and institutions as well as states.)

Where Did This System Originate? To quote a distinguished former holder of the Stockton Chair of International Law at the Naval War College, Judge Manley O. Hudson of the World Court, "Our system of international law has been developed over a period of more than three centuries. It is distinctly Western and European in origin. In tracing its growth, we usually refer to the Spanish jurist-theologians of the sixteenth century, but we ascribe first place to Hugo Grotius whose great book on 'The Law of War and Peace' was first published in 1625. For a long period, international law was conceived to be not only European, but also Christian, and its application was limited to Christian States. In the course of the nineteenth century, however, we broke ourselves free from such limitations, and in the words of the World Court the principles of international law 'are in force between all independent nations' and 'apply equally' to all of them."[4]

As we shall see, the fact that the roots of international law are European has created problems within recent decades as newly emerging nations assert that many principles of international law were proclaimed by European imperialist powers primarily for the purpose of keeping the colonial states in their state of subjugation.

What Are Its Modern Sources? Since the subjects of international law are states, which are sovereign, independent, and equal, it is obvious that the law's ultimate source (practically as well as philosophically) must be the consent of the states to be governed by it. This consent may be found either in *treaties* to which a state is a party (that is, explicit consent) or in *customary practices* so general as to

have become in effect obligatory (and to which a state, as a member of the community of nations, may therefore be said to have tacitly consented).

In addition to these two primary sources of international law, the Statute of the International Court of Justice (itself a treaty) gives three secondary sources to which the Court may turn to determine the law.[5] They are, first, the *general principles of law* recognized by civilized nations; second, *judicial decisions*; and third, the *teachings* of the most highly qualified publicists (scholars) of the various nations. Let us examine each of these sources, primary and secondary, in order.

"'The similarity between some of the friends of international law and most of its enemies is that they overstate the pretended case for international law'."

To make a loose analogy, *treaties* (or conventions, or compacts, or international agreements, by whatever name they are called) are the international counterpart of national legislation. Unlike national legislation, however, which binds even those who dissent from it, treaties are only binding on those states which consent to become parties to them. In this respect they are more like contracts than statutes. But there are some situations in which they may be regarded as binding on non-parties. For example, some parts of the United Nations Charter purport to bind non-parties, and some treaties are declarative of customary international law. The latter may be looked upon as evidence of the customary law and as therefore binding on non-parties as well as parties.

In general, however, *customary law* is created by state practice. To be sure, many authorities argue that even long-continued and consistent practice does not alone create customary international law, but that something more is required: a state's belief that the practice is obligatory. Nonetheless, a long-continued practice acquiesced in by other states may create customary international law irrespective of the intent of states that acquiesce.

Customary international law results from a process in which one state makes a claim and another state accommodates it; if the process is repeated often enough, a customary rule is created. That is why, in international practice, we find frequent resort to "diplomatic protests"; they serve to keep claims by other states from ripening into legal rights. Paper protests, however, may not be sufficient to sustain a position in the face of long-continued practice to the contrary. This is the principle underlying the U.S. Navy's "Freedom of Navigation" program, under which the navy conducts routine air or sea operations (usually transits) through areas that a foreign state claims as territorial seas or exclusion zones but are not recognized as such by the United States government.

Since customary international law is "unwritten," where do we find evidence of what it is? We look to diplomatic history, to collections of diplomatic documents, and to writings of scholars on these matters.

The *general principles of law* recognized by civilized nations are recognized as a source of international law by the Statute of the International Court of Justice. The effect of this provision is to allow resort to national legal systems. This device is necessary because international law is not as complete and well-developed a body of law as that of most nations; use of these general principles permits the gaps in the international system to be filled by principles of law that have attained near universality in national legal systems—such principles as, for example, that one shall honor his contractual obligations, or that one should compensate for unjustified injury caused to another. In a recent decision, a United States court of appeals faced with a decision involving international law looked to the laws of a number of nations to aid its determination that torture of a citizen by governmental authorities was contrary to international law.[6]

The most important *judicial decisions* are judgments of the International Court of Justice, sitting at The Hague, and its predecessor, the Permanent Court of International Justice. The decisions of arbitral tribunals also constitute judicial decisions in this sense, inasmuch as these bodies are in fact judicial institutions and render their decisions on the basis of law and not as attempted compromises of conflicting claims. In addition, the opinions of national courts on questions of international law are entitled to considerable weight, even though one might expect them to take a somewhat more one-sided view of the law than would a truly international tribunal.

The *teachings*, or scholarly writings, of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations perform a valuable service. Not only do they criticize and clarify ambiguities in the law, they also synthesize vast amounts of treaty law, state practice, and judicial decisions and reduce them to manageable proportions. However, one must exercise a degree of caution in using such material. Scholars may be subject to personal as well as national biases, and in their works it is often difficult to be sure whether they are talking about what the law *ought* to be or what it *is*. I personally prefer to consider this fifth "source" as not really a source at all but rather *evidence* of what the law is.

Contemporary Trends in International Law

With this much as background, let us now turn to some of the current developments and trends in international law.

The Expanding "Reach" of International Law. Our definition of international law stated that it is a body of rules or norms governing the legal relationships between *states*. The emphasis on states as such is certainly consistent with the environment in which the body of rules originally developed. That world was made up of independent, equal, and sovereign states, the only actors in the international arena. In the international arena, unlike in domestic societies,

individuals (unless representatives of states) had no role to play and no standing to assert a legal right. An individual obtained rights only derivatively, by virtue of the protection afforded him or her by nationality.

As an example, one of the firmly established rules of international law is that an alien residing in a foreign state is entitled to the protection of the state where he or she resides. If that state fails to live up to its obligation (as, for example, by arbitrary seizure of property or imprisonment without a fair trial), then it has violated this international norm, and the state of nationality has a right to bring a claim for reparation. But it is the state, technically, that does so, not the individual; under the international legal system, it is the state of nationality that has been wronged, not the individual. Thus the state of nationality has absolute control over the claim, and it may if it chooses refuse to assert the claim, or dismiss it, or compromise it—all without the consent of the individual.

One of the contemporary developments in international law is a gradual recognition that individuals themselves may, under certain circumstances, be "subjects" of international law; that is, they may have rights (and obligations) flowing directly from international law and not merely derivatively from their state of nationality. This recognition probably began between the world wars with the establishment of the International Labor Organization and its constitution, recognizing that working persons have certain minimum rights with respect to working conditions. The concept received a major thrust forward at the end of World War II with the adoption of the United Nations Charter and its emphasis on the rights of human beings. At the same time, the acceptance of the so-called Nuremberg principles recognized that individual Nazi leaders, not just the Nazi state, were criminally responsible for war crimes, crimes against humanity, and crimes against peace, and could be tried by an international tribunal convened by the allied states. The crimes for which they were tried, including atrocities against nationals of their own states, were considered to be international crimes.

The ideas of individual rights under international law and of individual obligations flowing from it have developed gradually. The principal impetus has been the United Nations General Assembly—first in the Charter itself, then in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, then in a series of treaties adopted over the past several decades. The latter included the Covenant on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, as well as a number of regional conventions of similar content and intent.

A corollary to this idea of individual rights under international law is the elimination of the view that how a state treats its own nationals is not an international concern but merely a domestic matter. As late as 1957, a

preeminent international law scholar could write chillingly in a leading English treatise on international law that how a state treated its own nationals was a matter of "discretion."[7] It is no longer possible to make this statement. A United States court of appeals has held, for example, that the torture of a Paraguayan citizen in Paraguay by an official of the Paraguayan government created a right of redress in the courts of the United States under a statute allowing such actions for violation of the "law of nations."[8]

Another aspect of the expanding reach of international law is the extension of international law to international bodies, such as the United Nations, the International Civil Aviation Organization, the European Community, the International Maritime Organization, and many others. For certain purposes these institutions are regarded as international "persons," as are certain non-governmental organizations (commonly called NGOs). There is even some indication that certain intergovernmental consortia and transnational corporations have some characteristics of international persons; this idea, however, is still in its infancy.

The Codification of International Law. A second major trend in contemporary international law is codification, i.e., rendering unwritten law into formal written form.

As noted, one of the two primary sources of international law is custom (the other being treaties). Customary law is just as valid and binding as treaty law, but it suffers from a number of difficulties and ambiguities. For one, customary practices are often difficult to prove. Also, is a practice, however uniform and long-standing, followed out of obligation (thereby becoming law) or merely from non-binding habit? Further, a general principle may be firmly established by custom, but the details of its content may be incomplete or fuzzy around the fringes. Only a written treaty text can fill in the particulars. These issues have created an impetus to convert customary practices into treaties, thus making them explicit, stable, and definite obligations.

This movement was given additional momentum by the creation by the United Nations, soon after its founding, of the International Law Commission. This Commission, which is made up of legal experts acting in their individual capacities and not as representatives of their states, has as its mission the codification and progressive development of international law. In the more than forty years of its existence it has prepared draft texts in a number of areas that previously had been governed only by customary international law. A number of these draft texts have been submitted to international conferences for negotiation as multilateral treaties, and many have entered into force. The four treaties on the law of the sea adopted in 1958 by the First Geneva Conference on the Law of the Sea are products of this process. Likewise, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic

Relations, the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, and several others have resulted from the same approach.

Codification has also proceeded in other ways. The United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, which adopted the 1982 U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea—perhaps the most ambitious undertaking in codification and development of international law ever undertaken—did not originate with the International Law Commission. It resulted from a series of U.N. General Assembly resolutions creating a Seabed Committee that served as a preparatory committee for the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea.

Another factor behind the movement toward codification is the desire of Latin American, African, and Asian states to have a voice in shaping international law. As stated earlier, international law is principally of European origin. The newly emerging states, mainly former African and Asian colonies of the European powers, have found it difficult to accept a system that they had no part in creating, and particularly one that, in the view of many of them, was shaped in such a way as to keep them in a position of inequality. They see the codification process as a means of influencing contemporary international law in a way more favorable to their interests. Newly emerging states have formed themselves into the so-called "Group of 77" (now with over a hundred members), which uses its large bloc-voting strength in the United Nations General Assembly and international conferences to exercise enormous influence.

The Institutionalization of International Law. A third current trend is the proliferation of intergovernmental (international) institutions. Not only are they instrumental in creating and implementing broad segments of international law, but also they have spawned a special body of international law—the law *of* international institutions. This consists of the constitutions and internal regulations of those bodies as well as of the treaties and agreements that provide the framework for their relations with host governments and with other states in whose territory they operate.

The preeminent international institution, of course, is the United Nations. Its functions are so broad and the reach of its activities is so all-encompassing that a whole new body of international law has grown up around its practices and procedures. It is not, however, the only international institution that affects the growth of international law. A whole host of international organizations create their own bodies of specialized law. Some of these entities are functional, such as the International Maritime Organization (instrumental in developing international rules and regulations governing safety at sea, ship construction standards, and the protection of the marine environment from pollution from ships) and the International Civil Aviation Organization, which is even more pervasive within its functional field.

Other international organizations are regional, such as the European Community, established by the Treaty of Rome. The E.C. has its own legislative, executive, and judicial branches, which in some cases have the authority to override national decisions. The activities of this organization are so pervasive with respect to member states that some international scholars are beginning to wonder when it will have assumed so many aspects of statehood that its members can no longer be considered states and the Community itself will have become one super-state.

The Enforcement of International Law. At the outset we observed that one of the principal criticisms of international law is that there is no means of enforcing sanctions against those who breach it. Without retreating from the rejoinder offered earlier—that for the most part international law *is* obeyed and that even in domestic legal systems the principal motivating force for obedience is not the fear of sanctions—we may note nevertheless that some small steps are being taken toward creating and making use both of third-party adjudicative mechanisms for international disputes and of means for enforcing their judgments. In so noting them I do not mean to overemphasize the role of third-party dispute settlement in the international arena, since the traditional methods of diplomatic negotiation, good offices, conciliation, and mediation remain the cornerstones of peaceful settlement of disputes between states.

Nevertheless, the hope following World War I was that the newly created Permanent Court of International Justice would serve as a judicial forum to which states would take their international disputes. This, unfortunately, proved a false hope. In the entire life of that court and of its successor, the International Court of Justice, only a handful of cases has been submitted and most of these have involved matters of little consequence. The principal reason, of course, is that a nation cannot be brought before the court without its consent, and states are reluctant to submit matters of great national significance to third-party adjudication. Additionally, proceedings before the Court are long and tedious, which is not very helpful when speedy resolution of a controversy is needed. The Court has recently revised its rules to make it somewhat easier for states to submit cases and receive relatively quick decisions. Whether as a result of this change or because of other factors, the Court now has on its docket a record number of cases awaiting decision.

A number of initiatives have been taken in other areas to create mechanisms for peaceful settlement of disputes:

- The European Community has a well-developed court system, whose decrees are enforced in the courts of member states.
- The World Bank has negotiated a treaty providing a process for arbitration of international investment disputes.[9] This treaty has gained wide acceptance and adherence both among capital-importing and capital-exporting states. A

unique aspect of the treaty is that it elevates disputes between states and private investors (usually multinational corporations) to the international plane, giving the latter equal status with states before this international arbitral tribunal. In addition, its judgments are enforceable in the domestic courts of any states that are parties to the Convention.

• The United Nations has sponsored a multilateral treaty that obligates member states to enforce other international arbitral awards in their domestic courts.[10] This treaty has enabled some American foreign investors to enforce international arbitral awards against foreign states even when the state has refused to participate in the arbitration.

• Some recent multilateral law-making treaties contain dispute settlement provisions. A leading example is the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea, which contains extensive provisions for compulsory conciliation, arbitration, or ultimately adjudication.[11] This was a real breakthrough because it marked the first time that the Soviet Union was willing to accept any form of third-party dispute settlement.

• Finally, there is the United Nations Security Council, which has the authority, if all other methods fail, to impose sanctions, including the use of armed force, on a wrong-doing state whose actions it believes constitute a threat to peace, a breach of peace, or an act of aggression.

As all are aware, until recently effective action by the Security Council in such situations was prevented by the "veto"—that is, the requirement for unanimity among the five permanent members of the Council (China, France, the United Kingdom, the former U.S.S.R., and the United States).[12] With recent events (including replacement of the Soviet Union by Russia) making unanimity possible under certain circumstances (as, for example, the recent Iraqi invasion of Kuwait), it is appropriate that we address the methods the Security Council may employ and the procedures it may follow in adopting them. We shall also examine a state's right of self-defense and how this doctrine fits in with any enforcement action that may be taken by the Security Council. A caveat is in order, however: the latter issue is a complicated subject and one about which there is great disagreement among international lawyers. In discussing it in this small space a great deal of over-simplification is necessary.

Self-Defense and the Role of the United Nations Security Council

The Security Council's principal powers with respect to the settlement of disputes and dealing with threats to peace are stated in Chapters VI and VII of the United Nations Charter. Chapter VI deals with the pacific settlement of disputes and empowers the Security Council to investigate any international dispute or "situation which might lead to friction or give rise to a dispute, in

order to determine whether the continuance of the dispute or situation is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security." It can do this either on its own initiative or at the request of one of the parties to the dispute. If it determines that a dispute or "situation" (as characterized above) exists, the Security Council may under Chapter VI recommend either a method of resolution or specific terms of settlement.

Chapter VII comes into play only if the Security Council determines that there exists a threat to peace, a breach of the peace, or an act of aggression. If so, the Council may either make recommendations to the parties or take "measures . . . to maintain or restore international peace and security." Such measures might not involve the use of armed force; such options include "complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations." If such non-forcible means are inadequate, the Council may "take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security."

"A corollary to this idea of individual rights under international law is the elimination of the view that how a state treats its own nationals is not an international concern but merely a domestic matter."

As originally envisaged by the Charter, armed action under the authority of the Security Council would be taken by national armed forces made available in advance to the Council. Overall direction of the employment of these forces was to have been exercised by a Military Staff Committee consisting of the chiefs of staff (or their representatives) of the armed forces of the five permanent members. Since this Military Staff Committee has never really functioned as intended, the Security Council has been forced to adopt ad hoc arrangements in the only two instances in which it has taken armed enforcement measures. In the Korean War, the United States was asked to designate a commander of U.N. forces. In Operations Desert Shield and Storm, the Security Council (in Resolution 665) used the device of calling "upon those Member States co-operating with the Government of Kuwait which are deploying maritime forces to the area" to use such measures as were necessary to enforce the maritime embargo previously declared by Resolution 661. The Council used the same approach when, in Resolution 678, it authorized offensive action against Iraq. There it authorized "Member States co-operating with the Government of Kuwait . . . to use all necessary means to uphold and implement resolution 660 (1990) [the initial resolution calling on Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait] and all subsequent relevant resolutions and to restore international peace and security in the area."

What we had then was less a *de jure* U.N. Security Council enforcement action than a Security Council imprimatur on a collective self-defense operation by states coming to the aid of Kuwait. If this interpretation is correct (and not all international lawyers would agree with it), then this brings into play Articles 2(4) and 51 of the United National Charter.

Article 2, paragraph 4, provides that "All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations." The most generally agreed exceptions to the prohibition on the use of force in Article 2(4) are actions authorized by or in implementation of a decision of the Security Council, humanitarian interventions for the rescue of nationals (a right disputed by some), and individual or collective self-defense.

Self-defense is the subject of Article 51, which provides in part that "Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security." The important concepts here are that: the right of self-defense is not created by the Charter but is inherent, a sovereign right of states; the right may be individual or collective; an armed attack must have occurred; and self-defense measures can continue only as long as the Security Council has not taken the action necessary to maintain peace and security.

Let us briefly address each of these concepts. First, the "inherent right" is based on the fundamental principle that a state has a right of self-preservation. This right pre-existed the U.N. Charter; although the Charter may have put limits on how it may be exercised, it did not take away the right itself. Second, this provision recognizes that a state is not required to rely on its own resources alone in repelling an attack. It may call upon other states to come to its assistance to repel the attack and maintain or regain its security. Our own whole web of mutual security arrangements with other states is based on this principle.

Third, the attack must "occur." This is perhaps the most controversial part of the article. Does it mean that the victim state must absorb the first blow before it can respond? If so, the right to respond would be an empty one; in this age of missiles and weapons of mass destruction, the first blow may be fatal. Nevertheless, some respected authorities have argued for this position. Others have pointed out the unreality of such a position and have argued for the right of anticipatory self-defense, pre-emptive attack, or preventive war. This too has its dangers, perhaps inviting all manner of pre-emptive assaults on the mere suspicion of an intent to attack. There is a middle ground, espoused by, among others, an eminent Israeli publicist, Yoram Dinstein, who suggests that an attack "occurs" when one party "embarks upon an irreversible course of action, thereby crossing the Rubicon."[13] He calls this type of self-defense "interceptive" rather

than anticipatory or pre-emptive. Under his theory, the United States would have been properly exercising the right of self-defense had it detected and attacked the Japanese fleet en route to Pearl Harbor in December 1941.

Fourth, when does the right to self-defense end? Does Article 51 mean that if the Security Council passes any resolution at all, the state or states exercising the right of self-defense must desist? As preposterous as this seems, some noted publicists have argued so. A more sensible interpretation is that the measures must be both "necessary" and "sufficient" to restore or maintain international security. Who then is to decide whether the measures are sufficient? Is it the Security Council itself, or the state that believes itself a victim of aggression? The Charter is silent. Most publicists argue for the Security Council, and I would agree, but only if the Security Council makes an explicit finding that the measures it has taken are sufficient to restore international peace and security and directs the state or states exercising the right of self-defense to desist from further armed action. Under the rule of unanimity of the five permanent members of the Security Council, the rights of a victim state would seem to be adequately protected by this interpretation. Under it, measures adopted by the Security Council and actions of states in the exercise of their rights of individual or collective self-defense can proceed concurrently, at least until the Security Council passes a definitive resolution requiring hostilities to cease. That is the situation that existed in Operation Desert Storm.

The International Court of Justice has recently addressed certain aspects of the right of individual and collective self-defense in the case of Nicaragua v. United States.[14] Some of the views expressed in the majority opinion take an extremely narrow approach to this right and have caused concern among some international lawyers who view the right as an important bulwark against aggression, particularly in a situation in which the United Nations Security Council fails to take effective action to protect a victim state. Among the holdings of the Court that I find troubling are the following:

- Although the term "armed attack" includes attacks by irregular forces or guerrillas from foreign territory under certain circumstances, the term does not include assistance to rebels in the form of weapons or logistic support.
- The exercise of the right of "collective" self-defense depends upon a declaration by the victim state that it is the subject of an armed attack and an explicit request for help to the assisting state. An assisting state cannot make this determination on its own, even if it is a party to a treaty with the victim state containing a clause stating that an attack on one is an attack upon all.
- Under Article 51 of the Charter, the failure by a state to report measures it is taking in self-defense to the Security Council contradicts that state's claim that it is exercising the right of collective self-defense.

Although the judgments of the International Court of Justice are not binding precedents in the same way that our domestic court decisions create law to be

applied in similar cases in the future, the Court is the most prestigious judicial body in the international system. Its statements will have persuasive effect in shaping the further development of the international law of self-defense.

The period since World War II has seen greater growth and change in international law than in any comparable period of history. There were many stimuli for these changes—the total victory by Allied forces in World War II, the creation of the United Nations and the other organizations it spawned, the emergence of the Cold War, the decolonization movement of the 1960s and 1970s, the recognition of the concept of internationally protected human rights, and many more. With the end of the Cold War, the breakup of the Soviet empire and the hoped-for emergence of democratic states in its place, the growth of the international environmental movement, and many other events we can not currently perceive, the next half-century will probably bring even more dramatic changes in international law. For like domestic law, international law is not a static body of rules but rather a living creature, continually forged and shaped to serve the needs of an international community that itself is constantly changing.

Notes:

1. R.R. Baxter, "Introduction to International Law," *International Law Studies*, v. 61 (Newport, R.I.: Naval War College Press, 1980), p. 1.

2. Constitution of the Universal Postal Union with Final Protocol, Vienna, 1 January 1966, 16 UST 1291, TIAS 5881, 611 UNTS 7. Additional Protocols were adopted in 1971, 1974, and 1984.

3. Baxter.

4. Manley O. Hudson, "Legal Foundations of International Relations," *International Law Studies*, v. 61 (Newport, R.I.: Naval War College Press, 1980), p. 57.

5. Statute of the International court of Justice, Article 38, San Francisco, 26 June 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, T.S. No. 933, 3 Bevans 1179. All members of the United Nations are automatically parties to the Statute of the Court.

6. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).

7. Hersh Lauterpact, *Oppenheim's International Law*, v. 1, 8th ed. (London, New York, Toronto: Longmans, Green and Co., 1957), p. 641.

8. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala.

9. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States, Washington, 18 March 1965, 17 UST 1270, TIAS 6090, 575 UNTS 159.

10. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, New York, 10 June 1958, 21 UST 2517, TIAS 6997, 330 UNTS 3. This convention has over eighty parties.

11. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, U.N. Publication Sales No. E.83.V.5. The Convention is not yet in force. It will enter into force when sixty states deposit their ratification. As of January 1992, fifty-one states had ratified.

12. United Nations Charter, Article 27, San Francisco, 26 June 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, T.S. No. 993, 3 Bevans 1153.

13. Y. Dinstein, *War, Aggression and Self-Defence* (Cambridge, U.K.: Grotius Publications, 1988), p. 179.

14. Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America) (Merits), I.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 4 (reprinted in *International Legal Materials*, September 1986, p. 1023).

A Focus on the On-Scene Commander

Frank M. Snyder

Bouchard, Joseph F. *Command in Crisis: Four Case Studies*. New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1991. 325pp. $45

WHAT ARE THE CHANCES that an international crisis would escalate into war as a result of tactical interactions between on-scene naval forces executing orders from national leaders trying to "manage" the crisis? Since war between the United States and the Soviet Union did not break out as a result of the many crises of the Cold War, a quick answer might be, "Escalation seems unlikely; at least it turned out that way." The question, however, deserves a more thoughtful answer.

This book examines four major crises in which naval forces were used as instruments of national policy by both the United States and either the People's Republic of China or the Soviet Union. The crises span fifteen years: the Taiwan Strait crisis in 1958, the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, and the crises during the 1967 and 1973 Arab-Israeli wars.

The first two crises were triangular, involving two major powers and a client state of one of them. The second two were quadrilateral; that is, during a conventional war between two client states a crisis developed between the major powers. These narratives describe the way that U.S. national decision makers used on-scene forces as part of their strategy for "managing" the crises.

Regrettably there have been few accounts, aside from individual personal reminiscences, that deal in such a comprehensive way as this with the manner in which naval forces have been used during crises over the past forty years. Before we close the book on the Cold War, we should attempt to understand the many ways in which policy makers have tried to employ naval forces during the crises of that time, and to consider whether that employment may have increased the risk of escalation to war even though the determined intent of policy makers was to avoid it.

The good news is that these case studies allow one to gain some sense of the information available to decision makers, the strategic objectives on each side,

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the tasking assigned to on-scene commanders, and the manner in which the on-scene forces carried out their orders. The bad news is that the "analytical-inductive" scheme set up by the author to analyze his case studies is unduly complex, and to some extent irrelevant. The author's numerous and cumbersome questions may only distract the reader (as they did the author) from detecting some of the important lessons to be drawn from the case studies.

Bouchard's intent is admirable. Recognizing that the vast literature on "crisis management" has understandably focused on the pressures and uncertainties that face decision makers at the seat of government, he has focused our attention instead on how faithfully their national-level decisions have were translated into action by on-scene commanders. He points out some of the risks of escalation that were either not accounted for by national decision makers or were perhaps discounted by them, and describes the way that orders and reports may have been distorted by delay, by misunderstandings within our own chain of command, by misinterpretations of the intentions of the other side, and by plain old political-military tensions. But he does not speculate about whether the risk of escalation to war has been increased or decreased by the introduction of new technologies.

During forthcoming debates about inevitable draw-downs in military forces, the navy will undoubtedly argue that its importance should increase because of the obvious role that is played by the naval forces during crises. Bouchard believes that in much the same way that the Royal Navy served as an instrument of British foreign policy for three centuries before World War II, the U.S. Navy can be expected to thrive as an instrument of American foreign policy in the future.

But by what criteria should we evaluate the effectiveness and risks of using naval forces in performing that role? As these case studies illustrate, a crisis is a two-sided game: the effectiveness of each side depends on the actions taken by both. Yet, measures prudently taken to increase the security of one's own forces, for example, might easily be interpreted by an opponent as an immediate threat to the security of his.

Though these studies are useful and well-researched, there are details that we are still denied. For example, we are told repeatedly that during the 1973 crisis the orders restricting the movements of the Sixth Fleet were "extraordinarily rigid," giving the fleet commander "little or no room for tactical maneuver," and that the fleet commander several times sought permission "to move his ships" but was turned down. We are therefore dependent on the conclusions of the participants, rather than on the precise terms used to impose the restrictions and to request relaxations. What in fact did the messages say? What were the terms of the restrictions? What relaxations were proposed? What advice were the Joint Chiefs of Staff providing to the policy makers? The author leaves the impression that policy makers imposed unreasonable restrictions and remained

unpersuaded by reasonable requests. We do know what events took place, but even with the recollections of participants, we do not have the wording of orders or advice, so the record is incomplete.

To better appreciate the timing of decisions and the unfolding of events, this reader found it useful to establish a D-day for each crisis (the day that Quemoy was first shelled, the day that medium-range ballistic missiles were discovered in Cuba, the days when the Arab-Israeli wars began), and then relate all the decisions and events as having occurred so many days before or after that D-day.

For his analyses, Bouchard has developed a "stratified interaction model," which he claims offers a good description of the interactions during each crisis (an inflated claim). The model postulates that while orders and reports are passing vertically between the decision makers at different levels on each side of a crisis, these same decision makers are also interacting with corresponding decision makers on the other side of the crisis. He has identified three decision-making levels: political, strategic, and tactical (which war colleges and joint doctrinal publications now call the "strategic," "operations," and "tactical" levels respectively). The author's focus is on interactions at the tactical level; he does mention interactions at the political ("strategic") level, such as the use of the "hot line," but he makes no mention of interactions (if there were any during these four crises) at what he calls the strategic ("operational") level. Bouchard set out to identify the factors that would cause what he calls inadvertent escalation: "Any increase in the level or scope of violence in a crisis that was not directly ordered by national leaders or anticipated by them as being the likely result of their actions." None of the four cases he studies resulted in such an inadvertent escalation.

The author's analytical method asks eight related questions about each of the crises (actually, twenty-three questions, clustered into eight groups). The first three clusters are used to establish whether his "stratified interaction" model applies to each crisis. It would have been simpler to have made "stratified interaction" one of the criteria for the selection of the crises for study.

The first question inquires whether interactions at the tactical level resulted from *direct* or *indirect* control by the president and secretary of defense (the National Command Authorities). The author clearly accepts a conclusion which he claims has been reached repeatedly in studies of international crises: "that the success of crisis management is critically dependent upon top-level political authorities maintaining close control of the actions of their military forces." The nature of such "control," achieved or attempted by the National Command Authorities (NCA) over the actions of on-scene tactical commanders, is variously characterized by the author as being "positive," "direct," "real-time," "close," "monitored delegated," "autonomous delegated," "decentralized," "indirect," and "by negation." With the exception of "indirect control," these terms are defined vaguely by the author, if at all, yet they do convey a general

if imprecise sense of the limitations imposed by national-level decision makers over the authority of on-scene commanders.

Readers are likely to be misled by the author's definition of indirect control as exercised by the National Command Authorities. His definition includes standing orders and contingency plans, the contents of which would neither be approved nor fully known by policy makers. He gives operation orders the label "mission orders," which unfortunately can too easily be read as "mission-type" orders—an entirely different meaning than he intended. He includes rules of engagement as a form of indirect control, but since they are customarily approved by the NCA and then passed without modification to on-scene commanders, they are really a form of direct control. Bouchard finds that in his four case studies, "direct" control (undefined) was not generally used by the NCA, the command of military forces having already been delegated down a chain of command. What he may be trying to convey by "control" is that in specific crises, the normal discretion exercised by an on-scene commander is either withdrawn by the NCA or is modified significantly. Mechanisms available to the NCA for ordering such changes include operation orders, rules of engagement, or less formal communication—currently conveyed through the chairman, though at the time of these crises communication was through the Joint Chiefs of Staff or their executive agent, the Chief of Naval Operations.

The author, indeed, finds that the presidents in each of the four cases exercised command through channels that already existed: the Chief of Naval Operations as executive agent in the first two cases, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff as a collective body in the second two. The case studies illustrate that in any given crisis, the guidance of the NCA may extend to: allocation of forces to participate in the crisis, and the timing of their movement to the scene; the positioning of specific naval forces; the tasks (such as escort or quarantine) that the forces at the scene are to perform; the procedures to be employed (for boarding ships, for example); or the rules of engagement that spell out the circumstances in which the use of force is permissible.

What the author characterizes as "mechanisms" of control really reflect those specific aspects of an on-scene commander's discretion that (in a given crisis) the NCA determined were to be subject to restraint or modification. The author, however, prefers to characterize such restraints or modifications as degrees of control. He did find that during the Cuban missile crisis, President John F. Kennedy and his advisors were forced by the immense scale of operations being conducted to focus their attention on particular operations, but did not attempt to control such operations while they were actually in progress. Bouchard concludes that the NCA attempted to exercise centralized control through a command system that he alleges was designed for decentralized control, but there is no discussion of this important idea.

Is it possible to learn the wrong lessons about control? The author quotes the view of a senior naval officer that the most important lesson of the crisis during the 1973 Arab-Israeli war was that on-scene commanders should be left alone to position their forces in a way they feel is best. In that case, the "extremely dangerous threat" by the Soviet navy could have been effectively countered, as the author puts it, only by destroying Soviet launch platforms before they were able to fire their weapons. While that may be the lesson that naval officers hope that crisis managers would learn, the real lesson from that 1973 crisis for naval officers is that the National Command Authorities may in the future—as they did in 1973—be unwilling to grant an on-scene commander's request for the freedom of manuever he feels he needs.

While Bouchard has provided us with useful case studies that span fifteen years and clearly reflect the advances in the technologies of telecommunications, sensors, and missile guidance during that period, he has downplayed these advances even as his case studies illustrate them. The radio communication to the fleet during the 1958 crisis was based on manual encryption and slow single-channel teletype over high-frequency radio circuits. He points out the long delays in receiving messages. By the fourth crisis, in 1973, these methods had been replaced by on-line encryption of messages over multi-channel circuits at higher speeds, some of them over satellite circuits instead of high-frequency radio. Before another fifteen years would pass, it had become possible in one instance for an on-scene commander, during a shooting war in the Persian Gulf, to request a modification of the rules of engagement through the chain of command and receive the president's decision within three minutes. Surely, such advances will serve to increase the degree of control that crisis managers will feel they can exercise over unfolding events.

Bouchard's second question is whether tactical forces were tightly coupled, by which he means whether or not each side had good intelligence on the other's forces and operations. His answer, unsurprisingly, is yes—that the forces of the major powers were "tightly coupled" during the four crises. He quotes Admiral Arleigh Burke, commenting on the 1958 Taiwan Straits crisis, as saying, "we sort of abided by rules of the other side, and they abided by our rules," but Bouchard fails to pursue this idea. What does it take to discover the rules on the other side, and how do we make clear to them what our rules are? Do "crisis managers" encourage or discourage this process of discovery? These questions are not discussed.

Bouchard answers his own third question—whether tactical forces were used as political instruments—in the affirmative. The author supports the view that "military actions have to be coordinated with diplomatic actions in an integrated strategy for resolving the crisis acceptably without war," yet throughout this work he labels the strategy pursued by national leaders as a "political-diplomatic" strategy rather than diplomatic-military.

The author touches briefly on one aspect of using naval forces for "signalling" during crises that merits more discussion. In describing the crisis of the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, the author alleges that the "Navy chain of command was not kept informed of the political and diplomatic aspects of the crisis," and the "on-scene commanders lacked important information on the political context on the crisis and had to interpret Soviet behavior on the basis of the military and naval moves being made by Soviet forces." The author concludes that on-scene commanders who lack information about the "political context" within which their forces are used for signalling purposes will be apt to interpret military moves only in a military context. This is an important point, because it is unlikely that any NCA will, without urging, share such information with on-scene commanders. Has its lack been serious enough to cause misjudgments on the part of on-scene commanders? The author does not say. Did the principal military advisors (a role now played by the chairman) have a responsibility to urge that dissemination occur? If there has been decoupling in the past because on-scene commanders did not understand the political context, should the chief military advisors share the blame? Bouchard goes so far as to conclude that an on-scene commander with an appreciation of the political objectives being pursued by national leaders could well decide to ignore orders that are inappropriate for the local situation and pursue a course of action that better supports crisis management efforts. He does note with approval that during the month prior to the 1967 war, the navy chain of command correctly estimated what the U.S. policy would be, and imposed suitable restrictions on fleet movements in the Mediterranean. There has been a long tradition (in the Royal Navy and our own) of informed and responsible employment of naval forces in the national interest.

Bouchard's fourth question asks if tactical interactions became decoupled from the strategy being pursued at the political (strategic) level. Without specifically saying whether or not decoupling occurred, the author simply lists many potential causes for it that he feels were present during each crisis. In discussing the Cuban missile crisis, the author concludes that communications delays give rise to decoupling and degrade crisis management, a conclusion that may be justified but is not supported by the case studies. The reader should be warned that the author uses the terms "coupling" and "decoupling" both in a horizontal sense (between tactical forces of the two sides in a crisis) and in a vertical sense (between interactions at the tactical level and the crisis management strategy pursued at the political ("strategic") level).

In the end, Bouchard—undermining the importance of the question—seems to be saying that vertical decoupling will not cause escalation. He concludes instead that "tactical-level military interactions normally will not escalate to war without a deliberate decision by national leaders," and that the factors that cause national leaders to abandon diplomatic efforts and resort to war are by far the most important factors affecting escalation control efforts. He does not discuss

whether or not the loss of or severe damage to major warships might become just such a factor. It is still possible to remember another naval incident during this same period—in the Tonkin Gulf—that had a great effect on both the executive and the legislature.

For his fifth question the author asks whether national leaders and on-scene commanders held different perceptions of the vulnerability of on-scene forces to preemptive attack. He finds that different perceptions did exist during the 1962 and 1973 crises. One of the important concepts used in the study, noted above, is that of the "crisis security dilemma": that many of the "prudent precautions" each side might take to increase its own security could easily by interpreted by the other side as actions that decrease *its* security. Thus, when military forces are used for signalling purposes by crisis managers, it is possible that the actions taken by one side—either for signalling purposes or for the purpose of ensuring survival—could be interpreted by the other side as disclosing an intention to launch a preemptive attack. One of the author's requirements for crisis stability is that "neither side has an incentive to launch a preemptive attack on the other side," but he fails to see that there may *always* be an incentive (at least an argument) for preemption, and that stability exists when the incentive *not* to preempt exceeds that "to preempt."

The sixth question attempts to identify the factors that inhibited the transmission to the strategic and political levels of any escalation that resulted from tactical-level decoupling. Bouchard finds the main inhibiting factors to be caution and prudence by on-scene commanders. The seventh question inquires whether political signals sent by military forces were misperceived. The author believes that in 1973, secretary of state Henry Kissinger did not properly perceive the intent of Soviet naval movements.

The final question deals with three specific types of politico-military tensions: those between political and military considerations, those between political assertions of control and the military desire for flexibility, and those between performance during crises and readiness for wartime missions. The author finds some tensions between political and military considerations in all four crises.

Likewise, Bouchard finds (but does not discuss) how tensions increased with each succeeding crisis between the political ("strategic") assertion of top-level control and the desire by on-scene commanders for flexibility and initiative. The four crises, spaced about five years apart, can be read as showing some evolution in technology, an important subject that, as noted, the author does not discuss. Now that modern telecommunications systems have made it possible for crisis managers to engage in gunboat diplomacy in real time, can the responsibilities of on-scene commanders and commanding officers for the safety and survival of their commands still be reconciled with the risks created by advances in sensors and missile guidance systems?

As for tensions arising from the contention between performance of crisis missions and readiness for war, the author reports that peacetime crisis operations have sometimes been viewed as reducing the capability of forces to carry out their wartime missions and notes that prior to the early 1970s, the United States Navy did not conceive of peacetime missions as a category separate and distinct from wartime missions. Bouchard asserts that the view consistently and strongly held by navy leaders for over forty years, and central to navy thinking today, is that wartime missions have priority over and are the foundation of peacetime missions. Yet during each successive crisis he found (but again did not explore) a gradual lessening of concern by on-scene commanders that crisis operations reduced wartime readiness.

Readers who are comfortable with numerous lists will find sixteen of them in the introduction alone. As nearly all books do, this one contains some errors. For example, the use of "hot pursuit" is used when "immediate pursuit" is intended; the adjective "principal" is several times misspelled; CW (continuous wave) communications are equated both to radiotelegraph (which it is) and to radioteletype (which it is not); backlogs were blamed on a requirement for "on-line" encryption, when "off-line" was apparently meant; and CincLant is quoted as having been critical of the Defense Communications System during the Cuban missile crisis, whereas the criticism is misplaced because portable equipment, interservice incompatibility, lack of equipment, and lack of frequency coordination were then the responsibilities of the services.

Joseph Bouchard, an active duty naval officer with a doctorate in political science from Stanford, deserves our thanks for creating this study. The book was apparently derived in part from his doctoral dissertation and relies on numerous documents as well as interviews or correspondence with a large number of participants in the four case studies. In short, this is a useful text for anyone interested in understanding how command has been exercised during crises, if they focus on the four case studies and draw their own conclusions from them about what lessons we learn.

Ψ

IN MY VIEW . . .

Desert Storm: 1940 Revisited

Sir,

The extensive and efficient six-week allied air campaign in the winter of 1991 that seriously damaged if not destroyed both Iraqi morale and their national infrastructure was a tribute to allied training and technology. Even this resounding triumph was eclipsed by the swift and decisive ground victory that the coalition ground forces achieved over Hussein's vaunted army in less than a week's time. The world was amazed by the brilliance and originality of the strategists of Desert Storm.

Unlike the previous limited wars and military actions since 1945, however, the ground campaign against Iraq was in effect a classic World War II campaign and was fought according to Second World War strategic guidelines and principles. In fact, the highly successful allied land campaign of February 1991 has a precedent in the strategic efforts of May and June 1940. A student of military history cannot help but notice striking similarities between the Desert Storm land campaign and the German offensive against France in the spring of 1940. Indeed, they are mirror images. A chronological comparison of these campaigns illustrates the similarities.

The German strategic plan against France and the Low Countries in May 1940 comprised two separate and distinct parts. The initial effort would be against the British and French left flank, a thrust into the Netherlands and northern Belgium. Recalling the Schlieffen Plan of World War I, the goal of these forces would be to entice the British and French into committing their main effort to defending their left. While the British Expeditionary Force and French forces were moving northeastward against the Germans in northern Belgium, a large German armored force would strike swiftly and decisively from the Ardennes

Forest in Luxembourg and from southern Belgium against the Allied right flank. The panzers would then surge to the English Channel, trapping the Allied armies in Belgium and northern France.

This is precisely what happened. Unfortunately for the Allies, their defensive plan played right into the hands of the Germans. The Allies had decided that any German offensive would be based on the Schlieffen Plan of twenty-five years before. Thus they had devised their own defensive plan, known as Plan D. This called for the bulk of Allied forces to move northward into Belgium at the first signs of a German offensive. They would meet the main German thrust before it had breached the major central Belgian defenses and fortifications, stopping the assault before it could reach the open plains of Flanders and northern France. It was a competent defense against the Schlieffen Plan; against the mobility of the panzers it would prove disastrous.

The German plan proceeded like clockwork. The offensive began on 10 May 1940 with attacks in the Netherlands and Belgium. The Allies quickly executed Plan D and began moving into Belgium. On 11 May 1940 the main German attack through the Ardennes began; on 21 May the panzers had reached the Channel, encircling the Allied armies. By early June the defenders had retreated into a small area around the French port city of Dunkirk. In late June 1940, France surrendered.

The German victory was crushing and decisive. The panzers had accomplished in one month what the Kaiser's armies had been unable to do in four years. The key to the German success lay in the inherent genius of the plan and in the execution of the armored attack against the French right flank. The panzer forces had not worried about their supply lines or threats to their rear to the point of stopping their advance; only through mobility could they keep the Allied forces constantly off balance. The swiftness with which the panzers moved to the Channel was indeed the key to the victory.

The allied forces under General Schwarzkopf would utilize a similar plan against the Iraqi army in February 1991. The Iraqi defenses on the Kuwaiti-Saudi Arabian border appeared formidable, and any frontal attack against them would undoubtedly result in high casualties to the attackers. The heavy American tank units that would spearhead any coalition ground offensive would have little room to maneuver if used against the Iraqi defenses in Kuwait (the Iraqi "center"). Here, only a determined assault by American and allied infantry, well supported by armor, had any chance of succeeding. This, however, was precisely what the Iraqis were expecting: static, bloody war of attrition, which would be unacceptable to the Americans.

With an assault on the Iraqi center apparently too costly, only the two Iraqi flanks remained as options for a coalition attack. Manstein, Rommel, and Patton, in the armored battle of the Second World War, had proven that mobile armored and mechanized forces could easily outflank and destroy fixed fortifications. In

the wide open expanses of desert west of Kuwait the American command saw its chance. A large armored force deployed against the Iraqi right flank could break through the weak Iraqi defenses on the Saudi border and surge to the Euphrates, trapping the bulk of the Iraqi army in Kuwait and southern Iraq.

There remained one problem, however: a means had to be found to freeze the Iraqi armored formations in Kuwait and southeastern Iraq. If the Iraqis expected an assault on their right, they could reposition and reorient the Republican Guards and other heavy armored formations to strike quickly southwestward. This could pose serious problems for the allies, who would be forced to turn their tanks eastwards into the teeth of Iraqi defenses to meet the counterthrust head-on.

Fortunately Salerno, Tarawa, Normandy, and other amphibious assaults of World War II offered a solution. A marine amphibious assault group in the Persian Gulf would provide the threat against the Iraqi left flank required to freeze the Iraqi troops in place. Protection for the amphibious group was provided by the largest carrier and battleship force assembled since Vietnam. This naval presence, combined with excellent deception measures and the memory of the major American amphibious assaults of the past, would perhaps convince Hussein and the Iraqi high command that the primary threat to occupied Kuwait would come from the sea and not from the desert. Heavy attacks on Faylaka Island and Kuwaiti coastal fortifications by American naval air forces and naval gunfire would reinforce this suspicion.

The plan for defeating the Iraqi army was now taking shape. The seemingly imminent threat of a major amphibious assault against their left would prevent the Iraqis from adequately opposing the main attack to be made against their right. In addition, attacks by marine ground units on the Iraqi center would serve to distract further the Republican Guards.

The long-awaited allied ground assault began on 24 February and, like the German offensive against France, proceeded like clockwork. Simply put, the coalition plan worked perfectly. The Iraqis, like the French and British of 1940, expected an assault on their left and were therefore thoroughly unprepared to oppose the swiftly moving armored force that appeared suddenly on their right. As with the French, the reaction of the Republican Guards was too little and too late. Within a week the allied forces had reached Basra, effectively encircling the Iraqi army in Kuwait and southern Iraq. There would be no Dunkirk this time; in one week Hussein's once vaunted army had ceased to exist in the theater as an effective fighting force.

The coalition triumph in 1991, like the Germans' in 1940, demonstrates how, given favorable terrain, a swiftly moving armored force striking hard against an enemy flank can complete a single-armed envelopment and encirclement of enemy forces. It is essential, however, that this force be given enough time, through tactical surprise, to gain sufficient momentum and become truly mobile.


FEBRUARY 1991
IRAQ
Euphrates River
IRAN
Jaliba
Al Basra
Republican Guard
KUWAIT
FAYLAKA IS.
Deceptive Amphibious Thrust
NEUTRAL ZONE
Center Thrust
Main Armoured Thrust
SAUDI ARABIA
PERSIAN GULF


MAY - JUNE 1940
ENGLAND
Paris
Dunkirk
Plan "D"
NORTH SEA
FRANCE
Brussels
Antwerp
N
BELGIUM
NETHERLANDS
Moselle R.
Deceptive Thrust
Main Armoured Thrust
GERMANY
Rhine R.
jerry lamothe

Thus the importance of a deceptive thrust or threat thereof: enemy forces cannot be allowed to react swiftly against the armored force in the early stages of its advance. The logic and necessity of the German attack into Belgium and the threat of an allied amphibious assault against Kuwait are clear; both efforts were required to enable the initial armored advances to get well underway relatively unopposed.

In both cases, the credibility of the respective deceptive thrusts was further improved by the memory of American and German offensives in past wars and campaigns. Memories of the Schlieffen Plan of World War I and of the major Allied amphibious assaults of World War II helped to convince their opponents that any present German or coalition offensive would be along these same lines.

Finally, the allied success in the desert in 1991 showed that, in the proper terrain, large armored forces are still the centerpiece of any offensive strategy. Despite the tremendous leaps in technology and weaponry since the 1940s, the fundamental tactical principles of maneuver remain unchanged. The aggressive use of a mobile, swiftly moving force against the decisive area of an enemy flank always places the initiative in the hands of the attackers. The brilliance of General Schwarzkopf's offensive was not in its originality, but rather in the recognition and use of fundamental principles of warfare that have resulted in victory time and time again.

John O'Brien
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VAW-123

War "without Feelings of Humanity"

Sir,

I offer this response to Major Shaw's comments on Clausewitz, Sherman, and Lee ("In My View," Winter 1992). Major Shaw has distilled Clausewitz's entire treatise down to one out-of-context reference to "total war. . . without feelings of humanity." Considering the breadth of *On War*, consigning his work to the "dustbin of history" seems unjustified. Actually, most of Clausewitz's theories worked quite well during Desert Shield and Desert Storm.

Karl von Clausewitz sought to identify the political and military framework within which conflict exists and the methodology of decision making. *On War* was never intended as a blueprint for the conduct of hostilities. Though he wrote in the early nineteenth century, a surprisingly large portion of *On War* remains valid today. One important theme stresses the difference between total and limited war. Total war pursues the complete subjugation or destruction of an enemy, while limited war seeks more finite goals. Both types of war, according to Clausewitz, had to be prosecuted "without feelings of humanity." A more

modern interpretation of this lack of mercy relates to national will. Put simply, when the goals of a war are decided, limited or total, they must be pursued with total dedication.

Clausewitz also stressed that the military should always be subordinate to the political leadership. The interface for this relationship should exist at the cabinet level so that military expertise is available to the civilian leadership during policy review. Commanders at the tactical/operational level should be left to fight the war within the guidelines formulated at the cabinet level. War remains the ultimate political tool in international relations and should never become influenced by military necessities outside the political goals. War fought for its own end is ultimately destructive to the country that pursues it, as evidenced by Germany in both world wars.

The last two American wars, Vietnam and Desert Storm, clearly illustrate the continued validity of Clausewitz's theories. In Vietnam, we fought a limited war with limited means and a lack of national will. Civil-military relations often occurred at the tactical level, with a myriad of combat restrictions. This might have been acceptable had those political decisions supported a clear-cut set of goals. They did not. Consequently, arbitrary interference existed in the form of daily target lists, approved at the White House level, and other restrictive rules of engagement. The lack of defined goals and of a dedicated national will would cost us any chance for success in Southeast Asia.

In contrast, Desert Storm faithfully followed the tenets of Clausewitz, with stunning results. Clearly defined political goals existed from the beginning. Modifications to these goals, processed efficiently at the cabinet level by the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, provided CentCom with timely guidance to adjust and execute the plan. As the political realities changed, new decisions flowed smoothly down the chain of command. Changing target priorities after the initiation of Scud launches against Israel validated the system. The decision to end the war was a political one, made after weighing the political and military options. This whole scenario could have come right out of Book One in *On War*, which should be enough to keep Clausewitz out of the "dustbin."

Shifting to Sherman and Lee, I agree with Major Shaw and Professor Freeman that Sherman was the first modern practitioner of total war and that Lee had a seemingly mystic effect on the Army of Northern Virginia's morale. Considering the altruism of the two, I believe that Major Shaw shows a bias unsupported by the facts. The "timeless Laws of Land Warfare" have really only been around since the eighteenth century. Before that, cities were put to the sword on a regular basis. Since then, those laws have only been followed sporadically, as evidenced by the actions of men like Nathan Bedford Forrest. Had Sherman, or more appropriately Stonewall Jackson, marched through my region sowing death and destruction, I might still detest him after 128 years. I am sure that the

Iraqi nation will detest us for years to come. What the modern aircraft lacks in rapine ability, it more than makes up for in destructiveness. Bombing Iraq into a pre-industrial state, we accomplished with great efficiency what Sherman sought in his Georgia campaign. Both brought about the rapid defeat of the enemy. The effect on the civilian population, in both cases, is also the same.

There are some telling quotations from both Lee and Sherman in two past *Reviews* that illustrate their respective attitudes. On page 24, Winter 1992, Sherman is quoted as saying: "I am sick and tired of war. Its glory is all moonshine. It is only those who have neither fired a shot nor heard the shrieks and groans of the wounded who cry aloud for blood, more vengeance, more desolation. War is hell."

Lee, in contrast, is quoted on page 83 of Summer 1991: "It is well that war is so terrible—we should grow too fond of it!"

Finally, from Sherman, in a letter responding to charges from the mayor of Atlanta that evacuating the city so Sherman could destroy it was cruelty: "War is cruelty, and you cannot refine it; and those who brought war on the country deserve all the curses and maledictions a people can pour out."

It seems that Sherman possessed the more realistic grasp of the consequences of war. It is not a gentlemanly game, played by generals, at the expense of their men. By his own words, Sherman is in no danger of growing "too fond" of war. He keeps war in the context that it belongs in.

Mark J. Perry
Lieutenant, U.S. Naval Reserve

Ψ

If there is truth to the proposition that knowing the past helps us to understand the present, I believe there is at least as much truth to the proposition that what we know of the present is crucial to our understanding of the past.

Kenneth M. Stampp
The Causes of the Civil War,
3rd ed., 1991

BOOK REVIEWS

A book reviewer occupies a position of special responsibility and trust. He is to summarize, set in context, describe strengths, and point out weaknesses. As a surrogate for us all, he assumes a heavy obligation which it is his duty to discharge with reason and consistency.

Admiral H.G. Rickover

"War Is a Thing in Itself"

D.E. Showalter

Van Creveld, Martin. *The Transformation of War.* New York: The Free Press, 1991. 254pp. $22.95

MARTIN VAN CREVELD has established an enviable reputation as a military historian and analyst. In this work he assumes a new role as a theorist of war. He offers a challenge both to Carl von Clausewitz and to the scholars and *epigoni* who have elevated Clausewitz's ideas to the status of a universal paradigm. Van Creveld describes Clausewitz as one who viewed war as a balance between governments, armies, and people. The author, however, states that at least one element of this "trinity" has been nonexistent for most of history. In particular, Clausewitz assumes that wars are made by states; van Creveld argues that not only is the state a modern, Western institution, but it is increasingly anachronistic because of its inability to sustain a monopoly of effective violence.

At the high end of war's spectrum, nuclear weapons make it impossible to use armed force for meaningful political ends. Since no one has yet developed a convincing idea of how nuclear war can be fought without devastating the planet, even the risk of such a threat serves to inhibit conventional war as well. At the opposite end of the spectrum, states and their armed forces are eroding due to various forms of low-intenisty conflict. The author argues that such conflict has been by far the most politically effective form of war since 1945—not least because it has highlighted the relative impotence of its opponents. "Counterinsurgency" has established a dismal record of failure. No more than

could the old colonial powers, both the United States and the Soviet Union have been unable to develop combinations of technique and technology consistently effective in a low-intensity environment. In short, the world's most powerful armed forces have become irrelevant to waging war.

This irrelevance reflects Clausewitz's misunderstanding of war's moral element. War is more than the servant of politics, more than the means to an end. The author believes that war is a thing in itself—a form of "play" in the anthropological sense, the only human activity that both permits and demands the commitment of all human abilities from the highest levels to the lowest. Such an elemental force denies any paradigm, much less the rational cost-benefit analysis at the heart of Clausewitz's system.

Van Creveld predicts that the combination of nuclear weapons and low-intensity conflict will do more than render states unable to fight each other. Domestic authority may diminish as the techniques of low-intensity warfare become more widespread. With governments no longer able to safeguard the lives of citizens, van Creveld hypothesizes a global descent into tribalism. Bureaucratic armed forces will be replaced with groups that are constructed on personal and charismatic lines. Wars will be fought for beliefs and existence. "Interest" and "reason of state" as defined by Clausewitz will become relics of a specific historical episode. Van Creveld's dystopian vision of a world transformed brings to mind the clear image of Beirut.

Yet *The Transformation of War*, for all its intellectually stimulating qualities, is vulnerable to the same criticism that the author makes of Clausewitz. It is a straight-line extrapolation that is based on a historically specific set of circumstances. Low-intensity conflict achieved its results in two contexts. One was the Cold War, which pitted thermonuclear superpowers against each other under conditions that not merely favored but fostered war by proxy. When either the United States or the Soviet Union became involved in low-intensity conflict, its rival usually found reasons for aiding the other side. Participants in low-intensity conflict became increasingly sophisticated in soliciting such aid—a behavior pattern that is also common to medium-ranking powers with local interests, such as Israel and Iraq. The end of the Cold War and the eclipse of the Soviet Union offer significant possibilities for an alternate future scenario of "gunboat diplomacy" in a revived form. For example, similar to the Gulf War, states having an interest in stability might temporarily unite to suppress challengers of international order and contain the scope of the conflict.

The successes of low-intensity conflict have also depended significantly on the moral weakness of the contemporary state. Communist and Third World governments have lacked any legitimacy except that conferred by force. The West has been disabled by a creeping utopianism that denies legitimacy to any system falling short of perfection. In each case, the result has been a tendency to paralysis. The insurgent's battle is half won before a shot is fired. Events of the

past five years suggest a new pattern. States of the twenty-first century may be smaller than their predecessors, but they are likely to be more stable and confident. Their firmer moral base will facilitate the deterrence and defeat of the kinds of threat posed by low-intensity conflict.

Of course, these hypotheses are as open to challenge as are van Creveld's. However, they are offered not so much to refute his arguments as to highlight the cunning of history. As van Creveld demonstrates in his critique of Clausewitz, using the past and present to structure the future is at best a risky undertaking. The skills of the historian are not the gifts of a prophet. It would be an intellectual loss if van Creveld, in his efforts to supplant Carl von Clausewitz, should forget how to be Martin van Creveld.

Chernavin, V.N. *Voyenno-morskoy slovar'* (The naval dictionary). Moscow: Military Publishing House, 1991. 511pp. (No price given).

The *Naval Dictionary* is the latest in a series of "encyclopedic dictionaries" offered by the Soviet military over the past decade. This work is part of an overall Soviet general staff effort which took over twenty years to complete. In it the entire core of military knowledge has been organized, defined, systematized, and centralized. As such, each encyclopedic dictionary is an authoritative summation of official military views that have been assembled and promulgated by the general staff with the participation and concurrence of the service most closely associated with the work.

The *Naval Dictionary*'s importance is underscored by its sponsorship by Fleet Admiral V.N. Chernavin, commander in chief of the Soviet navy. By authorizing the use of his name as chief editor, Chernavin placed his imprimatur on its contents. He and his colleagues in the Soviet Ministry of Defense produced a comprehensive reference work for all Soviet military personnel involved in research or publication of naval issues. It contains up-to-date, crisply worded definitions of all terms and concepts related to naval theory. It remains a valuable tool for any officer of the former Soviet navy given the lack of the clear doctrinal boundaries that earlier guided him, whether the service itself evolves into a commonwealth navy or "devolves" into republic forces.

Such high-level patronage was typical of Soviet encyclopedic reference works. For example, the first edition of the *Military Encyclopedic Dictionary* (1983) credited Marshal Nikolay Ogarkov as its editor in chief, while the second edition (1986) cited his successor Marshal Sergey Akhromeyev. Colonel General Pavel Zhilin, chief of the Military Historical Institute, is listed as sponsor of the *Encyclopedic Dictionary of the Civil War* and the *Encyclopedic Dictionary of the Great Patriotic War*. The most important work of all, the magisterial

eight-volume *Soviet Military Encyclopedia*, was initiated under the sponsorship of defense minister Andrey Grechko and continued under Marshal Ogarkov after Grechko's death. Its second edition (of which the first volume has just appeared) began under the sponsorship of General Mikhail Moiseyev, then the chief of the general staff.

The purposes of the *Naval Dictionary* were to minimize disruptive policy debates among military officers and to emphasize the heroic past and present importance of the Soviet military. Its introduction impresses on the reader that however far democratization had spread within the Soviet Union, it had yet to touch the top echelons of the Soviet navy. The most important resolutions of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union regarding questions about the creation and development of the Soviet navy for defense of the socialist fatherland are reflected in this dictionary: illuminating the heroic past of the Russian and Soviet navies, the revolutionary and combat tradition of the latter, the history of military art, the most important principles of Soviet military science, naval geography, and international maritime law and maritime practices.

Yet the impression made by the volume's introduction is not confirmed by its contents. Compared with the earlier Soviet military reference works, its content of ideological rhetoric is surprisingly low. Lenin is given only a half-page mention which replaces the two-page article on him in the *Military Encyclopedic Dictionary* in 1986. Almost all the entries on military theory are suffused with Marxist-Leninist concepts and terminology, but the florid sloganeering that dominated earlier works is absent. The introduction, then, was an assurance to the Soviet naval reader that this volume was indeed an officially approved, authoritative statement of military doctrine and policy, rather than an indication that an ideologically charged approach to military issues was being maintained.

It is difficult to say how much of this was due to the policy of glasnost (which was at its peak at the time of publication), or to the very technical and maritime nature of the work. The *Naval Dictionary* has relatively few entries that deal with the broad, ideology-suffused framework of Soviet military concepts, and these lack the exhortative character of the articles in previous volumes. Even such an entry as "Laws of War" offers no more than a terse, factual summary of the Soviet military position on this concept. One might find such an entry in a U.S.-produced military dictionary that attempted to include Soviet terms and concepts.

The roughly 11,000 entries focus instead on maritime issues. The naval translator or interpreter will find it a gold mine of otherwise unclear and undefinable terminology. For example, the entry "Reference Ellipsoid" carefully explains the minor ways in which this navigational term, as used in the Soviet navy, differs from its usage by the mariners of other

nations. The entries have a nationalist flavor; there are many more entries about the Imperial Russian fleet than one may be used to seeing in Soviet naval works—particularly on that fleet of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The point of their inclusion was, of course, to draw a historic connection between the glorious traditions of the Imperial Russian Navy and its Soviet successor.

The same might be said of the volume's numerous biographies of Soviet and Imperial Russian naval leaders. At the back of the volume are numerous charts and tables, and although some are technical in nature, most deal with subjects such as "Honorary Names Awarded to Formations and Units of the Navy from 1943-1945," or "Memorial Places of Glorious Victories and Heroic Defeats of Ships in the Russian and Soviet Fleet."

The *Naval Dictionary* has a number of entries that indicate the then-current state of Soviet thinking on naval organization and missions. Although its list of missions is essentially consistant with earlier lists, this volume provides more detail and precision on their content and how they were to be achieved. Operationally and organizationally this work defines terms that Western naval analysts encountered in other Soviet naval writings, and it explains to some degree how they relate to each other.

One particularly interesting set of entries is on "Naval Art" and "Naval Science," which indicate new developments in a Soviet military debate that dates back to the mid-1970s: is naval theory independent of general military theory or subordinate to it? The debate was resolved at the time of the disappearance of the term "naval science," with retention only of the term "naval art" to set aside peculiarly maritime issues that could not easily be incorporated into Soviet Military Science or Military Art. This arcane matter was important because it meant that theoretical issues regarding the Soviet navy would be decided by the general staff, not by the navy itself.

The entry on "Naval Art" is short, no more than three sentences, and summarizes the standard Soviet military definition of this concept. It refers the reader to the entry "Principles of Military Art" for more detail, but adds that "naval art" is the "most important part of the Theory of the Navy." The entry "Naval Science" initially qualifies this term as having only historical significance, but nevertheless gives a more detailed definition than that for "Naval Art." It goes on to state that "Naval Science is a constituent part of a unified Soviet military science, into which it was organically integrated in the 1970s. By 1991, issues which had been categorized under Naval Science were examined using "Theory of the Navy," a division of "Soviet Military Science." The entry Theory of the Navy implies—through the comprehensive list of issues this concept covers—that the old debate had been reopened to the distinct advantage of the Soviet navy. The new term

appears to be the exact equivalent of the old "Naval Science," except that formally it was "a division of Soviet Military Science."

In sum, this is an exceptionally well-written and researched reference work. Like its predecessors, it will be of great use for Western analysts in developing insights into the former Soviet navy and its successors. But unlike its predecessors, it is not particularly tendentious. If it were translated into English it would be a helpful reference for any U.S. naval officer.

WILLIAM C. GREEN
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Tunander, Ola. *Cold Water Politics: The Maritime Strategy and Geopolitics of the Northern Front.* Oslo: International Peace Research Institute, 1989. (No price given)

Many studies in progress (including my own) about Soviet security problems have suffered miscarriage before delivery. For decades, we could write at a leisurely pace, confident that nothing would change soon enough to embarrass us. However, the incredible changes that have occurred in all of Eastern Europe have put out of business those of us who made a living with periodic Cassandraesque warnings of the threat to Europe. We cannot write fast enough nor can our publishing houses print fast enough to keep up with the new states and governments of the former Warsaw Pact and the former Soviet Union.

Ola Tunander has managed to avoid that fate. What he has given us contains something new: a method of analysis which strategic writers will understand can save their craft in these perilously peaceful times. It is the application of semiotics (the science of signs) to the strategic competition.

What Dr. Tunander has written is brilliant, and a welcome relief from the stale reprocessing of commonly held information characteristic of the genre writing about the Soviet navy. Using the Maritime Strategy—the U.S. Navy's apparently unilateral operational plan for how to defeat the Soviet Union of 1986—as a kind of metaphor, both a sign and a signal, Tunander demonstrates how the different Nordic nations interpreted it within their own contexts and how they tried to adapt it to their own needs and wants. The result is a fascinating study of cross-cultural interpretations.

This invaluable book will be of interest to Americans for the lesson offered in the subtleties of seapower, complete with illustrations. From across the Atlantic, Americans were inclined to assume that Western Europe perceived its threat in compatible ways. However, Tunander details how differently the Nordic countries established their defensive fronts to the East.

Although the text is filled with convincing insights and research, the reader should first check Appendix II, "Sea and Sign." Here is something new, brilliant, and daring. Tunander applies the method of semiotics to the

strategic debate. The results are stunning. For example, Machiavelli is made current in a study of the strategic process. Tunander writes: "For the nuclear prince, war and interest in war are concerned not with actual war but with possible war, with strategies and counterstrategies, moves and countermoves in the superpower game....The simulation of war has not only distanced the prince from brutal force; in the direct interaction between superpowers, simulated war has largely replaced real war and has even distanced military personnel from brutal force."

Tunander's argument is that the underlying assumption in the arms race was that war was no longer possible, and that therefore what we have been doing all these years is interpreting the credibility of the signals and defining the signs—playing a game like chess with elaborate and dangerous rules. We have spent our lives translating the ambiguities and talking in a code.

As we have clearly entered a period in which the game has shifted, with the European nations and Japan scrambling about looking for new combinations and creating new ambiguities, there will be little work for those who deny the importance of political cultures and their language of signs.

The nations which continue to be culturally self-centered in the new age will be given devastating semiotic lessons such as are being administered in the United States by the Japanese. This work, with its engrossing appendix, splendidly demonstrates the new theory and practice of security studies. As a wonderful bonus, it is written with both clarity and professional scholarship, while avoiding the deadly jargon of the trade, and draws upon the resources of a literate mind for apt illustrations. Here is a man who not only knows his Hegel, but also his Derrida. It is increasingly seldom that we can recommend a book that says something new and useful for these revolutionary times.

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Friedman, Norman. *Desert Victory: The War for Kuwait.* Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1991. 435pp. $24.95

No doubt in the next few years publishers will offer numerous selections about Desert Storm, but Norman Friedman has produced the first comprehensive view of the Gulf War. Author of over twenty books on naval subjects, the internationally known military historian has in this work attempted to provide a balanced look into the air, ground, naval, joint, and coalition warfare aspects of the war. The success of his effort is debatable. It is apparant that Friedman is more conversant with naval concepts, and their contribution to the overall war effort, than with the other factors.

The author emphasizes the importance of maritime forces in deterring Saddam Hussein. In particular, Friedman highlights the effect that

amphibious forces had in tying down Iraqi divisions in Kuwait, and he also gives high marks to Central Command (CentCom), especially the army. However, his analysis of the air war brings into question his objectivity. Those who argue that the air war was the decisive part of Desert Storm will disagree with Friedman's analysis, which is critical of the inflexibility of the air-tasking order (ATO). Unfortunately, in the process he loses not only his objectivity but also, I suspect, many readers in the U.S. Air Force. Nevertheless, it is apparent in his analysis that air superiority was of great significance to the overall war effort.

Friedman deserves high marks for his coverage of the background of the war, and the appendices offer solid reference material. In them he lists most of the units involved and provides thorough descriptions of the equipment used by the United States, the coalition, and Iraq, as well as of Scud attacks and the losses suffered by both Iraqi and coalition forces.

Friedman has devoted his final chapter to the lessons we have yet to learn and those from which we have learned. Again his bias toward maritime forces is evident in that he cites as the two great lessons of the war the contributions of its two least-visible elements, sea power and overseas bases. He notes that the only U.S. forces that can be deployed without the consent of current allies are its naval or sea-based forces, and (to his credit, what many believe is the "real" great lesson), that people who are well trained and well led are what win wars. Weapons are not the deciding factor.

Assessments of the Gulf War will continue on for years, and Friedman's perspective of the war was no doubt influenced by the many naval participants that he interviewed. Those interested in the issues leading up to the war, encountered during it, and those that we face in its aftermath will find this book of great interest.

DONALD H. ESTES
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Naval War College

Allen, Thomas B., Berry, F. Clifton, and Polmar, Norman N. *War in the Gulf: From the Invasion of Kuwait to the Day of Victory and Beyond.* Atlanta: Turner, 1991. 237pp. $19.95

War in the Gulf is, rather than a study of the Gulf War, a celebration of Cable Network News (CNN). The book was commissioned by CNN and is filled with photos, graphics, and anecdotes of that network's excellent reporting of that conflict. Built on the premise that "fleetingness" is the weakness of television news and that images mark its strength, the book offers us images preserved for posterity.

Written by an experienced team with diverse backgrounds in journalism, military affairs, and pictorial histories, this work makes an immediate positive impression. Its strength, as one might expect, is its pictures. Many of them will be familiar to those who watched the war from afar, but

familiarity does not detract from their impact. The images of both the Gulf and the home front are sharp and skillfully edited. They have been woven into a coherent and moving photo essay. However, the book's weaknesses are the inaccuracies (predictable given its purpose, multiple authors, and speed of production), a self-serving focus on the medium of television, and a disjointed writing style which sometimes repeats whole paragraphs verbatim.

The narrative attempts to accomplish three things: present a chronology of events, provide some political and military analysis, and document the role of CNN in both reporting and influencing the war. It falls short. First, the chronicle of events is full of errors, which detract from the work's credibility. It misidentifies Umm Qsar as a Kuwaiti port, credits marines with capturing Faylakah Island in January, confuses the roles of the Saudi army and national guard, and links the PLO to the beginnings of the Intifada. The work betrays a lack of either research, knowledge, or understanding of the region.

There are many examples of superficial and misleading analysis, but two stand out as particularly pernicious. Discussing Iran under Khomeini, it is stated that "Iranians were shoved out of the modern age." It is not at all clear just what this means, though immediate reference to women's rights, religious laws, and human rights suggests that Iran's failure to reflect American values was the cause for that nation's gratuitous expulsion from the modern world. The second example is the full-page photo of Iraqi militiamen brandishing their rifles, with the caption, "Guns are a part of the culture of the Middle East." The photo reflects the popular television image of Moslem hostility toward the West which has prevailed since the Iranian revolution. More importantly, the caption is a disingenuous statement that says nothing yet manages to evoke a negative image. Together they reinforce a stereotype that is both incorrect and interferes with our gaining a better understanding of the Middle East. Recognizing the mischief that such stereotypes can cause, one only hopes that the irony of a gun-and-culture statement made by American authors is not lost on the readers.

Finally, when addressing the role of CNN the book confuses the medium with the message, equating reporting about the war with reporting about television. Evidence of this abounds; self-congratulatory passages appear throughout the text. Next, the authors declare that television coverage "changed the face of war," a rather presumptuous statement that is neither explained nor defended. While television has certainly had an impact, it is doubtful that television plays much in the thoughts and emotions of individual soldiers as they prepare for battle. Still another presumptuous statement is that this work covers the war "without modifying what happened." Given that assurance, we can only hope that this is the case.

Since television reporting is the raison d'etre for *War in the Gulf*, it is unfortunate that the controversy of live coverage is not explored more fully. Acknowledging that live coverage was used to advantage by both sides, this work fails to bring the discussion of television's proper role to a reasoned conclusion. This is particularly unfortunate with regard to the much-debated role played by Peter Arnett. There is much to be said for and against Mr. Arnett's actions, as the authors suggest. Had they pursued the issue beyond the superficial, they might well have contributed something meaningful to the debate over the media's role in modern war. Instead, the readers are left with little more than a weak apologia.

As a picture book, *War in the Gulf* is excellent. Never intended to be definitive or profound, it upholds the authors' assertions that the image is the strength of television news. The book runs into trouble, however, when it distorts these images with shallow and hurried attempts to document, analyze, and explain. Rather than "fleetingness," it is the substitution of images for facts which marks the most serious weakness of this work and, by implication, of television news, which it serves to promote.

THOMAS E. SEAL
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Barnett, Correlli. *Engage the Enemy More Closely: The Royal Navy in the Second World War.* New York: Norton, 1991. 1052pp. $35

Barnett has offered a substantial, comprehensive account of the Royal Navy's strategy and operations in the Second World War. Divided into four parts, it discusses the background of the Royal Navy, with a summary of the interwar period and an account of operations up to Dunkirk; the crisis period of 1940–41, from the successful defense against invasion in 1940 to the disasters in the Mediterranean and the Far East; the victory in the convoy battles in the Atlantic, the Arctic, and the Mediterranean; the invasion of northwest Europe; and the return to the Far East.

Barnett argues that through shortsighted policies Britannia had "let the trident slip" in the interwar period and that the Royal Navy had neglected important new forms of naval warfare. Nevertheless, the Royal Navy improved its fighting performance sufficiently to win the vital naval battles required to maintain sea communications so that Anglo-American military power could be reinserted into Europe.

The author argues that much effort was wasted in fruitless Mediterranean diversions. However, the Royal Navy's major achievement was in laying the groundwork for and masterminding Operation Neptune, the naval side of the Normandy landings. Victory against Germany was, however, accompanied by a very subordinate role in the American victory against Japan.

Correlli Barnett is a well-known military historian who has shown some hostility to the Royal Navy. It is notable therefore that he has produced a work that reveals real admiration for the service's fighting qualities and the vital maritime foundations of Allied victory ashore. His military origins also have given him insight into the vital interaction of sea power and events on land. Clearly, Barnett is most comfortable when discussing amphibious operations, and this work probably includes the best available modern account of the major European amphibious operations of 1943-45.

Since Barnett's attack on Montgomery in *The Desert Generals*, he has revelled in controversy. This book is no exception. American readers will perhaps be shocked by the author's stern but just criticism of Churchill, whose relationship with the navy was always an uneasy one. (The famous signal "Winston is Back" had a double meaning that was forgotten subsequently.) He is also right to be highly critical of Churchill's giving in to the Royal Air Force in its doctrinaire opposition to allocating long-range aircraft to an effort to plug the mid-Atlantic gap. Perhaps Barnett's strongest revisionist feature is his critical analysis of the Mediterranean strategy, of which Churchill was the major architect. Here Barnett produces a convincing and brilliant case; his description of Malta as "The Verdun of the Naval War" is especially telling. The huge resources put into a forward naval policy in the Mediterranean might have been used elsewhere to better effect.

It can be argued that it is unrealistic to analyse the Mediterranean campaign in terms of cold profit and loss. History always appears clearer if read after the political and emotional pressures of the time have faded in importance. The author does indeed display a tendency to criticize decision makers in terms of subsequent attitudes and contexts. He argues that Britain should have realized that her empire was a burden, cut her losses, and then concentrated on Europe. At the time however, this was not on the agenda—the British Empire was what the navy and its leaders were employed to defend. What is clear in this work is that less "cigar butt strategy" might have provided sounder imperial defence.

Barnett has produced a well written text that is easy, interesting reading. Its major flaw is the author's treatment of naval technology. There are persistent and significant errors of technical detail throughout that cannot be dismissed as mere annoyances for antiquarians. First, the book may be used as a college text and source of facts—students be warned! Second, naval specialists might be encouraged to dismiss the work because of its unreliability—that would be a tragedy. Finally, the author's historical conclusions about British technological decisions are based on flawed or partial data.

Barnett clearly wanted to add to his well known indictment of British technological deficiencies and

management, but there is another side to the story, to be found in the specialist literature. It is especially surprising and regrettable that Dr. Andrew Gordon's recent work on British naval procurement in the interwar period does not appear in the bibliography. Barnett's first two chapters on interwar policy, and all subsequent sections where technology is discussed, must be treated with considerable care and reserve and should not be regarded as the last word on the subject.

This said, *Engage the Enemy More Closely* is the most significant study of the British war at sea from 1939-45 to appear since Roskill's standard accounts. It is indeed a direct descendant of Roskill's works, since the great man's archive at Churchill College is kept by none other than Correlli Barnett. He has fully exploited the opportunities of his professional situation to add to his predecessor's work and has given the national security community a stimulating and timely reassertion of the fundamental importance of maritime power to a nation's overall war-making capacity. Admiral of the Fleet Lord Lewin's quote on the dust-jacket says that Barnett's "analysis clearly shows how vital it was for the war at sea to be won before land and air campaigns could bring final victory." That a military historian not regarded as a special friend of the Royal Navy has made this point so clearly is of special significance in today's debates over national strategy on both sides of the Atlantic.

ERIC GROVE
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Southampton University

Kersaudy, Francois. *Norway 1940.* New York: St. Martin's, 1991. 272pp. $19.95

Kersaudy has produced a work that reads fast and is full of lessons, but his interpretations should not always be trusted. For example, he refers to Winston Churchill as physically massive, when in fact Churchill was a diminutive person, and he assails Neville Chamberlain as militarily incompetent and lacking backbone. Yet the former Chancellor of the Exchequer knew more than most government members of Britain's defence establishment and its needs. Moreover, Chamberlain's act of appeasement at Munich in 1938 was absolutely necessary given the totally impotent state of the British air defences at that time. In addition, there is a curious misidentification of "the cruiser *Warspite*" (she was a battleship) beneath a photo of an H-class destroyer in Narvik fjord.

The Norwegian campaign of 1940 was a classic case of British intellectual arrogance—it wanted to run before it could crawl. The British started to organize an expeditionary force, ostensibly to aid the Finns against the Soviets. That concept, however, got muddled with closing the German access to Swedish iron ore, which was shipped during the winter from the

northern Norwegian port of Narvik. The logic of that idea was that Sweden could be persuaded to close its mines to the Germans; to assist them a couple of battalions were to be sent across Norway into Sweden. Naturally, the Scandinavians were not enthusiastic. None of these plans took into account the pacifist nature of the Norwegian government, or, more importantly, the likelihood of a stiff German reaction. So hypnotized were the British by their own planning that they failed to heed the warning signals from Europe regarding German intentions against Norway.

The muddle in London was compounded by the lack of a central direction of the war. Although a Military Coordination Committee was established, chaired by the prime minister, the leadership was usually delegated to Winston Churchill, then First Lord of the Admiralty. Moreover, London had little knowledge of the army's lack of strength, or the distances over which the navy and the air force would have to operate, or any appreciation of the necessities for a winter campaign in Norway. In addition, the British forces were not yet well acquainted with the Luftwaffe and the consequent need for both large numbers of anti-aircraft guns and to disperse ships and stores in restricted anchorages.

In addition to all this, the story involved not merely Britain but also Norway and France. The Norwegians faced the immediate need to mobilize their forces under German invasion. But the language used by the general staff was not the language heard by the government. To the Norwegian army, partial mobilization meant sending notices by mail for assembly within two days; the government understood it to mean that only those troops in the south would be called to the colors. The pacifist government did not have available the necessary stores of munitions and other supplies for the troops that did assemble. As if that was not enough, the Germans seized some of their ports with "Trojan horses," while others were destroyed by bombs. Since no one spoke the same language, communication was replaced by rampant suspicion, to such an extent British and the French were attacking when in fact they were evacuating.

Politically, the French government badly needed a victory. It sent Chasseurs Alpins to obtain one, and lectured the British government about how to run a war only weeks before France fell ignominiously.

Kersaudy tells his story with great insight, and discusses what was happening in Berlin as well. He tells a tale whose lessons should not be lost. Anything that can go wrong, will, if no one has planned ahead, no one knows the political and physical situation, and direction is from afar.

ROBIN HIGHAM
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D'Este, Carlo. *Fatal Decision: Anzio and the Battle for Rome*. New York: Harper Collins, 1991. 566pp. $35

Carlo d'Este has made, with *Fatal Decision*, another significant contribution to our understanding of the war

in Europe. It is meticulously researched and presents a complete account of one of the war's bloodiest campaigns.

Anzio tested and often exceeded the limits of human endurance. It was, for Ernie Pyle, a place where after a few hours "you wish you were back on the boat...this is a new kind of warfare...the whole beachhead is the front line...it ain't no picnic feeling." Martin Blumenson characterized Anzio as "a gamble conceived in impatience and carried out in haste, the result of a large measure of resentment and conflict between allies."

The author is critical of Sir Harold Alexander (who commanded 15th Army Group), Fifth Army commander Lieutenant General Mark Clark, and is particularly harsh with Churchill, on whose insistence Operation Shingle was launched. All contributed to the execution of a campaign characterized by severe operational and logistical problems, poor coordination between Allied forces, and changing tactical objectives. Churchill dismissed the objections of key military leaders, including Major General John P. Lucas (the designated Shingle force commander), as the usual negative thinking of military planners whom he referred to as "masters of negation." The result was a hastily planned operation that was unsupportable by the remainder of the U.S. Fifth Army, who were battling the Germans along the Gustav Line anchored on Monte Cassino.

The original plan called for Lucas's VI Corps to assault Anzio on 22 January 1944. If successful in establishing a beachhead, Lucas could then advance to the Alban Hills or march to seize Rome, thus severing German communications to the south. According to d'Este, there was nothing wrong with the basic concept of Shingle. If Lucas had had sufficient force he could have coerced Field Marshall Kesselring (German commander in Italy) to abandon the Cassino front. The main flaw of Shingle was its logistical restrictions which kept the size of the landing force too small to achieve its aim.

Unfortunately for the Allies, Kesselring did not react according to their plan. When Lucas hesitated to advance and consolidate the beachhead, Kesselring rapidly deployed elements of thirteen German divisions to Anzio in an effort to eliminate the beachhead. The result was four months of bloody stalemate in which Allied artillery and naval gunfire saved the beachhead from destruction. In the interim Clark replaced Lucas with Lucian Truscott.

Only when substantial reinforcements were received in May were Clark and Alexander able to penetrate the Gustav defenses. They then advanced and eventually joined hands with the beleaguered VI Corps at Anzio. Within a few weeks Rome fell, but only after Clark had allowed the majority of German forces to escape the Allied pincers.

More significant than failed leadership was the operational flaw in the Anzio planning. The distance between the main Allied forces at Cassino and the Anzio beachhead was too great to allow for mutual support. Both the author and Martin Blumenson (in the army's official history) point out that neither sector could influence the other. In short, the operation had been doomed from the beginning.

In the final analysis Anzio was a campaign marked by ineffective leadership at the highest levels. Too few forces allocated to Shingle jeopardized the attainment of even limited objectives. Moreover, the Allied operational and tactical commanders failed to exert the proper supervision and battlefield audacity that was required to ensure military success. The author claims that only the enemy leader possessed the ability to choose instinctively the right course of action on the field of battle.

Perhaps d'Este makes his greatest contribution in assessing the Anzio campaign as part of the overall Allied strategy in the Mediterranean. Was it worth 85,000 Allied battle and nonbattle casualties? The author leaves such judgments to us.

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Honan, William H. *Visions of Infamy: The Untold Story of How Journalist Hector C. Bywater Devised the Plan that Led to Pearl Harbor.* New York: St. Martin's, 1991. 346pp. $22.95

Bywater, Hector C. *The Great Pacific War: A History of the American Japanese Campaign of 1931-33.* New York: St. Martin's, 1991. 321pp. $22.95

Hector C. Bywater was a journalist for thirty-six years during which time he contributed to, or was employed by, leading newspapers on both sides of the Atlantic. After writing for James Gordon Bennett's *New York World* on the Russo-Japanese War between 1904-1905, Bywater shifted to Europe where he reported on the rising German navy even as he spied for British naval intelligence. Living mostly in Britain after 1919, Bywater wrote on the naval rivalry between the United States and Japan in the Pacific. His first major volume, *Sea Power in the Pacific,* assessed the situation in the Pacific at the time of the famed Washington conference of 1921-1922 for the limitation of arms. Four years later, when relations between the United States and Japan had passed through an acute crisis over immigration, Bywater produced his fictional account of *The Great Pacific War* of an American-Japanese war between 1931 and 1933.

William M. Honan, a gifted journalist and newsman, has searched in Britain, Japan, and the United States for clues that would indicate that Hector C. Bywater helped to shape Japanese and possibly American war planning before World War II. Honan wishes to convince his readers that Bywater, in *The Great Pacific War*

and elsewhere, predicted the shape of World War II in the Pacific, countered a basic weakness in American war planning, and influenced Japan's great Admiral Yamamoto Isoroku into thinking that Japan should carry out a surprise attack on the Pacific fleet at Pearl Harbor in 1941.

Honan has found no writings by Yamamoto to prove he was moved by Bywater, but it is surely safe to assume, as Honan does, that Yamamoto read *The Great Pacific War* while serving as naval attaché in Washington (1926-1928), if not before. As further evidence of Yamamoto's commitment to Bywater, Honan draws attention to a few other incidents: reports about Bywater by other Japanese officials in the United States; two Japanese army General Staff papers of 1926 (that apparently carry no proof of Yamamoto's authorship); a lecture by Yamamoto given in 1928 as recalled by a member of the audience forty-two years later; a brief encounter between Bywater and Yamamoto at the naval conference in 1930 held in London; and a more extended meeting in 1934 between the two, upon which Honan speculates at some length. Honan concedes that no Japanese naval intelligence reports survive for the period, nor does he cite any Japanese war plans records that prove a Bywater influence.

The author wants his readers to find the source for Yamamoto's plan to attack Pearl Harbor in Bywater's account, written sixteen years earlier. In the tradition of the Japanese attacks on the Russians at Port Arthur in 1904 and on the Germans at Tsingtao in 1914, the Japanese in Bywater's tale planned to capture swiftly and deny to the Americans any naval base facilities in the western Pacific that might serve the United States fleet once it had moved from Hawaii to the Philippines. Yamamoto's attack, of course, was a blow at the main battle forces of the Pacific Fleet, not the crucial support facilities. Only the element of surprise was common to the plans of the two men.

Honan sees in the final battle in *The Great Pacific War* the inspiration for Yamamoto's 1942 plan to attack Midway. Whereas Yamamoto aimed to extend Japan's defense perimeter eastward to Midway and perhaps farther, the Japanese fleet in Bywater's final battle was provoked to fight by a supposed American threat to capture Yap. To this reviewer the circumstances of Bywater's battle were far closer to the desperate sorties by the Japanese against the Americans in the battles of the Philippine Sea and Leyte Gulf than to Midway.

Among Honan's other claims are: that Bywater revealed the Japanese strategy at the Washington conference in 1921 to force from the United States a renunciation of further building of fortifications or naval bases in the Pacific west of Hawaii; that Bywater was the first to expose German building of "pocket battleships"; that the Japanese demand for a "common-upper-limit" for the American, British, and Japanese navies in the 1930s was really Bywater-inspired; and that Bywater in 1937 uncovered

the Japanese construction of superbattleships. Even Honan concedes that Bywater underestimated these great ships by 30,000 tons. Finally, Honan concludes that Bywater's death in August 1940 may have been arranged by Admiral Yamamoto in order to prevent him from discovering and publishing the admiral's plan to attack Pearl Harbor fifteen months later.

Honan's conjectures make for entertaining reading. But they contain more than a hint at the old and, one would hope, outmoded myth that while the Japanese may be smart, they really cannot think things through for themselves.

The Great Pacific War is a novel that was written by a man generally well grounded in the facts of the situation. Perhaps it is chiefly significant as evidence of Bywater's remarkable ability to bring before the public the strategic problems then being discussed by the professionals behind closed doors. To evaluate Bywater's predictions fairly, it should be kept in mind that he placed his war in 1931, the year of the Manchurian incident, when Herbert Hoover was president. It is safe to conclude, as the American military had estimated since 1906, that Japan would have mounted a massive attack on Guam and the Philippines. American war planners also feared, as Bywater warned, that Japan would somehow block the Panama Canal. In light of the revised estimates upon which the 1929 War Plan Orange was based, Bywater was surely correct in predicting a step-by-step movement by the American fleet across the Pacific. It is difficult to accept Bywater's warning that the administration in Washington might, in panic, approve an inadequately covered attack on the Bonin Islands just south of Tokyo. American war planners were then firmly convinced that the United States fleet required a main advanced base in the Philippines before moving north to blockade Japan.

The Pacific war (1941-1945) departed significantly from Bywater's vision. Naturally Bywater did not anticipate that Japan would fight a coalition of the United States, Britain, China, and the Netherlands. Writing in the day when air power was still considered as useful support for battleships, Bywater did not dream of the role of carrier air in World War II. Moreover, assuming that the United States would remain true to its earlier commitment to freedom of the seas, he wholly failed to anticipate the consequences of the mounting of unrestricted submarine warfare by the Americans against Japan's maritime arteries. In addition, he erroneously expected that gas would be an important factor. Given his obvious respect for both the Americans and the Japanese, he conceived of a civilized war in which each belligerent would be solicitous of the other's defeated and helpless combatants, and he did not forsee that Japan would continue the struggle for nearly a year after the bulk of her fleet had been destroyed. However, none of this detracts from the novel. It is a remarkable estimate

of the situation by one of the distinguished naval writers of his generation.

WILLIAM R. BRAISTED
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Goldstein, Erik. *Winning the Peace: British Diplomatic Strategy, Peace Planning, and the Paris Peace Conference, 1916-1920.* New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1991. 307pp. $69

A crafted analysis of bureaucracy and personality, *Winning the Peace* explores how Britain after the Great War emerged from the Paris Peace Conference with its postwar objectives substantially intact. France had obtained neither Luxembourg nor the Rhineland, and Keynes managed to have the reparations sum left blank in the treaty. In Eastern Europe, the New Europe idea had created a relatively stable group of medium-sized powers generally well disposed toward Britain. British interests in the Middle East were protected and consolidated.

How did Britain do it? Goldstein's answer is, preparation. Through the establishment of a Foreign Office Political Intelligence Department (PID) that was staffed by outstanding civilian regional experts, position papers were prepared that addressed the general issues and knotty details that would face the Paris conference participants. These papers served as the informational basis for negotiation.

The book examines the politics surrounding the establishment of the PID in March 1918 by Lord Hardinge of the Foreign Office (a counter to Lloyd George's personal secretariat, the "Garden Suburb"). To begin his operation Hardinge pirated twelve members of the Department of Information's Intelligence Bureau (DIIB) into the Foreign Office, despite the protests of the Department of Information's new minister, Lord Beaverbrook. The twelve included such subsequently well known figures as Robert William Seton Watson, Lewis Namier, and Arnold Toynbee. Brief biographies are given of the principal players in the PID; these provide a rich picture of the personalities who prepared the seventy-one PID memoranda for the conference negotiators. These memoranda were supplemented by 174 Historical Section handbooks and thirty-five military intelligence reports.

Sifting through the mountain of Admiralty, cabinet, foreign office, and personal papers, Goldstein has constructed a coherent thread. His account is not without humor from time to time, as in this discussion of the exultation of the British imperialists in early 1919: "The war was won and the British Empire once again stood victorious. What was more, British armies were in occupation of most of the Middle East. It was not so much a question of what Britain could get, but rather what it would choose to keep. Undoubtedly some dregs would have to be provided for France, preferably in darkest Africa, while some

gristle would be found for the Italians' seemingly curious colonial appetite, and a particularly vile mandate might be graciously offered to the Americans to teach them the arduous nature of an imperial burden."

But as 1919 continued on, the euphoria of the imperialists proved short-lived: Ireland was erupting, Egypt was rumbling, and the Amritsar massacre had ignited India. The tide turned, and imperial reformers became more important in the negotiations.

Allen Leeper, whose credentials included speaking Romanian and holding the position of secretary of the Anglo-Romanian Society, had the difficult job of representing Britain on the conference's Romanian Committee in the face of Italy's support of maximal Romanian claims. Italy, on the basis of checkerboard diplomacy, sought Romania as an ally located to Yugoslavia's rear. Leeper's comment in a Foreign Office minute conveys his despair: "If Mr. Bratianu's Govt. insists on quarreling with the Serbs & putting their trust in Italy, no one can save them from ruin." Allen Leeper's correspondence with his brother Rex, who worked on Russian questions for the PID, is cited on a number of occasions and provides candid background comment on the diplomatic developments. In future, the reader might hope to hear more from Goldstein about the role of the Leeper brothers in postwar diplomacy.

Successful though they were, the PID staff and the British negotiators wanted more from the Paris Peace Conference than they got. They wanted a larger Belgium that included Luxembourg. They wanted a Yugoslavia that included Fiume. They wanted a pro-British Greece. They did not get these or a number of other desired concessions and arrangements. For Britain, winning at Paris meant not losing. As Goldstein puts it, "On paper Britain gained nothing. Its victory was that neither did any other state." Winning the peace meant losing less than anyone else.

This work provides a powerful case for Britain's thoroughness in its preparations and the quality of its PID experts, which made it successful in the diplomatic arena.

GRANT F. RHODE
Brookline, Massachusetts

Pipes, Richard. *The Russian Revolution.* New York: Knopf, 1990. 970pp. $40

The Russian Revolution is an immense and masterful account of the revolutions of 1905 and 1917, the Bolshevik coup of October 1917, and that party's attempt to consolidate its power. It begins where Professor Pipes's earlier study, *Russia under the Old Regime* (1974), left off—both chronologically and, one must lament, ideologically. The work is vintage Pipes. It displays an impressive mastery over evidence which, unfortunately, is forced to serve a narrow and inadequate interpretation of Russian history.

Pipes is probably the foremost proponent of the "patrimonial" interpretation of Russian history, which avers

that because the tsar considered Russia to be his private estate, politics became indistinguishable from the economics of the household. Russians were viewed as mere servitors, not citizens. *Russia under the Old Regime* stated that the modernization of the patrimonial institutions in the 1880s brought on "unmistakable germs of totalitarianism." In *The Russian Revolution*, Pipes asserts that the continued existence of a patrimonial government, impinging as it did upon a recently liberated society and economy, was the primary source of discontent. To a large extent, "revolution was the result not of insufferable conditions but of irreconcilable attitudes." One can "beg to disagree" with Pipes and his patrimonial theory, and one can fault him for paying insufficient attention to the "insufferable conditions," yet still find merit in Pipes's assertion that "nothing in early twentieth-century Russia inexorably pushed the country toward revolution except the presence of an unusually large and fanatical body of professional revolutionaries."

Pipes's interpretation states that the revolutionary period extended for almost a century, from the 1860s to Stalin's death in 1953. The "culminating period," however, was 1899-1924, from the university strike to the death of Lenin. During this period, Pipes argues, the "*Weltanschauung*" and institutions of Soviet totalitarianism were established. Stalinism, consequently, was not an aberration but merely the effective implementation of Leninist ideology—a conclusion which Pipes attempts to support in his last chapter, "The Red Terror." (Unlike the Jacobin Terror of 1793-1794 in France, for "Soviet Russia, the terror never ceased.") However, this interpretation remains unpersuasive, especially in light of Lenin's late opposition to the rise of Stalin. (For an interesting argument *contra* Pipes on this matter, the reader should examine Robert C. Tucker's recent work, *Stalin in Power: The Revolution from Above, 1928-1941*, which interprets Stalinism as a second revolution.)

The well known historical landmarks which fall within Pipes's culminating period (or, more precisely, that part of the period examined in this book—the remainder will be examined in a sequel, *Russia under the New Regime*) are subjected to his considerable powers of extensive and intensive scholarship. The result is an engaging and occasionally provocative book. He informs us that: (1), contrary to popular opinion, interior minister Plehve did not seek war with Japan in order to divert a domestically troubled Russia; (2), the 1905 Revolution, although a clear victory for the liberals, exacerbated Russia's principal problem—the conflict between the government and society; and (3), prime minister Stolypin's agrarian reform was but a marginal success, even before it was disrupted, and his plan to create a class of farmers loyal to the regime was thus destined to fail.

In Pipes's view, World War I was less the cause of the revolutions of 1917 than were two decisions made by Tsar Nicholas during the war: to

prorogue the Duma and take personal command of the war at the front. According to Pipes, "the decisions which Nicholas took in August 1915 made a revolution unavoidable. Russia could have averted a revolutionary upheaval only on one condition: if the unpopular bureaucracy, with its administrative and police apparatus, made common cause with the popular but inexperienced liberal and liberal-conservative intelligentsia."

The spontaneous revolution in February brought not only the end of tsarist rule in Russia but also a weak but accountable Provisional Government that was beholden to an unaccountable and hostile Provisional Executive Committee of the Petrograd Soviet. Trotsky subsequently utilized the soviets as a cover for initiating the Bolshevik coup. Lenin completed the coup by emasculating the soviets and proroguing the Constituent Assembly. As these highlights indicate, Pipes believes that political events were more responsible for bringing revolution than were social problems (e.g., the dislocation of peasants or alienation of workers). This perspective allows the author to establish the continuity between Russian patrimonialism and Soviet totalitarianism—in the person of Lenin.

Richard Pipes's treatment of Lenin is a bit much. Not only is too much made about his "cowardice," given the admitted paucity of evidence, but what is one to make of the following? "To reconstruct his thinking, it is necessary, therefore, to proceed retroactively, from known deeds to concealed intentions." Are we to discount totally the possibility of tactical adjustments in response to events? Nevertheless, it is from this questionable methodology that Pipes (less than two pages later) has Lenin personifying the critical, deterministic link between Russian patrimonialism and Soviet totalitarianism. Pipes says, "This [militarized] outlook on politics Lenin drew from the inner depths of his personality, in which the lust for domination combined with the patrimonial political culture shaped in the Russia of Alexander III in which he had grown up. But the theoretical justification for these psychological impulses and this cultural legacy he found in Marx's comments on the Paris Commune. Marx's writings...served to justify his destructive instincts and provided a rationale for his desire to erect a new order: an order all-encompassing in its 'totalitarian' aspiration."

Such is the narrow and inadequate interpretation of Russian history which emerges from an otherwise rich and engaging work.

WALTER C. UHLER
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

Williamson, Samuel R., Jr. *Austria-Hungary and the Origins of the First World War.* New York: St. Martin's, 1991. 272pp. (No price given)

This publisher's series, *The Making of the Twentieth Century*, has included to date works on the origins of the First World War for Britain (Z. Steiner),

France (J. Keiger), Germany (V. Berghahn), Italy (J. Bosworth), and Russia (D. Leiven). Williamson, president of the University of the South, completes the survey with this volume. He is most qualified to do so, having spent the past two decades completing a two-volume history of the Habsburg monarchy from 1910 to 1914. He is perhaps best known for *The Politics of Grand Strategy: Britain and France Prepare for War, 1904-1914* (1969).

The book is divided into two major sections: the first six chapters examine the nature of the Dual Monarchy and how it functioned, while the last four analyze decision making during the Balkan Wars and the July Crisis of 1914. The research was conducted in the major Austrian military and political archives and includes the personal papers of Archduke Francis Ferdinand. The work is beautifully crafted and is written in an impeccable style.

Williamson's major purpose is to correct the Germanocentric view of the First World War partially created by Fritz Fischer's pioneering studies. Hence, the author reminds us that the initiative for war was Vienna's, not Berlin's: "The steps that pushed Europe toward war were taken in Vienna." Williamson details how a seasoned set of policymakers, enjoying "unusually complete and united backing" in the monarchy, opted for war in 1914. The military, in the words of the chief of the general staff, wanted "war, war, war." The Foreign Office sought nothing less than a *"final and fundamental reckoning"* with Serbia. The emperor, while recognizing the "tragedy of that contemporary moment," in the end concurred that war was the only solution to the dynasty's ethnic problems.

Despite this "now or never" mentality, Austria-Hungary was ill-prepared for war in 1914. The bulk of the army was on harvest-leave until 25 July, thus precluding a lightning strike against Serbia. Secondly, General Conrad von Hötzendorf committed a major strategic error. On 30 July, ignoring news of pending Russian military measures, he ordered his offensive force to move southward; when Russia ordered mobilization on 31 July, von Hötzendorf agreed with his railway staff that the troops should continue south and then reembark and head northward. They arrived in time to influence neither theater.

Williamson's damning conclusion is that von Hötzendorf dispatched the force against Serbia in order to "subvert a diplomatic solution." Put differently, the general had "reacted in an almost classical fashion by ignoring the information that contradicted what he wanted most—war against Serbia." In the end, Habsburg prospects rested upon hopes and illusions (short war, power of the offensive) rather than realistic chances of success. Finally, Williamson rejects the apologia that Vienna pursued no war aims. Russian Poland and the Ukraine emerged in short order on such a wish-list. And in every post-war scenario concocted at Vienna, Austria-Hungary emerged as the dominant power in the Balkans,

"supplanting Russia and excluding Germany."

In conclusion, Williamson has provided a superb corrective to the Germanocentric view of the origins of the First World War. In crisp, well-chiseled sentences the author has laid out the motivations that prompted Vienna to choose war in 1914 as well as both their short-term and long-term results. A more balanced interpretation of the July Crisis of 1914 should emerge as a result of his labors.

HOLGER H. HERWIG
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Sumida, Jon Tetsuro. *In Defence of Naval Supremacy: Finance, Technology and British Naval Policy 1889-1914*. Scranton, Pa.: Harper Collins, 1989. 377pp. $70

Sumida has offered a study that will profoundly influence our understanding of the Royal Navy before World War I and, in the widest sense, how we view the relationships between technology, finance, and government policy.

The author traces the growth of British naval spending while Britain faced emerging threats from continental Europe during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. He connects the pressing requirement to achieve economies in the defence votes with the appointment of the reformist John Fisher as First Sea Lord in 1904. The key to Fisher's confidence that he could improve Britain's imperial security while effecting reductions in naval spending was his belief in the potential of radical technical innovation, particularly the all-big-gun ship, the first of which was the *Dreadnought* of 1906.

Sumida explains Fisher's attempts to embody his ideal fighting ship in a vessel with the endurance and speed necessary to find its opponents and force them into action at a range of its own choosing—at which its superior gunnery ensured that there could be no effective reply. Critical to Fisher's plans for such a "super ship" was his assumption (he did not fully comprehend the complex issues involved) that Britain was on the verge of producing a fire control system that could operate effectively in the worst conditions of sea and visibility when both target and firing platform were manoeuvring, achieving hits at ranges at which Britain's opponents could not. The ideal fighting ship, in Fisher's words, was "never meant to get in [the] enemy's range!" and thus did not require heavy armour.

The failure of the fire control project defeated the concept. Without such predictive systems, it was too easy (as the Germans were to demonstrate) to produce a ship of equal gunpower and speed with superior protection. Because the story of gunnery fire control has never before been comprehensively explained, a popular belief has developed that the *Dreadnought* represented the real "revolution" in capital ship design, and that the faster but ill-protected battle cruisers represented an evolutionary cul-de-sac because of their vulnerability to vessels with better

protection and comparable speed. The true story is much more complex.

Sumida's careful analysis shows how the journalist and inventor Arthur Hungerford Pollen came to define the gunnery problem and set about solving it before anyone else. Pollen's complex travails are discussed with great skill and at necessary length. The Admiralty's misjudgments resulted in the rejection of Pollen's equipment in favor of an inferior, partly plagarised version that was incapable of providing a fire control solution for a manoeuvring ship and thus proved ineffective under the conditions of the coming war. While Pollen made errors in his relationships with the Royal Navy, it is clear that neither its personnel nor administrative structures were capable of dealing with the complex technology of gunnery fire control. Although Sumida is restrained in his conclusions, the incapacity of the understaffed Admiralty to manage a navy of the size of 1910 is manifest. This proved to have dire consequences during the First World War. Similarly, the technical comprehension of most "expert" officers left much to be desired, not from a lack of formal technical training but through a general absence of intellectual curiosity, due to some extent to sheer overwork both in the Admiralty and at sea.

Sumida's work not only illuminates an important aspect of naval history but suggests directions for further research. His own interests are demonstrated in his plans for a sequel to cover the years to 1939 as well as in a recent paper, "British Naval Administration in the Age of Fisher," which reveals more about the Admiralty's fundamental difficulties in this era.

In addition, we need to know more about Fisher's thinking. The creative, and derivative, ferment which was his mind can be likened to an intellectual catherine wheel. He has been compared to Hyman Rickover; but while his ability to grasp great concepts was equally reamarkable, he possessed little of the latter's comprehension of the associated risks and technical difficulties encountered in placing *any* new system into service. Sumida has been careful not to overstress the connection between predictive fire control and Fisher's "all-big-gun" theories, but the evolution of the Admiral's thinking on the subject *without benefit of hindsight* deserves more attention. This process has been started by Charles Fairbanks in his essay, "The Origins of the *Dreadnought* Revolution: A Historical Essay."

Jon Sumida's effort to improve our understanding of the Royal Navy before the First World War can best be summed up by St. Matthew: "The stone which the builders rejected, the same is become the head of the corner."

JAMES GOLDRICK
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Naval War College

Schom, Alan. *Trafalgar: Countdown to Battle, 1803-1805.* New York: Atheneum, 1990. 431pp. $27.50

This book starts off with a dubious proposition—namely, that "most

British naval historians" have "ignored or misinterpreted" the series of events that began with the renewed hostilities between Britain and France in 1803 and ended with the famous battle of Trafalgar two and a half years later. In particular, Alan Schom asserts that the role played by the British fleet commanded by Admiral Sir William Cornwallis in blockading the main French naval arsenal at Brest and thereby preventing Napoleon's invasion of England has not been understood. Very few naval operations throughout history have been as exhaustively studied by so many famous historians as the campaign that led to the action off Cape Trafalger on 21 October 1805. It would indeed be surprising, then, if so many talented historians and strategic analysts had missed such a critical aspect of the Trafalgar campaign—and, of course, they have not. To be sure, Cornwallis's name is put in the shadow by Nelson's glory in popular accounts of the actual battle of Trafalgar, but it is simply untrue to say that serious naval historians have not understood the critical role played by Britain's naval forces in the Channel in fending off Napoleon's attempted invasion. One need only recall the famous passage by Alfred Thayer Mahan about those "storm-beaten ships" to realize that naval historians have long understood the strategic importance of the blockade of Brest. In addition to this unwarranted attempt to denigrate the work of other historians, Schom's writing style at times leaves much to be desired: his sentence structure is frequently confusing, and this clumsy writing makes his account difficult to read. *Trafalgar: Countdown to Battle* is also marred by some irritating errors; for example, you would think that Schom, who is so determined to set the record straight and give Cornwallis his due, would get his nickname right and call him "Billy Blue" and not "Blue Billy."

But this book is not without merits. Its principal value is that Schom effectively exploits the studies done by Edouard Desbrière about French invasion plans of England, and he has used French archives for further information about Napoleon's strategic schemes and preparations. Schom is at his best in providing character sketches of France's leaders and in examining Napoleon's difficult relationship with his admirals. In addition to that of Admiral Villeneuve, the unfortunate commander of the Franco-Spanish fleet at Trafalgar, Schom quite rightly highlights the important role played by the hard-driving Admiral Denis Decres, the French navy minister, in attempting to carry out Napoleon's plans to defeat Britain. In his typical fashion, Napoleon aimed at delivering a knockout blow against the British, which meant landing a large army in England. Napoleon consistently underestimated the difficulties of transporting an army across the Channel. When his unrealistic plan failed, Napoleon blamed Villeneuve, Decres, his Spanish allies—in short, everyone but himself for the failure of the invasion plan to come off as planned. Although Schom

has not delivered on his promise to offer a corrective to our understanding of British naval strategy in the period 1803-1805, he has provided a good account of French plans, preparation, and operations. Despite this book's flaws, it also places the fleet movements that ultimately led to the battle of Trafalgar within a larger strategic context.

JOHN MAURER
Naval War College

Howarth, Stephen. *To Shining Sea: A History of the United States Navy, 1775-1991.* New York: Random House, 1991. 563pp. $25

Stephen Howarth has provided an entertaining and readable work that is helpful in combining personal experiences and knowledge with the history of the navy as a whole. Written by a Briton, it is a history with a different view of our institution's historical wake. Reading it, one is reminded that many current problems have been around for many years. For example North African pirates and postwar budget cuts are nothing new, but it is instructive and sometimes entertaining to learn how these problems were handled in the past. Howarth has offered a single neatly focused and explicit volume of 214 turbulent years of history.

From the other side of the Atlantic the author writes lovingly of "our" navy and its heroes, with a palpable reluctance to step on America's toes. Unlike the navy's benefactors and heroes, those few characters who attract his scorn do not have ships named after them—with one notable exception, Albert Gallatin, Jefferson's secretary of the treasury. Gallatin was notorious for cutting the navy budget, so it is appropriate that the ship which bears his name is a coast guard cutter.

Howarth can be forgiven for comparing American naval history to the British experience at sea and for quoting his own admirals. However, he is on target in employing a famous Nelsonian remark in defense of Admiral Halsey at the Battle of Leyte Gulf: "No captain can do very wrong if he places his ship alongside that of an enemy." He explains the controversy over Halsey's action, but he does not maintain the same balance in having apparently interviewed only Admiral Elmo Zumwalt to describe that officer's polemical years as Chief of Naval Operations in the early seventies.

To Shining Sea has changed my perspective of the U.S. Navy's history and of my own thirty-year participation in it. For example, I never knew before reading this book that the six Russian submarines discovered in the vicinity of Cuba in October 1962 actually surfaced at American request in obedience to orders from Moscow. This reviewer was witness to a Foxtrot surfacing off the north coast of Cuba: I had thought we had hounded them to exhaustion.

Another personal story: Howarth describes how after the battle off Santiago in the Spanish-American War of 1898 the Spanish admiral was fished out of the water hatless and shoeless. When he arrived on the quarterdeck

of the American ship that rescued him, he was cheered for a full minute by the American sailors. In 1988 I spent seven weeks at sea aboard the Spanish aircraft carrier *Principe de Asturias*. The executive officer, Commander Jaime Cervera, jokingly remarked, "My great grandfather Pascual was a 'guest' of the U.S. Navy in Annapolis for two years after 1898." Pascual Cervera was the same waterlogged Spanish admiral who had stood on deck of the USS *Iowa* to the cheers of the American sailors and who had indeed been imprisoned in Annapolis. It would have eased my mind that day if I had known that we had treated him so well the day of his capture.

There are one or two discrepancies I would like to mention. First, the leader of the USS *Enterprise* dive-bomber attack on the three Japanese carriers at Midway was better known as "Wade" McClusky than as Clarence. Second, there were three carrier groups, not two, in the Aleutian exercises of 1982: those of the *Midway*, *Coral Sea*, and *Enterprise*.

The author brings to mind things I had learned long ago and had forgotten, but I also found information I had never known—the most important being that while we professionals understand the need for a U.S. Navy, the public must be repeatedly educated to gain this appreciation. (After every war the United States reduces the fleet and sends the sailors home.)

It will not have been a waste of time and effort for any officer who reads this book.

S.L. TURNER
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Barnet, Richard J. *The Rockets' Red Glare: When America Goes to War.* New York: Simon & Schuster, 1990. 442pp. (No price given).

Richard Barnet has described his study as the story of "the role the American people have played in the critical decisions of war and peace." The text is divided into four eras, based upon the primary national interest of the time: the Federalist period (steering clear of the Napoleonic wars); the nineteenth century (westward expansion); the Colonial period (expansion of empire at the turn of the twentieth century); and World War I to the present (saving Europe from dictatorial rule while picking up the mantle of world leadership). The book is therefore an examination of the relationship between presidential conduct in foreign policy and the will of the people.

Rulers of the past had usually managed to ignore the will of the people. Foreign policy was the business of kings. However, as a result of foreign policy's crucial impact on the American Revolution, a strong interest in it developed throughout the United States. Therefore, from the beginning each president has been forced to consider the impact of public opinion regarding foreign policy decisions. It was quickly learned that

a democratic government made it difficult to conduct a rational foreign policy, especially when public emotion ran counter to national interests.

Barnet points out that during the first years of the republic, existence and trade were so intricately tied to events in Europe that there was little difference between our foreign and domestic policy. His description of late eighteenth-century America is reminiscent of what we face today, with our economic and military interests comingled with the rest of the world. In fact, several analogies can be made: presidential use of force without declaring war; manipulation of the press to sell foreign policy; media portraying themselves as fact-finders while selling their version of the truth; hobo armies taking over the streets; and the presidents' sometimes successful attempts to read the will of the people. After the Vietnam War, the national security community relearned the importance of public opinion and the necessity of the people's backing in any military operation. Secretary of defense Caspar Weinberger epitomized this when he declared, "the armed forces will not fight wars that the American people will not support."

Unfortunately, when the author discusses the 1970s his objectivity slips. His last two chapters contain personal opinions and errors that weaken his otherwise excellent analysis. Barnet's concluding chapter introduces topics not formerly discussed, such as the "growing awareness of the suicidal consequences of even so-called conventional wars," and the "potentially catastrophic consequences of man-made ecological degradation." Important as these issues are, they are forced into his conclusion.

Up to the Kennedy years, however, this is a compelling work. Mr. Barnet has done an excellent job of combining different events and personalities into a coherent thesis. *The Rockets' Red Glare* will show the military professional how and why the principle of the will of the people originated, and that it continues to be important in any national strategy.

JOHN W. EADS
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University of Mississippi

Pearson, Mark. *Paper Tiger: New Zealand's Part in SEATO 1954-1977.* Wellington, New Zealand: New Zealand Institute of International Affairs with the Ministry of External Relations and Trade, 1989. 135pp. (No price given)

For almost twenty years, the South East Asian Treaty Organization (Seato) played a prominent role in the Western alliance's approach to Southeast Asian security problems during an era in which that region was fraught with instability and conflict. Yet, what is surprising is that the contemporary academic literature on this now moribund alliance is limited indeed. With the exception of the excellent book by Leszek Buszynski, *SEATO: The Failure of an Alliance Strategy* (1983), there are few historical

narratives and analyses of Seato. Moreover, despite Buszynski's solid scholarship, he labored under the constraints of not having access to government primary sources.

Mark Pearson, an officer with the New Zealand Ministry of External Relations and Trade, has provided a welcome contribution to our understanding of Seato. *Paper Tiger* provides an excellent analysis of the forces behind the creation (and the subsequent evolution) of this alliance, albeit largely from the limited perspective of New Zealand. Moreover, his work has the singular advantage of being based on the records of the New Zealand Ministry of External Affairs, although it does not include the files from the Ministry of Defence. Despite this limitation, Pearson has succeeded in writing a clear and in-depth assessment of the alliance's history. Also original is his treatment of the evolution of problems associated with the numerous alliance defense plans. Thus, the work's value should extend beyond those who are interested principally in New Zealand's diplomatic history, to include students of Southeast Asian affairs.

THOMAS-DURELL YOUNG
U.S. Army War College

Hicks, George, ed. *The Broken Mirror: China After Tiananmen*. New York: Longman, 1990. 526pp. (No price given).

The Tiananmen crisis—the sudden emergence of the Chinese pro-democracy movement, its bloody suppression in Beijing, and the political repression and leadership changes immediately following the massacre—was a milestone in the turbulent history of the People's Republic of China (PRC). The events of April-June 1989 and their domestic and international repercussions have become the subject of analysis by journalists and academics. This is one of the first scholarly works to address the significance of this crisis.

Edited by George Hicks, a Hong Kong-based economist, *The Broken Mirror* contains twenty-seven essays, many of which were written by distinguished scholars. It contains five parts: an examination of the participants in the Tiananmen crisis (students, intellectuals, the leadership, and the military); the historical and cultural background of communism, political culture, the socialist economy, authoritarianism, and ideology; the reaction of the international community, with a focus on the West, Hong Kong, and Taiwan; the changes in domestic and foreign policy subsequent to Tiananmen (with an emphasis on the suppression of human rights and the diplomatic moves to counter Beijing's international isolation following the massacre); and the exploration of the long-term implications of the Tiananmen crisis for the future of communist rule in China. Two useful appendices are included and a chronology of major documents and statements relating to the crisis, as well as a "who was who" during Beijing Spring.

Two separate themes run through this work: a skeptical assessment of the accomplishments of the decade of reform preceding June 1989, and a pessimistic appraisal of what the future may hold for the PRC. It aims to redress the more optimistic view of the prospects for China's reform program that were prevalent prior to Tiananmen, as well as to contribute to our understanding of this crucial event in the PRC's history. It succeeds in both.

Another strong point of this work is the attempt by some of its authors to relate the Tiananmen crisis and the communist system in China to the collapse and crisis of communism in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Although the PRC's foreign policy, and in particular Sino-Soviet relations and Beijing's role in the "strategic triangle," have received much attention, comparative examination of Marxist-Leninist systems in China and in the former Eastern Bloc has been a weak point in the China studies field. This volume, however, presents both analyses of PRC's foreign policy and also the comparative approach.

The Broken Mirror is long, but its essays are well-written and relatively short. Though published in 1990 it should provide a useful background to those in the national security community who seek a broad understanding of the Tiananmen crisis. The essays relating to political affairs, the military, foreign policy, and the future of China can be read fruitfully by those with little time to spare.

ROXANE D.V. SISMANIDIS
Washington, D.C.

Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis. *After Tiananmen Square: Challenges for the Chinese-American Relationship*. Cambridge: Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, 1990. 124pp. $9.95

Historically, Chinese-American relations have been characterized by misperception and illusion. A great cultural gap, some may even say an unbridgeable gap, separates America and China. No matter the time period or the regime in either land, the relationship has been plagued by the same obstacles and pitfalls. Many American illusions about China have prevented U.S. policy makers from correctly identifying the true character of the Chinese condition. In turn, Chinese ethnocentrism has produced a similar situation leading to mutual misunderstandings.

This work was designed to assess the implications of the Tiananmen Square massacre on Sino-American relations in the 1990s. It not only provides a succinct analysis of China's post-Tiananmen domestic and foreign policies but also recommends a reasonable set of U.S. policy options for Sino-American relations. The work contains six chapters written by specialists on China, including two Chinese scholars. Not only are American and Chinese viewpoints offered but also discussions of

the impact of China's relations with the Third World and with the nations of the western Pacific.

Jurgen Domes, a sinologist at the Saar University, examines China's internal dynamics and predicts a collapse of the communist system in that country. The time of the demise of the current system will depend upon the outcome of the forthcoming struggle for succession.

A chapter entitled "The Sino-American Relationship: A Chinese Perspective," by Ding Xinghao, begins with the premise that good relations between the United States and China are of vital importance to peace and stability in East Asia and the Pacific. True to the current party line, Ding places the burden of maintaining this relationship on the United States and warns that using trade and high technology as a lever to pressure China for political purposes would be counterproductive and may force China to close its door again.

In a concluding chapter, Robert Pfaltzgraff notes that Tiananmen brought to the fore the long-standing dilemma that has beset Sino-American relations. Americans believe that the central problem of the relationship is the balancing of U.S. strategic interests with concern for human rights. With the decline of the Soviet threat, the strategic imperative has lost much (but not all) of its impact. The United States must continue to recognize that China remains an indispensable component of any emerging Asian-Pacific political-military balance.

This work is thought-provoking and informative and should prove useful to those interested in world affairs and the Sino-American relationship.

MICHAEL T. BYRNES
Colonel, U.S. Army
Beijing, China

Fotion, Nicholas G. *Military Ethics: Looking toward the Future.* Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1990. 122pp. $18.95

This is an important but difficult work. It is important because it provides a solid, logically argued refutation of the pacifistic belief that all things military are immoral. It is diffficult because of its dense prose, a veritable Socratic argument of endless "either-or" questions. The result is a volume that clearly defines the moral logic of conventional military capability, deterrence, nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, and strategic defenses. Though relatively short in length, it is not an easy read.

Nicholas Fotion is a professor of philosophy and an expert in the study of ethical behavior. He begins with the subtle premise that many (if not most) of America's intellectual elite have developed an aversion to the serious study of military matters and are therefore easily swayed by what he calls "the big argument" of new-wave pacifism: that modern weapons and military technology have made war more destructive, more costly, and therefore more immoral than ever before. The implication of the argument is that modern nations can no

longer "afford" to fight wars. The hopeful side of this view is that there may be fewer wars; the cynical side is that "civilized" nations may have to acquiesce to the demands of have-not states or dictatorial regimes that threaten violence and destruction. As Fotion points out, this is not an argument directed at traditional pacifists—those individuals who declare their willingness to die rather than cause their enemies harm by defending themselves—but to citizens who are skeptical of the intentions of the world's remaining dictatorial states yet sympathetic to the idea that all "military expenditures can be viewed as a waste, a taking away of money that could be spent on more humanitarian concerns." The impact is on public support for the "opportunity costs of possessing standing military and industrial forces." Fotion demolishes the big argument in a point-by-point refutation that illuminates how modern weapons—smarter, smaller in yield, and more discriminating—can actually make just wars less destructive, and thus, from the logical point of view, more "moral" than past conflicts. The book was published just weeks before Desert Storm verified in practice what Fotion identifies in theory. Since military strategists have long maintained that the use of smart weapons would reduce civilian casualties, Fotion's discussion cannot be claimed as prophetic. However, his use of logical reasoning to demonstrate the ethics of American adoption of emerging military technology enhances the intellectual credibility of modern strategy among those who seem so patently hostile to it, namely, academicians.

One area in which Fotion might claim some degree of prophecy is in his discussion of chemical weapons. He argues that deterrence via chemical weapons might even be more effective than that between nuclear arsenals, since chemical weapon agents are exclusively anti-personnel and cannot be used as counterforce weapons. Since chemical weapon agents cannot destroy an opponent's chemical weapon arsenal per se, these weapons are not in the "use it or lose it" situation which is frequently used to describe strategic nuclear arms. Fotion states that history and logic indicate that the likelihood that chemical weapons would be used in battle against an opponent that also possesses them is very low. His implication is that if a Hitler refused to use chemical weapons, a Saddam Hussein would probably not—for all the same reasons. On the other hand, use of chemical weapons against an opponent unable to respond in kind, whether Ethiopians in the Italian-Abyssinian War or Kurds in Iraq, is likely. As Fotion describes it, antimilitary ideology does not apply in this case: "the cliche, 'if you have a weapon, you will use it' seems far from the truth....Historical records on poison-gas use suggest a different cliche: 'if you don't have it, watch out!' "

For the naval audience, *Military Ethics* may seem like preaching to the choir. However, it is important for officers to be aware of and understand

the arguments that propel those individuals who have the greatest intellectual impact on public (defense) policy. Fotion carefully outlines both the pros and cons concerning future military investment and the maintenance of modernized, capable defenses. He is quite familiar with the specifics of modern weapon systems, although there are a few minor slips. At one point the author compares the Soviet SS-18 strategic missile to the American Titan system; in fact, the Titan is more similar to the SS-9. This does not in the least mar his exposition of the current debates. More importantly perhaps, the professional officer who seeks to examine intellectually what he or she knows "in the gut" to be true will find this work an excellent introduction to the morality of strategic logic. Not a code of ethics, this book is rather an invitation to ethical reasoning on the future of the common defense.

SAM J. TANGREDI
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Hoover Institution

MacKenzie, Donald. *Inventing Accuracy: A Historical Sociology of Nuclear Missile Guidance*. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1990. 464pp. (No price given)

Weapon system development is the result of a fascinating, complex, and varied dance of threat-driven requirements, strategic concepts, technological capabilities, cost, politics and institutional interests, personalities, formal research and development, and acquisition processes. Too often, descriptions of how weapon capabilities develop are overly simplified and do not capture the essential driving factors. Thus, it is easy to misunderstand the development process and to explain why mismatches between America's strategies and the technical capabilities of her forces may arise.

Donald MacKenzie has undertaken the study of the development of the accuracy of nuclear-armed ballistic missiles. His focus is upon the social processes involved in the evolution of the V-2s of World War II into today's MX missiles and Trident IIs. MacKenzie included in his research written documents and 140 interviews with guidance and navigation technologists, navy and air force officers, and defense officials, including secretaries of defense and heads of defense research and development. It is an intricate work, full of captivating detail.

MacKenzie accepts the complexity of his subject and does not abuse it with simplistic "insights" that fail to consider all relevant material. In his conclusion he addresses five subjects: technology, politics, the paradoxical ordinariness of the technical and political worlds of nuclear weaponry, the relationship between technology and politics, and facts. (Technical facts are "hard," in contrast to the "soft" political facts.)

Many opponents of the nuclear arms race and the weapons it produces would describe its development as the wild frenzy of a military-industrial dervish. This work does not support the idea of an uncontrollable technological juggernaut pushing the

political system into endless expenditures. Reality is more complex than that.

MacKenzie has offered a satisfying work. Though its sources were from unclassified sources, no part of the subject was slighted. Those interested in the history of modern weapons will put this book on their "must read" list. It has no set answers, but rather it provides much information that will help the reader to have greater insight into a complex subject.

DALE K. PACE
The Johns Hopkins University
Applied Physics Laboratory

Lynn-Jones, Sean M., Miller, Steven E., and van Evera, Stephen, eds. *Nuclear Diplomacy and Crisis Management: An International Reader.* Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1990. 347pp. $14.95

This anthology presents reprints of articles that have appeared in the journal *International Security*. The eleven papers are grouped into two sections. The first section discusses "The Political Impact of Nuclear Weapons," and the second discusses "Nuclear Weapons and Crisis Management."

Sean Lynn-Jones reminds us in his preface that since Hiroshima, statesmen have conducted diplomacy in the shadow of the Bomb. The fundamental questions facing strategic thinkers as they attempt to define and analyze the political implications of the nuclear revolution are: Have nuclear weapons fundamentally changed international politics? Has a major war been averted because of, or in spite of, the growth of nuclear arsenals? What are the political uses of nuclear weapons? How have the United States' leaders perceived the nuclear balance? Have they acted as if nuclear superiority can be exploited for bargaining leverage? Have nuclear threats been effective in crises?

The papers cover crises that have occured since the end of World War II. For example, those who served in the Korean War may find Gordon Chang's article, "To the Nuclear Brink: Eisenhower, Dulles, and the Quemoy-Matsu Crisis," of interest. Was Eisenhower bluffing or not?

Professor Marc Trachtenberg provides an introduction to a selection of tapes from the "Excom" meetings of October 1962 at the beginning of the Cuban missile crisis, and discusses the decision processes used by John Kennedy and others in resolving the military crisis abroad and the political crisis at home. Interesting reading to say the least!

If one wishes to know if there is a "bottom line," I suggest the final article, "The Political Utility of Nuclear Weapons: The 1973 Middle East Crisis," written by Barry M. Blechman and Douglas M. Hart. The authors note in what circumstances a state may resort to nuclear threats during tense international situations. This article alone may well provide the motivation for the defense professional to become familiar with this text. The authors state that "it makes sense to analyze past nuclear incidents...to

understand the thinking of those who turn to nuclear threats, the psychological and political mechanisms that are set in motion when such threats are made, and the consequences of these actions both for the specific situation of concern and for broader consideration."

ALBERT M. BOTTOMS
Charlottesville, Virginia

Marshall, Andrew W., Martin, J.J., and Rowen, Henry S., eds. *On Not Confusing Ourselves: Essays on National Security Strategy in Honor of Albert and Roberta Wohlstetter.* Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1991. 331pp. $49.95

Albert and Roberta Wohlstetter are truly the first couple of national security studies. Albert Wohlstetter has towered above all other defense strategists and analysts for over a generation, bombarding the community with his far-seeing ideas and often acid prose. Roberta Wohlstetter established her reputation with a seminal 1962 study on the nature of indicators and warning as they applied to the attack on Pearl Harbor. She has continued ever since, often in tandem with her husband, to illuminate the discipline and influence policymakers with her observations on ambiguous warning and nuclear proliferation.

This work is a paean to this remarkable husband-and-wife team by a group of seventeen elite former colleagues or students, many of whom have themselves been at the center of key national security policy debates for the past four decades, and some of whom framed the policies that were the subject of those debates.

The Wohlstetter *festschrift*, like most volumes of its kind, has a certain uneven quality about it. Some chapters were written expressly for the book, while others are adaptations of speeches or other essays. Some contributions are specifically built around the experiences, concerns, and writings of the Wohlstetters, while others address topics that seem less central to the interests of the honorees. Yet all have an element in common in that they not only shed light on the unique personalities of the Wohlstetters, particularly Albert, but offer an introspective portrait of individuals Herbert Goldhamer termed "Advisers" and Fred Kaplan, from a far less flattering perspective, labeled "The Wizards of Armegeddon."

Beginning in the early years of the Cold War, Albert Wohlstetter and his circle set the agenda for national security policy and helped to implement it. With each decade came fresh ideas: work on strategic bomber basing in the fifties; the importance of rational thinking about arms control in the seventies; the nature of discriminate deterrence in the eighties; and the multipolarity of threats to United States interests in the nineties. Along the way they established net assessment as a key national security discipline. They provided the intellectual underpinnings for strategic defenses; emphasized the importance of "regional" conflicts outside Nato and of critical allies on Nato's flanks,

notably Turkey; and underscored the need to harness technology to policy through effective and enduring command and control capabilities.

Therefore, the reader will find in this work a wealth of sociological, historical, and analytical detail. Of special note are, the title essay by J.J. Martin and James Digby; Leon Sloss's valuable chapter on "The Ambiguous Role of Strategic Defense in U.S. Strategy"; William Odom's brief yet encyclopedic review of Soviet military development and doctrine; and the excellent exposition on net assessment by three of its practitioners, George Pickett, James Roche, and Barry Watts. Finally, as Robert Bartley aptly notes in his preface, Fred Ikle's elegant essay on "The Role of Character and Intellect in Strategy," which closes the volume, "sketches a silhouette with recognizable features"—of a voluble fountain of analytical brilliance and intellectual breadth, and of the more reserved but no less worldly and astute analyst who has been his lifelong companion.

DOV S. ZAKHEIM
Arlington, Virginia

Bellamy, Christopher. *The Evolution of Modern Land Warfare: Theory and Practice.* New York: Rutledge, 1990. 327pp. $45

The value of military history has long been a subject of debate in the operations departments of the several war colleges and in the military operations research community. To the outsider or the amateur, this enduring debate seems quite incredible. After all, the works of Alfred Mahan and Julian Corbett are firmly embedded in military history, deriving their lasting value from the illumination which history provides to current issues. To the practitioners of the military arts and science, history is an elusive, seductive, sometimes treacherous muse—often as distorting as illuminating. The modern military planner rapidly discovers that operational planning is a fine art form closely akin to the creative practice of architecture and engineering, while military history seems almost irrelevant. To the military acquisition planner, advanced, rapidly deployed technology appears to distort beyond recognition the patterns of the historical experience. Only upon extended contemplation does the experienced operator or planner come to realize that fine art, architecture, and engineering each have their technical and social histories which provide context and a measure of expectation for current and, indeed, future endeavors. Perhaps military history can serve equally well. Enter Christopher Bellamy, bearing his new book *The Evolution of Modern Land Warfare.*

The author largely succeeds in providing a summary of the way modern land warfare, military thinking, and concepts have evolved, and simultaneously makes the case for the utility of competently researched military history. Let the reader be warned, Bellamy is both a professional

research historian and a professional soldier. In his view, useful illumination can be drawn from the full range of the human military experience: Asian military history is just as legitimate as European military history. The study of military operations is, he believes, a neglected historical field, and historical context is a powerful tool in current decision making.

The resulting work is a beautifully researched, nicely written, and well edited book, well worth a leisurely week's reading and contemplation. The air-land community will find this book useful and enlightening. The maritime community is unlikely to find a more accessible and well conceived introduction to modern land warfare. Now that we have fondled the package, let us examine the contents.

The first four chapters are a guided tour through the ground rules of land warfare: the connection between technology and techniques and warfare, and the expansion of the battlefield and the restoration of large-scale maneuver resulting from the industrialization of warfare. There is little that is new or controversial in this section. One may say that it serves its purpose of preparing the reader for what comes later. There is one nuance in this section which this reviewer would have liked expanded (with all due respect to the dangers of Pandora's box). It is Mr. Bellamy's opinion that most of the cliché's about the Great War are "gross over-simplications or completely wrong." This reviewer believes that his view is correct; its importance is simply not developed.

Most of these "cliché's" arose in the popular history of Liddell Hart and J.F.C. Fuller between 1916 and 1956. These two writers dramatically influenced two generations of historians and soldiers. It can reasonably be said that modern American Civil War history is little more than an expansion of Fuller's and Liddell Hart's footnotes. If one really believes in the central utility of military history, a few cautionary paragraphs on the dangers of erudite former soldiers with broadaxes to grind might have been in order.

Bellamy "gets serious" in chapter five and treats his readers to a case study of military history applied to the Operational Maneuver Group concept, which dominated Nato's Central Front nightmare in the early 1980s. The author traces this concept through sixty years of Soviet military thought, shows both its virtues and limitations, and has convinced this reader that a knowledge of serious military history can provide near-immunity from the alarms and excursions of popular fads in the military science arena. This chapter is a useful review of concentrated mobile warfare.

A second serious dose is offered in chapter six, with an introduction to the scale and mobility associated with Asian mobile warfare and guerrilla warfare. Here we find a rich understanding of two manifestations of dispersed mobile combat, both highly multi-disciplinary in nature. In Asia,

as elsewhere, politics, economics, military science, and human nature produce an exquisitely braided rope of complexity. The Asian and European variants are quite different and arise from geography, population densities, distances, and culture.

In the final chapter the author offers his conclusions and prognoses. They are simple and insightful.

This reviewer has no hesitation in recommending this book to any serious student of military affairs.

JAMES O'BRASKY
Naval Surface Warfare Center
Dahlgren, Virginia

Shenk, Robert. *Guide to Naval Writing: A Practical Handbook for the Naval Professional.* Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1990. 349pp. $22.95

"What are you trying to say? Rewrite this!" Every officer who has ever stood in front of an executive officer has heard those fateful words. Many sea-service professionals would rather stand consecutive midwatches or take "zero-zero traps" than take pen in hand or sit at a keyboard. Although driving the ship, flying the plane, or diving the boat require carefully developed skill, expressing oneself clearly in writing is perhaps the most difficult task faced regularly by officers and senior enlisted people.

Over the years the art of writing in the navy has been akin to a secret handshake. Those who have never been able to crack the code should take heart, for help is finally at hand. Robert Shenk, a naval officer and professor of English at two service academies, has written a book that bridges the gap between fitness report word-lists and professional style manuals.

This handbook is specifically aimed at the unique requirements of the seagoing officer. Based on interviews with hundreds of naval professionals, it is a jewel. It is filled with common sense and practical advice, and covers all aspects of every writing assignment regularly required of navy and marine corps personnel. Although for decades guides for writing fitness reports have been passed around the fleet, common documents such as naval letters and messages have been given short shrift. Not so in this work. Each of these, along with other reports and forms, is carefully and thoroughly analyzed in separate chapters. In addition to format guides and completed examples (both good and bad) that tell how a phrase should be constructed, the *Guide* explains why it should be written that way.

This is a reference book that not only shows how to draft an effective press release but also how to eliminate emotion in writing and how to use sex-neutral language. It includes a very useful ready reference on the mechanics of writing (capitalization and punctuation), and contains an extensive list of abbreviations and acronyms used in naval messages.

From this description, one could reasonably surmise that this handbook is the usual dry, boring reading normally associated with textbooks. On

the contrary, it has the immediacy of a bull session with a good friend in the wardroom. Sidebars and anecdotes interspersed throughout the book give a unique flavor to this comprehensive, highly readable guide to one of the most important aspects of the naval profession. This book should be in every wardroom and ready room in the fleet. Every reporting officer should receive a copy. It is indispensable.

WILLIAM F. HICKMAN
Captain, U.S. Navy

Peters, Hubert J.M.W., comp. *The Crone Library: Books on the Art of Navigation*. Nieuwkoop, Netherlands: De Graaf Publishers BV, 1989. 805pp. $96

This descriptive bibliography was published for the Netherlands Scheepvaart Museum in Amsterdam and is a major contribution to maritime scholarship. It is not merely a listing of the museum's collections of navigation books but a collection of scholarly treatises, and is a tool of remarkable scholarly value.

There are five parts to the book. The first pays homage to the collector, Dr. Ernest Crone (1891-1975), the former chairman of the board of the Sheepvaart Museum, in a biographical sketch explaining his interest and experience in navigation and listing the 109 items that he published. This is followed by a "Survey of the History of the Art of Navigation in the Netherlands," by Professor C. Koeman. It is a useful sixteen-page overview of the subject, which places Dutch contributions to navigation within the context of broader elements.

Koeman's essay is followed by W.F.J. Morzer Bruyns's descriptive list of the "Crone Collection of Nautical Instruments." These instruments were a direct complement to the books which Crone acquired, linking the bibliographic aspects of the study with the real practice of navigation in history. This description is divided into several categories: instruments for measuring the altitude of a celestial body above the horizon; time measurement; compasses; instruments for measuring the speed of a ship through the water; telescopes; and drawing and computing instruments.

These introductory parts lead to the main catalogue, which is a chronological listing of 1,223 items published between 1483 and 1971. The whole takes up 565 pages, with a complete technical description of each work. There is a thirty-one page explanation of the principles, and also instructions for using the list explaining the various entries, references, and abbreviations.

The main list is followed by seven indices, including one each for authors, printers, and book sellers, and place names and their imprint variants, with reference maps by period showing the place of publication with numbers of editions. The final fifty-pages cap the volume with a selection of illustrations, mainly title pages but also bindings and maps and illustrations within a book.

This is a magnificent piece of scholarship. It is a type of bibliography that is rarely seen and is done to an impeccable standard. *The Crone Library* is a volume which every major maritime library and serious student of the history of navigation should possess. It is not only a guide to the history of Dutch contributions to the art of navigation and to the fine collection in Amsterdam, but it also provides a standard and a reference for the entire history of maritime publishing in Europe.

JOHN B. HATTENDORF
Naval War College

CALL FOR PAPERS

WORLD WAR II—A 50-YEAR PERSPECTIVE

Siena College is sponsoring its eighth annual *multidisciplinary* conference, June 3-June 4, 1993, on the 50th anniversary of World War II. The focus for 1993 will be 1943—though papers dealing with broad issues of earlier years will be welcomed. Topics welcome include: Fascism and Naziism; Stalingrad, New Guinea, the Air War, North Africa, Sicily and Italy, the North Atlantic; Literature; Art; Film; Diplomacy; Political and Military History; Popular Culture, Minority Affairs, and Women's and Jewish Studies dealing with the era. Asian, African, Latin American, and Near Eastern topics of relevance are solicited. Obviously, collaboration and collaborationist regimes, the events on the home front, religion, conscription, and dissent will also be of significance.

Replies and inquiries to: Professor Thomas O. Kelly II, Department of History, Siena College, 515 Loudon Rd., Loudonville, New York, 12211-1462.

Deadline for submissions: December 1, 1992

Recent Books

Bush, George. *National Security Strategy of the United States: 1991-1992.* McLean, Va.: Brassey's (US), 1991. 135pp. $14

According to the publisher's note, this is "the President's articulation to the U.S. Congress of American strategic objectives." It is a public document, but a more attractive and readable printing job than the Government Printing Office would have done. Probably more expensive too.

Friedman, Norman. *The Naval Institute Guide to World Naval Weapons Systems 1991-1992.* Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1991. 928pp. $120

This is the second of a reference series which the Naval Institute intends to produce biennially, alternating with editions of A.D. Baker's well-known *Combat Fleets of the World.* It draws upon open literature, declassified government documents, and manufacturers' materials, and it is organized not by nations (as are *Combat Fleets* and *Jane's*), but by warfare discipline, such as: surveillance and control, strategic strike, strike and surface warfare, antiaircraft warfare, antisubmarine warfare, and mine warfare. This edition contains over 1,200 photographs and drawings and is much larger than the first. At the expense of some historical data, the new material includes expanded treatment of combat direction systems and more detail on systems than previously listed. The reference as a whole is current through February 1991 (updated to March in an Addendum); however, much of the introduction has inevitably been overtaken by events. Notwithstanding, in suggesting "some grave deficiency in the U.S. way of evaluating potential enemies," it raises a point which has only become more cogent since publication.

Goldstein, Donald M., Dillon, Katherine V., and Wenger, J. Michael. *The Way It Was: Pearl Harbor, the Original Photographs.* Washington, D.C.: Brassey's (US), 1991. 181pp. $29.95

Freeman, Thomas and Delgado, James P. *Pearl Harbor Recalled: New Images of the Day of Infamy.* Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1991. 164pp. $42.95

These books were published to capitalize on the great public interest in the 50th anniversary of the attack on Pearl Harbor. That anniversary is now long past, but the books are as interesting now as ever. Considering how often we have seen views of Pearl Harbor, the surprising thing in *The Way It Was* is the number of previously unknown photographs the compilers found, from both the Japanese and Americans. Those newly discovered views taken in the days and weeks just before the attack are particularly interesting. In *Pearl Harbor Recalled,* James P. Delgado's text is brief and very good, while Tom Freeman's paintings

are mixed in quality. Some of them suggest that Freeman tried to do too much in too short a period of time.

Inacker, Michael J. *Unter Ausschulss der Oeffentlichkeit? Die Deutschen in der Golfallianz*. Berlin: Bouvier Verlag, 1991. 185pp. (No price given)

While not widely acknowledged, the Federal Republic of Germany did play an important role in supporting the anti-Iraq coalition during Desert Storm. But exactly what did Bonn do? Heretofore, reports of this "silent" support have been confined to the occasional article in German newspapers and the weekly *Der Spiegel*. This lacuna in our understanding of Germany's role in the Gulf War has been rectified by Michael Inacker, currently the defense correspondent for *Welt am Sonntag* in Hamburg. In this short book he details both the substantial German contribution to the coalition and the German political situation that dictated this *sotto voce* policy. One can only hope that an English translation of this book will be forthcoming in the near future to enable a wider readership to appreciate the extent of German involvement in this conflict.

Unsworth, Michael E., ed. *Military Periodicals: United States and Selected International Journals and Newspapers*. New York: Greenwood, 1990. 404pp. $75

This reference work is a recent title in Greenwood Press's Historical Guides to the World's Periodicals and Newspapers series. It was produced by an editorial collective headed by Mr. Unsworth, History Bibliographer at the Michigan State University Libraries. It describes in detail, and gives publication histories for, over two hundred unclassified periodicals—journals, newspapers, newsletters, bulletins, etc.—"devoted to military and naval subjects." Its entries are mostly American publications, but a number of foreign periodicals are included, selected by criteria (variously) of value, accessibility in the United States, and uniqueness of coverage. The volume comprises three major parts, each arranged alphabetically. In Part I the most "prominent military journals" (including the *Naval War College Review*, see pp. 169-173) are treated at greatest length, with tabular data on indexing, databases, and other information. Part II describes other publications more briefly, and four multiple-edition periodicals (like *Stars and Stripes*) appear in Part III. Mr. Unsworth also provides, along with an index, a brief history and overview of the military publishing "industry," a two-column chronology placing military and military-publishing events side by side, and a list of the book's periodical titles by subject area.

Woodward, Bob. *The Commanders*. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1991. 399pp. $24.95 (No price given)

This account of the events and decisions that led to the U.S. initiatives in Panama and the Gulf, as the author acknowledges, falls somewhere between newspaper journalism and history. However, it is an extremely useful, if preliminary, report

of the role that national leadership played in dealing with these events. Here is an inside story of government in action: the conversations, arguments, meetings, phone calls, personal attitudes, and backgrounds and relationships of the major players. It is the where-and-how of the way a state practices Clausewitz's famous apothegm that war is "the continuation of state policy by different means."

Zimmerman, David. *The Great Naval Battle of Ottawa*. Canada: Univ. of Toronto Press, 1989. 209pp. $24.95

This book is loosely organized on a chronological and thematic basis, allowing Zimmerman to guide the reader step by step through Canada's many failures and few successes in antisubmarine technology during the "battle of Ottawa." While the book is illustrated, its few photographs are poorly located and are printed on the same paper stock as the text itself, which makes it hard to identify details such as radar antennae; not included are detailed drawings of the various radar systems discussed. The author has, however, thoughtfully provided a five-page list of all the abbreviations used in this work. Unfortunately, readers are forced either to accept the author's argument of the ineffectiveness of the Royal Canadian Navy in antisubmarine warfare, or to confirm it through their own research. Despite these few faults the book is well written, well researched, and persuasively argued. It will interest all those who are interested in the history of radar, the Royal Canadian Navy during World War II, the Battle of the Atlantic, and even students of Canadian history and politics. Zimmerman has rendered us a great service by detailing the extent of, and the reasons for, the Royal Canadian Navy's failure in antisubmarine warfare during the Second World War.

Ψ

Royce G. Shingleton
Rising Naval Historian

Russell W. Ramsey

LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT, in its naval mode, has become the forte of Royce G. Shingleton, a naval historian now teaching at Darton College in Albany, Georgia. In his writings, the enemy is usually the U.S. Army or Navy; his favorite subjects are junior officers and skippers of a maritime force which existed only four years, the Confederate Navy. Contemporary students of the art of war will be surprised to see riverine tactics, joint operations, logistics, civil-military relations, undercover operations, innovative gadgetry, and battlefield intelligence all systematically treated in Royce G. Shingleton's page-snapping accounts of the "Gray Ghost" navy.

Shingleton's mode is biographical. His 1971 doctoral thesis at Florida State University was on "Rural Life in the Old South," based upon memoirs of British travelers. Next, he started research on his biography of Richard Peters, an Atlanta Reconstruction-era politician. During his investigation Shingleton discovered that Peters, and many a wealthy Southerner, had invested profitably in blockade running during the Civil War. With that discovery, Shingleton's writing had found its genre.

Richard Peters: Champion of the New South (Mercer University Press) finally emerged in 1985, but by then several of Shingleton's naval history pieces were already in print. "Stages, Steamers, and Stations in the Antebellum South" presents the economic linkage between "cotton boxes" (crude rafts carrying fifty to a hundred bales), river steamers, and the early railroads of the Jacksonian era in the south.[1] "The Cruise of the CSS *Tallahassee*" told of a combat saga of southern river ports, the Gulf of Mexico, and the Caribbean.[2]

Shingleton survived kidding about resurrecting Rhett Butler from *Gone With the Wind* in his article on the *Atlanta*.[3] He was already well along by that time on his most ambitious work, the biography of Confederate Navy hero John Taylor Wood. This man was officially the naval staff aide to Confederate

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president Jefferson Davis; in reality, he waged a campaign of low intensity conflict against Union army and navy forces along the York and Rappahannock Rivers that tied up significant theater resources. Shingleton brought out first an article on Wood[4] and then in 1979 a book-length biography, *John Taylor Wood: Sea Ghost of the Confederacy* (University of Georgia Press). This volume was reprinted in 1982 as a National Historical Book Club Selection.

Shingleton next produced a series on a southern river town for the 1986 Albany (Georgia) *Herald* sesquicentennial issue. He demonstrated the determinative role of the Flint River in Albany's founding and revealed the town's significance as a food supply center for the Confederate Navy. He took readers slightly west to the Chickasawhatchie River to lay bare a much ballyhooed local militia victory over Indians that was actually an inexcusable massacre.

Shingleton has now returned to the work he does best, naval biography. His current project (well advanced at this writing) is a book-length biography of John Newland Maffitt, captain of the CSS *Florida* and several blockade runners. Maffitt, barred from serving his adopted country with the fall of the Confederacy, went on to command the British charter steamer *Widgeon*, employed by the Brazilian government to haul troops on the unforgiving Parana River during the War of the Triple Alliance, 1865-1870. Shingleton has agreed with the University of South Carolina Press to produce *The Life of Maffitt* for its Maritime History Series.

Meanwhile, Shingleton's articles keep appearing. "Raider's Stinging Blow" recounts John Taylor Wood's naval guerrilla warfare campaign of July and August 1863 in and around Chesapeake Bay.[5] The August 1990 issue of *Civil War* magazine published Shingleton's story of Wood's raid on Union-held New Bern, in eastern North Carolina. Shingleton is a native of that area, born and reared on a tributary of the Neuse River, which flows to the New Bern estuary—where Woods's daring raid constituted one of the most arduous cutting-out expeditions in naval history.

Civil War Times carried in December 1989 a photographic essay on Mike Usina, another of Shingleton's Confederate naval officer discoveries. The author has now completed a full length article on that blockade runner, titled "Mike Usina: Confederate Sea Fox." Shingleton also writes occasional book reviews. The magazine *Atlanta History: A Journal of Georgia and the South* included in summer 1989 his reviews of Stephen R. Wise's *Lifeline of the Confederacy: Blockade Running during the Civil War* and Maxine Turner's *Navy Gray: A Story of the Confederate Navy on the Chattahoochie and Apalachicola Rivers*. He has many other historical articles in print, on such topics as runaway slaves, Confederate army biographies, lesser-known battles of the Civil War, nineteenth century agriculture, and municipal government.

Royce G. Shingleton's hallmarks are precision, deceptively easy prose, flowing narrative, and—vital for the military reader—linkage between resources,

decisions, and events. He has won several awards for writing excellence, and is listed in *Who's Who in the South* and in *Contemporary Authors*.

The institution where he teaches, Darton College, took its name from a medieval Anglo-Saxon term meaning "town by the river" to symbolize Albany's proximity to the Flint River. This writer is reminded after reading Shingleton's work of a certain other writer, Thucydides, who attended Plato's Academy hard by the banks of the Ilissus in a long ago and far away place called Athens. The comparison is not strained.

Notes

1. "Stages, Steamers, and Stations in the Antebellum South," *Georgia Historical Quarterly*, Summer 1972.
2. "The Cruise of the CSS Tallahassee," *Civil War Times Illustrated*, May 1976.
3. "The *Atlanta*: A Civil War Blockade Runner," *Atlanta Historical Bulletin*, Fall 1976.
4. "Swashbuckler in Gray: The Confederate Service of John Taylor Wood," *United Daughters of the Confederacy Magazine*, October 1978.
5. "Raider's Stinging Blow," *Military History*, April 1990.

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